On Mon, Oct 10, 2016 at 10:55 PM, Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
wrote:
> open-source implementations
> Jump in! The worst that can happen is that you get the fun and
> education of implementing an interesting new proof-of-work algorithm.
> :-)
Zcash is Linux only. That's not good for diversity, adoption,
I'd agree that "forums" are a poor choice.
They're magnets for masses of the clueless,
which is fine for that purpose. And they're
heavyweight, captive, and exploitable.
Lists can be archived, replicated, distributed,
offlined, searched with any MUA, etc. +1.
(A bidirectional gateway to list, with
Let's do another 100 post round on the favorite subject shall we...
because serious RNG is serious.
Academics Make Theoretical Breakthrough in Random Number Generation
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11719543
https://threatpost.com/academics-make-theoretical-breakthrough-in-random-number-gene
On 3/18/16, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> It sounds like its turning into a circus sideshow:
>
> ... in addition to Courtroom 4, there will be additional overflow
> rooms in which the hearing will be shown on video screens. All of
> these rooms together can accommodate up to a total of 324 spectators.
>
On 2/21/16, Michael Best wrote:
> What, if anything, could the government do involving crypto that you
> wouldn't see as nefarious or two faced?
Um, as crypto can be done anywhere by any individuals / consensus / delegee.
Question is really, is any govt (any specific extant one, or in theory),
va
On 2/14/16, Henry Baker wrote:
> Can someone please post a link to the .mp3 or .mp4 of this interview?
youtube-dl https://api.soundcloud.com/tracks/246093198
Interview with Cryptome (2016-02-06)-246093198.mp3
sha1: 2cf21291e0190dcc2b6c1fa2587994546311ea0f
_
On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 1:21 AM, mtm wrote:
> how did hominids manage prior to crypto?
Papyrus sealed in wax via trusted courier with promise of
sword to neck for peeking, capture, or failed delivery.
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On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:51 PM, Ted W. wrote:
> And yet, we find that the Paris attackers did not communicate via
> encrypted channels for most of their planning. Surprise surprise:
Which means absolutely nothing to these anti crypto people.
And is no excuse for you to quit deploying crypto and
On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 1:39 PM, Givon Zirkind wrote:
> imho, the crypto involved is not the issue. not having boots on the ground,
> good intel, good spies who can walk and talk like the enemy, is the real
> issue.
Exactly. Governments have had at least 15 years to strap those boots,
and certai
On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 11:06 AM, John Young wrote:
> Wheedling about crypto and Snowden diverts from CIA Director's full speech
> and broader critique. CIA version omits Q&A.
>
> http://csis.org/files/attachments/151116_GSF_OpeningSession.pdf
> https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/pari
What is of more crypto / security interest is not bandwidth use
or even domain or path restrictions, but failure of webdevs to
seed and restrict sensitive cookies (like your authenticated
session id's) from and to TLS only sessions.
Well known top100 sites that still have a legacy http mode
fail to
On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 at 12:53 PM, John Young wrote:
> CNSS Advisory Memo on Use of Public Standards for Secure Sharing of
> Information Among NatSec Systems 08/11/15
>
> https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/openDoc.cfm?DLuhIVBMUGJh7R8iXAWwIQ==
> iang wrote:
> John, that document blocked due to session varia
No evidence, calling baloney on this one.
The theory is fun though.
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Is this not the old chained crypto argument? It comes down to whether
or not you believe is, or will be, an attack known or unknown upon
any singular or combined crypto choice. If you do believe, which
is reasonable given prior crypto has been broken and that all
knowledge is never public, then com
On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 3:50 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/
>
> AMERICAN AND BRITISH spies hacked into the internal computer network
> of the largest manufacturer of SIM cards in the world, stealing
> encryption keys used to protect the
>From someone failing to send to list:
> Or he actually got those docs ...
Possible, but you would expect crypto research to be
well compartmented from legal, sigint and offensive ops
that appear to be the sole scope of the known docs.
If research does posess a break, maintaining that secret
while
Here's an interesting comparison. Most academic cryptographers believe
that the NSA has lost its lead: While for years they were the only ones
doing cryptography, and were decades ahead of anyone on the outside, but
now we have so many good people on the outside that we've cau
On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 6:31 PM, ianG wrote:
> On 31/01/2015 16:14 pm, John Young wrote:
>>
>> An early program of Highlands Group was perception management by
>> which public opinion would be shaped by disparagement of opposition
>> to ubiquitous gov-com spying with gambits like "tin-foil hat," "c
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USA_Freedom_Act
> http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/02/the-lawfare-podcast-episode-109-robet-litt-on-us-surveillance-policy-one-year-after-ppd-28/
> http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/02/live-bob-litt-speaks-at-brookings-on-intelligence-and-surveillance-reform/
Related la
On Sat, Feb 7, 2015 at 8:42 PM, John Young wrote:
> ODNI counsel Robert Litt is "optimistic" cryptographers will devise secure
> encryption which provides government access, it's "what many governments >
> want."
> "One of the many ways in which Snowden's leaks have damaged our national
> securit
On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 7:16 AM, John Young wrote:
> http://cryptome.org/2014/12/gilmore-crypto-censored.htm
John(Gnu):
Likely Trilight Zone is not an app (like cspace), it's a service
(like other/similar services they claim to be concerned about
in media-35535.pdf). Best used in the noted conju
On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 7:17 AM, John Young wrote:
> Cryptome does not pretend to provide illusory security, that is security.
> It is a vile, rotten, corrupt endeavor, like life. Chuckle.
> Visitors, readers, consumers must be skeptical of security, and not rely
> [...]
All due respect to Crypto
> K scriben:
> I would like to get back to serious crypto conversations now. Thank you.
You mean the quarterly circle jerk about random numbers, PKI,
standards, committees, and whatever else gets routinely hashed
to death?
I'd consider models of hashing and signing distributed materials
as a ser
On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 8:20 AM, John Young wrote:
> Hash this motherfucker, said math to germ.
JYA, you, as the original publisher of various and valued datasets...
the responsibility to calculate, sign, and publish said hashes rests with
you alone. Please consult with any trusted parties should
On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> To check an OpenPGP fingerprint for correctness, it is sufficient (for
> practical purposes) to compare the leading and trailing eight
> hexadecimal digits, and perhaps a few digits in the middle.
It is, only if you prefer these odds...
16^
On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 10:16 AM, Jonathan Thornburg
> business to E-mail me a receipt/confirmation/whatever.) Getting the
> spelling of $spouse's (8-letter, but "odd" to many people) E-mail correct
> over a poor-quality phone connection is hard enough already!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_
On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:43 AM, Henry Augustus Chamberlain
wrote:
> I propose that we use the local part of the email address to store the public
> key,
> ...
> my email address would be (64 random letters)@gmail.com
> ...
> Somebody not using encrypted emails could still click on your "mailto"
On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 05:03:46PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote:
>>
>> "WHAT'S THE "CHICKEN-EGG PROBLEM" WITH DELIVERING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTOGRAPHY?
> Somebody, please, give me something to say against people that claim JS
> client s
On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Maarten Billemont wrote:
> Is there public research to demonstrate what kind of cost would be associated
> with, say, 10B, 50B, 100B SHA-256 hashes per second?
The Bitcoin network is bruteforcing at about $950k/PH/s of
double SHA-256 on ASIC, plus expenses. So u
Any links to a list of digital currencies organized by technology?
ie: Bitcoin has countless forks characterized by nothing more
than adjusting (or not) the operating parameters of the bitcoin.org
code and starting their own genesis. Others may swap out the
hash or crypto functions within that. Wh
On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 6:35 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote:
> (I hope it is clear that I do not think of this as anything like a practical
> threat to AES.
Of course, 8 rounds at 2^unreachable is not practical.
> I had just remembered this paper, with its enormous data
> requirements when I saw ori
On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 3:23 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote:
> On 2014-06-19, at 10:42 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte
> wrote:
>
>> With common algorithms, how much would a LOT of storage help?
>
> Well, with an unimaginable amount of storage it is possible to shave a few
> bits off of AES.
>
> As
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 6:05 PM, Dan McDonald wrote:
>> In the OpenZFS world, you deploy each OS's FDE underneath ZFS.
>
> For now, yes. That's what you're stuck with.
That's actually not a problem.
> That blog is 3.5 years old. I think things have likely improved since then.
Only if customer
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 4:18 PM, Dan McDonald wrote:
> ZFS crypto, closed-source thanks to Oracle, was supposed to address this
> problem. Its design was to apply crypto in the "ZIO" path, like it does for
> checksums. I've not used Oracle Solaris, but apparently ZFS crypto is in
> there and it
On Sun, Jun 8, 2014 at 1:04 PM, jim bell wrote:
> Why not wrap the phone in a couple of layers of aluminum foil? (Although,
> it won't shield against audio if that's being recorded even while an RF
> contact does not exist...)
The thread referred to refrigerators and microwaves.
Yes even an ungr
On Sat, Jun 7, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Sidney Markowitz wrote:
> I don't know what would make me feel safer - putting the phones in a microwave
> oven with the chance that the door could easily be left ajar, or getting the
> acoustic insulation and masking hum of a refrigerator.
Trust the microwave you
(or as Snowden demonstrated, put in a fridge to avoid scrutiny and
audio capture the best idea. non-serial tower associations are an
anomaly alerted and acted upon.)
Faraday cages concept really depend on the freqs they are designed
to inhibit, pressure, sound, radio, optic, etc. G
On Sun, Jun 1, 2014 at 9:45 PM, Cathal (phone)
wrote:
> What about streaming, which is increasingly used to hold power to account in
> real time? Or other rich, necessarily large media which needs to *get out
> fast*? Big media isn't always frivolous. Even frivolity is important, and a
> mixnet wi
On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 6:01 AM, wrote:
>> >> pesky to/from/subject/etc headers.
>> > Those are hidden by use of TLS.
>> weaknesses intrinsic to SMTP discussions?
>> Yes, they are hidden in TLS transport on the wire.
>> No, they are not hidden in core or on disk at
>> the intermediate and final
In May 2014 someone wrote:
>> > p2p is no panacea, it doesn't scale
>>
>> I believe it could. Even if requiring super aggregating
>> nodes of some sort. Layers of service of the whole
>> DHT space. More research is surely required.
> It is not possible to have fast p2p unless:
> - Cable networks c
>> pesky to/from/subject/etc headers.
>
> Oh boy, here we go.
> Those are hidden by use of TLS.
Have you not been following the weaknesses intrinsic
to SMTP discussions?
Yes, they are hidden in TLS transport on the wire.
No, they are not hidden in core or on disk at
the intermediate and final mess
On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 8:36 AM, wrote:
>> >> - Email is entrenched in the offices, many a business is powered by it;
>>
>> They are powered by authorized access to and useful end use of message
>> content, not by email. That's not going anywhere, only the intermediate
>> transport is being redes
On Fri, May 9, 2014 at 11:49 AM, rysiek wrote:
> Dnia wtorek, 22 kwietnia 2014 20:58:50 tpb-cry...@laposte.net pisze:
>> Although technical solutions are feasible
Then do it and see what happens.
>> we ought to consider some things:
>> - Email is older than the web itself;
So is TCP/IP and the
On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 5:36 PM, ianG wrote:
> On 25/04/2014 22:14 pm, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
>> Somewhat off-topic, but Google took ChaCha20/Poly1305 live.
>> http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/04/speeding-up-and-strengthening-https.html
>> ... It also *does not support any cipher suit
On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 2:02 PM, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
>> On 4/7/2014 6:14 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>> http://heartbleed.com/
>> Patch your stuff.
> Comments / suggestions from those w/ in depth knowledge in this area? How
> users should proceed; how to check if sites used (bank
On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 11:13 AM, Jason Iannone wrote:
> And remain undetected? That's a nontrivial task and one that I would
> suspect generates interesting CPU or other resource utilization anomalies.
> It's a pretty high risk activity. The best we can hope for is someone
> discovering the exp
The liberationtech list occaisionally has threads on this.
Then things like guardianproject are working on hardening and
even making alternate phone OS's. ie: I think there may
now be some porting of some BSD's to phone cpu's, not that
it is much different from linux/droid in regard.
Then remember
On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 10:03 AM, Kevin wrote:
> What sort of claims?
1) secure
2) anonymous
3) free
4) the usual etc
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Lots of unknown popups making bold claims lately
that should be looked into... discuss?
-- Forwarded message --
From: David Irvine
Date: Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 10:51 AM
Subject: [bitcoin-list] Meeting place to discuss 'the decentralised
internet' projects
To: bitcoin-l...@lists.sou
More direct junkmail...
-- Forwarded message --
From: Doug McFetters
Date: Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:06 PM
Subject: Email is unsecurable - maybe not?
To: grarp...@gmail.com
Hello
I ran across the Nov 25 blog post on RandomBit.net titled ‘Email is
unsecurable.’
I think we have
>> On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 2:14 PM, gwen hastings wrote:
>>> ...
>>> I am looking at resurrecting
>>>
>>> mixmaster, mixminion and nym.alias.net nymserver designs from the
>>> various code wastebaskets and retrofit them with some newer encryption
>>> technology based on curve25519 and poly-1305 li
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 5:09 AM, danimoth wrote:
> On 24/12/13 at 04:20am, grarpamp wrote:
>> This thread pertains specifically to the use of P2P/DHT models
>> to replace traditional email as we know it today. There was
>> a former similarly named thread on this that
On Wed, Dec 25, 2013 at 7:19 AM, Randolph wrote:
> Anyone looked at BitMail p2p ?
> http://sourceforge.net/projects/bitmail/?source=directory
re: bitmail, goldbug, etc.
With all due respect, I doubt few here have or will anytime soon.
You spam out links to binaries no one's heard of, your source
On Wed, Dec 25, 2013 at 8:21 AM, Jeremie Miller
wrote:
> This thread seems pretty immense and in various places, what's the best way
> to contribute to it?
>
> I'm pretty keen on the topic, been working on /real/ p2p infrastructure for
> 5+ years now :)
I'm not sure that it has a proper home.
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 5:01 AM, danimoth wrote:
> In these months there was a lot of talking about "metadata", which SMTP
> exposes regardless of encryption or authentication. In the design of
> this p2p system, should metadata's problem kept in consideration or not?
> IMHO exposing danimoth@cryp
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Natanael wrote:
> Somebody in there mentioned allowing IPv6 addressing on top of I2P/Tor. That
> would be Garlicat/Onioncat. It creates a local virtual IPv6 network
> interface for your software to use, so that you can map key based addresses
> to routable local ad
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 5:09 AM, danimoth wrote:
> A problem which could rise is the 'incentive' for peers to continuosly
> providing bandwidth and disk space to store messages. I'm a simple dude,
> with a mailflow of ~5 email per day. Why I should work for you, with
> your ~1 mail per day for
More summary pasting...
/ Someone...
/ There are people I know who do not mind the extra steps for pgp. I
/ certainly want to get the roll out to use and test and enjoy. Sign me
/ up.
grarpamp...
Encryption is only part of it. There's transport, elimination of
central storage, anonymity
g and finally a user facing daemon that
moves messages into and out of local spools for use by normal
user/system tools.
Pasting in a very rough and unflowing thread summary to date
for interested people to pick up and discuss, draft, etc.
=
grarpamp...
> [pgp/smime email encryption, etc]
>
Moving the last couple days talk to this thread seems fine.
On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 3:19 PM, Ralf Senderek wrote:
> On Sun, 15 Dec 2013 grarpamp wrote:
>
>> The only way to have any real global seamless success is to go
>> ground up with a completely new model. IMO, that will
>> Phillip H-B, et al have been saying...
>> [email encryption, etc]
>> What is the gap we have to close to turn this on by default?
>
> How many times has this been rehashed the last six months?
> You can't fix email as we know it today using todays bolt-ons,
> protocols and corporate stakeholders
On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 1:01 AM, ianG wrote:
> On 23/11/13 15:30 PM, Ralf Senderek wrote:
>> On Sat, 23 Nov 2013, David Mercer wrote:
>>
>>> But of course you're right about actual current usage, encrypted email
>>> is an
>>> epic fail on that measure regardless of format/protocol.
>>
>> Yes, but
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:50 PM, R.R. D. wrote:
> fwd fyi
> -- Forwarded message --
> Subject: GoldBug Secure Messenger V 06 released
> http://goldbug.sf.net
Forwarded eh? From who, or where? ... 'mikeweber', 'berndhs'?
Public mailing list, forum, website, bugtracker, IRC?
You kee
> https://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-security/2013-October/007226.html
http://www.freebsd.org/news/status/report-2013-07-2013-09.html#AES-NI-Improvements-for-GELI
http://www.freebsd.org/news/status/report-2013-07-2013-09.html#Reworking-random(4)
___
> Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 11:44:57 +0200
> From: Pawel Jakub Dawidek
> To: z...@lists.illumos.org
> Subject: Re: [zfs] [Review] 4185 New hash algorithm support
>
> On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 12:47:52AM +0100, Saso Kiselkov wrote:
>> Please review what frankly has become a bit of a large-ish feature:
>>
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 4:21 AM, ianG wrote:
> Long Live Competition!
There should be no King to serve, no Committee to subvert, only an open Process.
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Some have said...
> this [Snowden meta arena] has been a subject of discussion on
> the [various] lists as well
> Congrats, torproject :-D
> "Tor Stinks" means you're doing it right; good job Tor devs :)
> good news everybody; defense in depth is effective and practical!
Yes, fine work all han
On 9/27/13, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 01:12:19PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
>>
>> The mentioned tech has nothing to do with traditional 'ham'.
>> And without the crypto key they can't see it and can't disrupt
>
> HamNet/AMPRNet ...
>
On 9/27/13, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> I don't see how a ham running a repeater backbone can
> prevent end to end encryption other than sniffing for
> traffic and actively disrupting it. I'm not sure tampering
> with transport is within ham ethics, though they definitely
> don't understand the actual us
On 9/25/13, Greg Rose wrote:
> Even under the much-relaxed export laws of the US, deriving spreading
> information cryptographically is a prohibited export. Which isn't to say it
> is not a good idea.
The US only applies to itself. Further, over the air, it's noise, the crypto
is undetectable and
On 9/25/13, Rich Jones wrote:
> That kind of technology is already widely deployed in walkie talkies - I
> think I remember at HOPE a speaker mentioning that the NYPD used this
> technique until they abandoned it due to its inconvenience.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frequency-hopping_spread_s
On 9/25/13, John Young wrote:
> Now that it appears the Internet is compromised what other
> means can rapidly deliver tiny fragments of an encrypted
> message, each unique for transmission, then reassembled
> upon receipt, kind of like packets but much smaller and less
> predictable, dare say ran
On 9/6/13, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> - Forwarded message from Andy Isaacson -
>
> From: Andy Isaacson
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced -
> rumors
>
> On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 10:45:46AM -0700, Joe Szilagyi wrote:
>> Does anyone put any stock into the ru
On 9/6/13, John Young wrote:
> An understated response to the NSA and unidentifed friends treachery:
>
> http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html
>
> More of these expected, many. But who knows, as Green says,
> all could go back to swell comsec business as usual.
Linked from s
On 9/5/13, coderman wrote:
> of all the no such agency disclosures, this one fuels the most wild
> speculation.
> """
> James Bamford, a veteran chronicler of the NSA, describes the agency
> """
Links to links to source quotes...
http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/2013-June/004477.
On 9/5/13, coderman wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 11:38 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>> ...
>>> however, the crypto breakthrough discussed is more mundane:
>>
>> Source? Sure, non-PFS can be exploited.
>
> i asked Snowden for an authoritative copy... ;P
Didn't
On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 8:49 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte
wrote:
> Assume all mayor cryptotools are exploited. Sad but true.
> ..
> False security is a danger unlike many others. None of us should forget
> that.
NSA says use aes256 for top secret. AES goes worldwide.
Would be pretty funny if in
On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:44 PM, Aaron Toponce
> which in order to be truly random, must come from some chaotic random
> source, such as radioactive decay. However, you can make statistical
> judgements on the output
> to determine if the source is 'random enough'.
Perhaps not quite, as others h
On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 5:58 PM, Natanael wrote:
> For all you know the PRNG could be doing nothing more
> than doing SHA256 of a fixed value plus a counter
Yes, and in an application where even that trivial design would serve
to fit some use, testing the apparent randomness.of proposed hash
func
The subject thread is covering a lot about OS implementations
and RNG various sources. But what are the short list of open
source tools we should be using to actually test and evaluate
the resulting number streams?
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> if they had a product, you would have had it.
>
> It's a recurring theme -- there doesn't seem to be enough market demand for
> Hardware RNGs.
>
> I once toyed with the idea of creating an open source hardware design
This reminds me, where are the open designs for a strong hwRNG based
on the com
> On IBM's watch, right. But the Thinkpads were manufactured by Lenova in
> China well before that; what IBM sold was the franchise & rights.
And so where does Cisco and Juniper gear come from again... ?
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On Mon, Jul 22, 2013 at 3:41 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> Could you please get another domain name, that name is just ridiculous.
>
> It might tickle your humour but I guarantee it does not 99% of potential
> subscribers...
>
> Unless your hidden objective is to drive away potential subscribers.
Though
> A number of projects have been launched to use cell phones as a money
> device, a smart card. I am pretty sure if your malware can send sms, it can
> transfer funds.
>
> This not all that fatal, as the money is traceable, but it means that the
> financial institution needs an apparatus to revers
> id like to say these fellas are decent men
True for sure. Yet sometimes when you assemble large systems of
even the best of men, those systems may drift from or not always
retain the fine character of its components. A weakness of humanity
perhaps.
___
> Whereas the
> incentive to keep the secret from spilling is so strong that it should
> act as a moderator on its operators.
... against use outside of its original scope/parties. I can see that.
Time and history tends to expose everything though. And in the present,
not knowing what we don't kno
> I think if Tor had an arbitrary queue with store and forward as a high
> latency module of sorts, we'd really be onto something. Then there would
> be tons of traffic on the Tor relays for all kinds of reasons - high and
> low latency - only to all be wrapped in TLS and then in the Tor protocol.
> And when LEA
> get caught doing this nothing terribly bad happens to LEA (no officers
> go to prison, for example).
It is often in the interest/whim of the executive to decline to
prosecute its own,
even if only to save embarassment, so many of these cases will never see a jury.
That's why you n
> I'm not seeing that many options though. The Phantom project died pretty
> fast;
> https://code.google.com/p/phantom/
> https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/phantom-protocol
> http://phantom-anon.blogspot.se/
I would bet that Phantom both ran out of developer time and
has discouraged further
> There should be a disclaimer somewhere that Tor is a competitor to I2P, is
> far from perfect itself (actually has a few glaring weaknesses, such as exit
> nodes), and the guy critiquing I2P works for Tor.
There should be a table somewhere that shows that
all these different systems have diffe
> that if Snowden has access to them - other people who wish to have
> access may also have these document - too bad none of them seem to care
> to educate the public or to expose the incredibly illegal interpretation
The incidence/depth of leakers/leaks over time seems to be increasing.
Whether o
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