Hello Nico Williams. Nice to hear from you.
Yes, when David-Sarah Hopwood and I (both Tahoe-LAFS hackers)
participated on the zfs-crypto mailing list with you and others, I
learned about a lot of similarities between Tahoe-LAFS and ZFS.
On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 1:10 PM, Nico Williams wrote:
>
> O
On 04/25/2012 10:11 PM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
It goes like this: suppose you
want to ensure the integrity of a chunk of data. There are at least
two ways to do this (excluding public key digital signatures):
1. the secret-oriented way: you make a MAC tag of the chunk (or
equivalently you u
You'd have to ask Darren, but IIRC the design he settled on allows for
unkeyed integrity verification and repair. I too think that's a
critical feature to have even if having it were to mean leaking some
information, such as file length in blocks, and number of files, as I
look at this from an ope
On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 10:27 PM, Marsh Ray wrote:
> On 04/25/2012 10:11 PM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
>> 2. the verifier-oriented way: you make a secure hash of the chunk, and
>> make the resulting hash value known to the good guy(s) in an
>> authenticated way.
>
>
> Is option 2 sort of just pu
Also,
On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 10:11 PM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> Hello Nico Williams. Nice to hear from you.
>
> Yes, when David-Sarah Hopwood and I (both Tahoe-LAFS hackers)
> participated on the zfs-crypto mailing list with you and others, I
> learned about a lot of similarities between Ta
On 2012-04-26 1:11 PM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
how are we
doing? Are we winning? I don't know about you, but I consider myself
to be primarily a producer of "defense" technology. I'd like for every
individual on the planet to have confidentiality, data integrity, to
be able to share certain a
On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 9:27 PM, Marsh Ray wrote:
> On 04/25/2012 10:11 PM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
>>
>> 1. the secret-oriented way: you make a MAC tag of the chunk (or equivalently
>> you use Authenticated Encryption on it) using a secret key known to the good
>> guy(s) and unknown to the
I think the separate integrity tag is more general, flexible and more secure
where the flexibility is needed. Tahoe has more complex requirements and
hence needds to make use of a separate integrity tag.
I guess in general it is going to be more general, flexible if there are
separate keys (incl
I thought of another example along the principle separate keys for different
security properties Zooko discussed earlier in this thread.
In the distant past on the openpgp there was some discussion about
separating storage and communication keys (it was related to an egress
corporate key escrow f
On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 4:29 AM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> Um, frankly I'm having a hard time understanding exactly why my
> intuitions about this come out so differently for "data-at-rest" tools
> like Tahoe-LAFS and ZFS than for "data-in-motion" tools like TLS. My
> intuition is that secret-
On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 12:22 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
> Also,
>
> On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 10:11 PM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
> wrote:
[big snip]
>> I don't question the usefulness of the Authenticated Encryption
>> abstraction for protocols that fall into that category.
>
> Right, me either. I c
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