But XDR is so BORING compared to a REAL standard like ASN.1!
It doesn't have infinite possibilies for object definitions
requiring help from standards committees, multiple incompatible
data representations with different kinds of ambiguity,
or ugly API packages that are too large to believe that t
On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> Favor Or Oppose The Following?
>Favor Oppose
> Attack suspected terrorists like bin
> Laden even if we're not sure they're
> responsible for last week's attack 54% 40%
Jail child molesters like Ge
On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> The survey was commissioned by Newsweek. An explanation from Princeton
> Survey Research Associates and the exact wording of the question asked
> (which did cover privacy and business impact) is here:
>
> http://www.politechbot.com/p-02530.html
The
On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, Pawel Krawczyk wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2001 at 01:44:57PM -0700, Bram Cohen wrote:
>
> > > What is important, it *doesn't* feed the built-in Linux kernel PRNG
> > > available in /dev/urandom and /dev/random, so you have either to only
> > > use the hardware generator or fee
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > >Because it is typically slower by many times than hand
> > >tuned assembler.
>
> On 14 Sep 2001, at 14:24, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> > Are you sure? For general code, that certainly hasn't been
> > true in a long time; opti
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46953,00.html
Bush Bill Rewrites Spy Laws
By Declan McCullagh ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
2:00 a.m. Sep. 19, 2001 PDT
WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration will ask for more power to
eavesdrop on phone calls, the Internet and voicemail mess
- Original Message -
From: "InfoSec News" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 9:04 AM
Subject: [ISN] Linux Security Week - September 17th 2001
> +-+
> | LinuxSecurity.com
--
On 19 Sep 2001, at 11:01, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> According to the two-page outline -- which lacks key
> details and could change before it's sent to Capitol
> Hill -- police would be able to conduct more wiretaps
> and use the Carnivore surveillance system in more
> s
"Kevin E. Fu" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>But XDR is so BORING compared to a REAL standard like ASN.1! It doesn't have
>infinite possibilies for object definitions requiring help from standards
>committees, multiple incompatible data representations with different kinds of
>ambiguity, or ugly AP
hi,
How much space is needed to house a home for crypto? Let us know as
we are in the process of setting up CVS on OpenBSD just now. Currently
we have sup working fine it appears. But are still debugging why
anonymous
cvs checkouts are not working. b.t.w. we have reliable bandwidth that
we
cou
On Wed, Sep 19, 2001 at 01:12:44AM -0700, Bram Cohen wrote:
> > not necessary in general case
> Since most applications reading /dev/random don't want random numbers
> anyway?
Here I meant exactly what you said about /dev/random religion. On the
other hand feeding the /dev/random with i810 durin
At 1:12 AM -0700 9/19/01, Bram Cohen wrote:
>Of course, there's the religion of people who say that /dev/random output
>'needs' to contain 'all real' entropy, despite the absolute zero increase
>in security this results in and the disastrous effect it can have on
>performance.
If I am generating
> Bram Cohen wrote:
>> On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, Pawel Krawczyk wrote:
[..]
>> It's not that stupid, as feeding the PRNG from i810_rng at the kernel
>> level would be resource intensive,
>
> You only have to do it once at startup to get enough entropy in there.
If your machine is left on for months
The real-RNG in the Intel chip generates something like 75 kbits/sec
of processed random bits. These are merely wasted if nobody reads them
before it generates 75kbits more in the next second.
I suggest that if application programs don't read all of these bits
out of /dev/intel-rng (or whatever
On Wed, Sep 19, 2001 at 01:50:53PM -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
> The real-RNG in the Intel chip generates something like 75 kbits/sec
> of processed random bits. These are merely wasted if nobody reads them
> before it generates 75kbits more in the next second.
>
> I suggest that if application p
At 16:23 09-09-2001 -0400, you wrote:
>Does anyone have an open source implementation of Rijndael in
>assembler for the Pentium?
Yes... Robert Durnal has two versions:
a RijnDael variation and
the original also known as AES.
Search 'Robert Durnal crypto' to get his page ...
..
On Wed, 19 Sep 2001, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> Bram Cohen wrote:
>
> > You only have to do it once at startup to get enough entropy in there.
>
> If your machine is left on for months or years the seed entropy would become
> a big target. If your PRNG status is compromised then all future uses
On Wed, 19 Sep 2001, John Gilmore wrote:
> Also, the PRNG in /dev/random and /dev/urandom may someday be broken
> by analytical techniques. The more diverse sources of true or
> apparent randomness that we can feed into it, the less likely it is
> that a successful theoretical attack on the PRNG
On Wed, 19 Sep 2001, Theodore Tso wrote:
> One of the things which I've always been worried about with the 810
> hardware random number generators in general is how to protect against
> their failing silently.
That certainly is a concern, although no more of a concern it is with the
even faulti
On Mon, 17 Sep 2001, Greg Rose wrote:
> There is one very simple reason why they might have wanted the encryption
> switched off. Wiretapping at the base station requires a wiretap order,
> whereas sniffing the airwaves in a matter of national security is something
> the NSA is allowed to do (
At 03:55 20/09/2001, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes:
> >>"Kevin E. Fu" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >>>But XDR is so BORING compared to a REAL standard like ASN.1!
> >>I can feel this sliding into a specification languag
- Original Message -
From: "Theodore Tso" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John Gilmore" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Pawel Krawczyk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Bram Cohen"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 5:17 AM
Subject: Re: chip-level rando
Or also their XML equivalents:
http://xml.coverpages.org/xml-spki.html
Enzo
- Original Message -
From: "Paul Crowley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peter Gutmann" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, Septem
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010918/ts/attack_investigation_dc_23.html
Tuesday September 18 7:55 PM ET
News Home - Yahoo! - My Yahoo! - News Alerts - Help
FBI Investigating Florida Terrorist Connection (WKMG, Orlando)
By James Vicini
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The FBI (news - web
Bram,
I need _lots_ of random-looking bits to use as covertraffic, so I'm using
continuous reseeding (of a BBS PRNG) using i810_rng output on i386 platform
as well as other sources (the usual suspects plus CD latency plus an
optional USB feed-through rng device a bit like a dongle). I don't use a
On Wed, Sep 19, 2001 at 09:23:56AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Not so good. Anyone can easily suspect me of being a
> terrorist, if I should discuss certain topics that are of
> interest to this list.
Yeah, the draft sent to Congress late Wednesday doesn't have crypto
restrictions, but it
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