At 04:24 PM 2/4/2002 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
At 2:09 PM -0800 2/4/02, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
1) A typical message would have a 20-byte nonce random number, which
computed to a 20-byte SHA1 and then encrypted with RSA resulting in 20-byte
signature (basic message plus 40-byte infrastructure
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Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002
I'd argue that the RSA and DSA situations can be made equivalent if
the card has some persistent memory. Some high quality randomness is
needed at RSA key generation. For the DSA case, use 256 bits of
randomness at initialization to seed a PRNG using AES, say. Output
from the PRNG could be
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Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 10:51:25 +0100 (MET)
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Subject: [Mojonation-users] MojoNation public network shutting
At 04:24 PM 2/4/2002 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
At 2:09 PM -0800 2/4/02, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
1) A typical message would have a 20-byte nonce random number, which
computed to a 20-byte SHA1 and then encrypted with RSA resulting in 20-byte
signature (basic message plus 40-byte
-- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBMTO: N48 04'14.8'' E11 36'41.2'' http://www.leitl.org
57F9CFD3: ED90 0433 EB74 E4A9 537F CFF5 86E7 629B 57F9 CFD3
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Date: Tue, 5 Feb
Although the headers and quoting have gotten munged, this
appears to be a reply to my message.
Eugene Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
-- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
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ICBMTO: N48 04'14.8'' E11 36'41.2''
At 09:46 AM 2/5/2002 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
I couldn't find it. Give me a hint?
Sorry, I should have been more specific:
http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/QC/fips140.c goes straight to it.
Greg.
Greg Rose INTERNET: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Qualcomm
At 6:37 AM -0800 2/5/02, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
I'd argue that the RSA and DSA situations can be made equivalent if
the card has some persistent memory.
I expect you could initialize the random data in that memory during
manufacture with little loss of real security. (If you are concerned
At 2:25 AM -0800 2/5/02, Eugene Leitl wrote:
-- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
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ICBMTO: N48 04'14.8'' E11 36'41.2'' http://www.leitl.org
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On Tue, 5 Feb 2002, Greg Rose wrote:
This forced me to instrument my FIPS-140 code to measure it. It takes 1.42
ms to run a test on a Sun Ultra at 250MHz (I know, this is an ancient
machine). It's all integer arithmetic, on short integers at that, except
for the chi-square poker test,
On Tue, 29 Jan 2002, Bill Frantz wrote:
What would be really nice is to be able to have the same PIN/password for
everything. With frequent use, forgetting it would be less of a problem,
as would the temptation to write it down. However, such a system would
require that the PIN/password be
At 03:48 PM 2/5/2002 -0600, Kim-Ee Yeoh wrote:
I took a brief look at your code, and one optimization you could do is to
make a single pass for both the monobit and poker tests. If c_0, c_1,
..., c_15 are the frequency counts of nibbles, then the monobit count is
just the sum over all i's of c_i
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