I'm going to respond to AARGH!, our new Sternlight, by asking two questions.
1. Why can't I control what signing keys the Fritz chip trusts?
If the point of TCPA is make it so *I* can trust that *my* computer
to run the software *I* have approved, and refuse to run something
which a virus or
--
On 31 Jul 2002 at 23:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> So TCPA and Palladium "could" restrict which software you could
> run. They aren't designed to do so, but the design could be
> changed and restrictions added.
Their design, and the institutions and software to be designed
around them, i
On Wed, Jul 31, 2002 at 11:45:35PM -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> Peter Trei writes:
> > AARG!, our anonymous Pangloss, is strictly correct - Wagner should have
> > said "could" rather than "would".
>
> So TCPA and Palladium "could" restrict which software you could run.
TCPA (when it isn't tur
On Thu, Aug 01, 2002 at 02:33:43PM -0700, James A. Donald wrote:
> According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
> hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
> is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
>
> But this is not what the content prov
1) There were some very interesting questions such as
-- whether one can construct a hash function that
generates all possible codes.
-- ditto, generating them as uniformly as possible.
-- Whether off-the-shelf hash functions such as SHA-1
have such properties.
The answers are re
David Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I don't know of any good cryptographic hash function that comes with
> a proof that all outputs are possible. However, it might not be too
> hard to come up with plausible examples. For example, if we apply the
> Luby-Rackoff construction (i.e., 3 round
> David Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > I don't know of any good cryptographic hash function that comes with
> > a proof that all outputs are possible. However, it might not be too
> > hard to come up with plausible examples. For example, if we apply the
> > Luby-Rackoff construction (i.e
> From: "James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700
> On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> > both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
> > what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
> > http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM
Peter Trei writes:
> I'm going to respond to AARGH!, our new Sternlight, by asking two questions.
>
> 1. Why can't I control what signing keys the Fritz chip trusts?
>
> If the point of TCPA is make it so *I* can trust that *my* computer
> to run the software *I* have approved, and refuse to ru
Eric Murray writes:
> TCPA (when it isn't turned off) WILL restrict the software that you
> can run. Software that has an invalid or missing signature won't be
> able to access "sensitive data"[1]. Meaning that unapproved software
> won't work.
>
> [1] TCPAmain_20v1_1a.pdf, section 2.2
We need
On 2002-08-01, AARG!Anonymous uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED],...:
>It does this by taking hashes of the software before transferring
>control to it, and storing those hashes in its internal secure
>registers.
So, is there some sort of guarantee that the transfer of control won't be
stopped by a ch
On Thu, 1 Aug 2002, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
> Eric Murray writes:
> > TCPA (when it isn't turned off) WILL restrict the software that you
> > can run. Software that has an invalid or missing signature won't be
> > able to access "sensitive data"[1]. Meaning that unapproved software
> > won't w
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 3:31, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
> More generally, as long as we have computers which allow data to
> be addressed as code and vice versa, the ability to control use
> of data will necessarily entail ability to control use of code.
> So, either we will get systems where circumven
--
In an anarchist society, or in a world where government had given
up on copyright and intellectual property, TCPA/Palladium would be
a great thing, a really good substitute for law, much more
effectual, much cheaper, and much less dangerous than law.
In a world where we have anticircumve
On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
> You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
> motives.
Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only people who need anonymity or
pseudonymity are
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