Re: [Bodo Moeller ] OpenSSL Security Advisory: Timing-based attacks on SSL/TLS with CBC encryption

On Friday 21 February 2003 11:19 pm, you wrote: > This changes the padding on each message containing the password, making > the attack rather more difficult, and has the advantage that you don't need > to convince the party running the server to update their software. > Depending on how much stu

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--- begin forwarded text Status: RO From: "Patrick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "'Digital Bearer Settlement List'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Lucrative Update: V5 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2003 14:27:34 -0600 Sender: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Lucrative release 5 is out today. This release brings Lucrative sign

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Fw: Euler's Phi Function

I'm just after thinking about 1. 1 is relatively prime to itself but it would be the only positive integer. However if we take the first definition as correct then phi(1) might be considered meaningless as there are no positive integers less than 0. I suppose however, that this could mean that ph

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Hi, I have seen two slightly different definitions for the Euler's phi function. They don't cause any difference in its value but I was just wondering if there would be anyone who would complain about the use of one or the other? One says that for a positive integer n, phi(n) is the number of pos

Re: [Bodo Moeller ] OpenSSL Security Advisory: Timing-based attacks on SSL/TLS with CBC encryption

At 12:46 PM 2/21/03 -0500, Anton Stiglic wrote: ... If SSL required encrypt-then-MAC, a programmer would more naturally start by verifying the MAC, then decrypt the message, so Vaudenay's attack would be caught first by the MAC verification and the implementation would probably return an error afte

Re: [Bodo Moeller ] OpenSSL Security Advisory:Timing-based attacks on SSL/TLS with CBC encryption

There was even an OS that, for a time until the patch got out, when you handed it a pointer to a user name and a pointer to a password, conveniently returned to you the password pointer updated to point at the first bad character in the password for that account. Thanks, Donald

Re: question about rsa encryption

Hello Scott, At 03/02/03 21:50, Scott G. Kelly wrote: I have a question regarding RSA encryption - forgive me if this seems amateur-ish -, but 'm still a beginner. I seem to recall reading somewhere that there is some issue with directly encrypting data with an RSA public key, perhaps some vulnera

Re: [Bodo Moeller ] OpenSSL Security Advisory: Timing-based attacks on SSL/TLS with CBC encryption

SMB writes: > I'm struck by the similarity of this attack to Matt Blaze's master key > paper. In each case, you're guessing at one position at a time, and > using the response of the security system as an oracle. What's crucial > in both cases is the one-at-a-time aspect -- that's what makes t

Re: [Bodo Moeller ] OpenSSL Security Advisory: Timing-based attacks on SSL/TLS with CBC encryption

An extremely trivial observation, but may be useful to some: >The attack assumes that multiple SSL or TLS connections involve a common >fixed plaintext block, such as a password. There's been a discussion about how this affects POP over SSL on a private list. My suggestion was: -- Snip -- - Do

Re: AES-128 keys unique for fixed plaintext/ciphertext pair?

Ed Gerck wrote: > This may sound intuitive but is not correct. Shannon proved that if > "n" (bits, bytes, letters, etc.) is the unicity distance of a > ciphersystem, then ANY message that is larger than "n" bits CAN be > uniquely deciphered from an analysis of its ciphertext -- even though > that

Re: AES-128 keys unique for fixed plaintext/ciphertext pair?

Hmm. another simpler theory to remove Shannon from the discussion. assume that the original assertion is correct - that for each plaintext p and each cyphertext c there exists only one key k that is valid to map encrypt(p,k)=c. In this case, for each possible cyphertext c, *every* possible plainte