lude an accounting of all the "money" issued. And not
be reliant on one computer to keep the records.
Or the propounders wanting to: make a profit/control the bank?
--
Peter Fairbrother
(who's drunk now, but will be sober to
usually, on Windows boxen) now install similar
software keyloggers remotely, without needing to break in.
-- Peter Fairbrother
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e general will plan his defences according to his opponent's
capabilities, not according to his opponent's avowed intentions.
However, in this case the intention to attack with all available weapons has
not been well hidden. There may be some dupes w
sed, the only things redacted (so far - I'm half way through)
are the names of the inks and developers...
-- Peter Fairbrother
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can only
recommend you read this, or at least look at the pictures, if you haven't
already.
Wow.
Makes Tempest look like a toy. Nice (?) one, Markus.
-- Peter Fairbrother
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d there, for one.
Cash has it's place, but requiring electronic confirmation is exactly where
it isn't. We have credit cards for that. Cash needs to be authenticatable by
humans alone.
-- Peter Fairbrother
> Sampo Syreeni wrote:
> On Mon, 11 Feb 2002, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
icle: "hippus movement" In Journals: Br. J.
Ophthalmol.
Your search retrieved zero articles." (from 1965 to 2001).
Spin? Snake oil?
-- Peter Fairbrother
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used SFS keys) are used only for signatures. The use of
persistant keys for encryption in both PGP and GPG make them unsuitable for
GAK resistance, and if you haven't got GAK yet, you might get it someday,
making all your present traffic insecure.
-- Peter Fairbrother
Pete Chown wrote:
> John G
ity system where Bob is not trusted. Case of
beer for any better solutions than mine, or a case for the best solution
anyway. I will post mine later, it's not that good, this is brainstorming
not STO.)
-- Peter Fairbrother
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Capturing keystrokes of email in composition would appear to me to be part
of a "transfer of ..intelligence of any nature transmitted ... in part by a
wire...", and nothing to do with stored email or 2703, but I am not a
lawyer.
-- Peter Fairbrother
> Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
ecrecy, in the hope that it will confuse the defence/Court, or
perhaps it's just legalese, I don't know.
-- Peter Fairbrother
> David Wagner wrote:
> It seems the FBI hopes the law will make a distinction between software
> that talks directly to the modem and software that do
email). Pretty
silly imho as they didn't need to install the "keystroke capture component"
at all.
-- Peter Fairbrother
> Rick Smith at Secure Computing wrote:
> Stripping off the precise legal language, this looks like a software
> keystroke logger that was carefully craf
uot; should have continued to work if the overall
design was good.
Could it be remotely installed? Is this a serious security failure in PGP?
The recent announcement by NA that they are looking for a buyer for PGP, at
a time when it's value would be low anyway following the WTC attacks, may be
on to use a PRNG rather than a real-rng, which is to
deliberately repeat "random" output for debugging, replaying games, etc. Not
very relevant to crypto, except perhaps as part of an attack strategy.
-- Peter
>> On Wed, 19 Sep 2001, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>
>> Bram Coh
our of using all the entropy that can easily be
collected without taking those hits. The Intel rng can do this nicely
(although I would use other sources of entropy as well).
-- Peter Fairbrother
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.,
>> domestic) phones were working while, side by side, 'world' phones
>> weren't.
Incidently, even the A5/1 algorithm is supposedly not very secure against eg
LEAs, Corporations, or perhaps even a very dedicated amateur, though I have
no exact details to hand.
-- P
nced it could be done.
Any other suggestions for how to ban crypto? I can't think of anything that
would actually work against terrorists.
-- Peter Fairbrother
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> Ray Dillinger at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> It is time to move the conference because it is no longer safe for
> cryptography researchers to enter the USA.
>
> Bear
I'm worried about the long-term National Security implications. If DMCA
stands and US cryptography researchers are imprisoned
Given: an online Steganographic Filing System database based on the second
construction of Anderson, Needham and Shamir*, with many users. Users write
email to the data base, with random cover writes. They read from the
database to collect their mail, reads are covered by random cover reads, and
r
A standard business letter has "From:" and "To:" addresses. It has a date.
It has a "Dear:", showing also (perhaps) who it is for. It has a "Yours:"
showing (perhaps) a relationship between the correspondents. It has a typed
name showing whose name it is sent in, and it has a signature which
authe
> Bram Cohen at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[..]
> I can't emphasize enough that it's very important that the form factor be
> a double-female phone jack and work when plugged in with *either*
> orientation - is this an easy thing to detect?
Surely a male-to-female jack. Plug it (male) into the wall
Transoceanic cables vary from about 15 to 23 mm diameter. Until recently
they had 4 pairs of fibres maximum.
The SL21 from Tycom is a typical modern transoceanic cable. It has a
diameter of 21 mm, weighs about 1.25 kg/m, working load 17,500 lb. It has 8
fibre pairs in a steel-wire and copper tube
> John Denker at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I wrote:
>
>>> AfricaONE has a backbone that circles the continent offshore, plus
>>> separate drops for each country, when it would have been vastly cheaper
>>> to go by land[Offshore is] less likely to be tapped by hostile powers.
>
> At 12:38 A
> Matt Crawford at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Cable companies do this (from the surface) when they repair cables, but they
>> usually cut the cable before separately raising the cut ends and splicing in
>> a new section. I doubt that cable would be strong or extensible enough to
>> lift uncut, u
> John Denker at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I was talking with some colleagues who had read the WSJ article
>
>> http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB990563785151302644.htm
>>
>> http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2764372,00.html for
>
> and who were wondering as follows: Giv
> Enzo Michelangeli at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> On another mailing list, someone posted an interesting question: how to
> ascertain that a tamperproof device (e.g., a smartcard) contains no hidden
> backdoors? By definition, anything open to inspection is not tamperproof.
Inspectability and ta
> Amir Herzberg at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[..]
> This takes care reasonably well of peer to peer e-mail (I think), and can be
> easily deployed (any volunteers? I'll be very glad to provide our system for
> this !). As to mailing lists like this one... Here one solution is manual
> moderating,
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