"Wild and Crazy": Interview with Palladium's Mario Juarez

2002-07-02 Thread pasward
R. A. Hettinga writes: > Juarez: You have the ability to establish the notion of trusted code which > can't be observed or modified. Moreover, information on your machine, which > is living in one of those vaults or one of the sub-vaults, or as storage on > your disc can be encrypted with ma

Re: Ross's TCPA paper

2002-06-26 Thread pasward
hy Mailing List > Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- -------- Paul A.S. Ward, Assistant Professor Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] University of Waterloo [EMAIL PROTECTED] Department of Computer Engineering Tel: +1 (519) 888-4567 ext.3127 Waterloo, OntarioFax: +1 (519) 746-3077 Canada N2L 3G1 URL: http://shoshin.uwaterloo.ca/~pasward - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: biometrics

2002-02-01 Thread pasward
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Re: CFP: PKI research workshop

2002-01-14 Thread pasward
Eric Rescorla writes: > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > Eric Rescorla writes: > > > Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > > And most (all?) commercial CAs then disclaim any responsibility for > > > > having actually checked that right correctly... > > > While this is true, I'd

Re: CFP: PKI research workshop

2002-01-14 Thread pasward
Eric Rescorla writes: > Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > Michael Sierchio wrote: > > > > > > Carl Ellison wrote: > > > > > > > If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/ > > > > where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle > >

Re: private-sector keystroke logger...

2001-11-27 Thread pasward
Jay D. Dyson writes: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > > On Tue, 27 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > > Hrm, how about a worm with a built-in HTTP server that installs itself > > > > on some non-standard port, say TCP/28462 (to pick one at random)? > > > > > >

Re: IP: Magic Lantern

2001-11-27 Thread pasward
Adam Fields writes: > > On a somewhat related note, is it > wise for the FBI to open itself up to potential lawsuits if their > software corrupts data or otherwise interferes with legitimate > business, or allows an intruder to do so undetected by utilizing the > AV-invisibility channel res

Re: private-sector keystroke logger...

2001-11-27 Thread pasward
Jay D. Dyson writes: > On 27 Nov 2001, Derek Atkins wrote: > > > Hrm, how about a worm with a built-in HTTP server that installs itself > > on some non-standard port, say TCP/28462 (to pick one at random)? > > Craftier still, backdoor an existing service that behaves normally > unt

Re: Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"

2001-11-23 Thread pasward
Jay D. Dyson writes: > On Wed, 21 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > But this doesn't really address the question. Certainly you take > > various precautions. The question is: how can I know if the system is > > compromised? > > There's a wealth of utilities that can indicate

Re: Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"

2001-11-23 Thread pasward
Jay D. Dyson writes: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > > On Wed, 21 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Yet another reason why Open Source is your friend. > > > > I did not mean to imply that I am running some variety of windows. I am > > interested in the technical

Re: Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"

2001-11-23 Thread pasward
Jay Sulzberger writes: > > > On Wed, 21 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Jay Sulzberger writes: > > > > > > > > > On Wed, 21 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > > > > R. A. Hettinga writes: > > > > > Everyone remember First Virtual's Nat Borenstein's "major discov

Re: Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"

2001-11-21 Thread pasward
Jay Sulzberger writes: > > > On Wed, 21 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > R. A. Hettinga writes: > > > Everyone remember First Virtual's Nat Borenstein's "major discovery" of the > > > keyboard logger? > > > > > > 'Magic Lantern' part of new 'Enhanced Carnivore Project' > >

Re: Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"

2001-11-21 Thread pasward
Jay D. Dyson writes: > On Wed, 21 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Everyone remember First Virtual's Nat Borenstein's "major discovery" > > > of the keyboard logger? > > > > > > 'Magic Lantern' part of new 'Enhanced Carnivore Project' > > > > In the same vein, but a different a

Re: Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"

2001-11-21 Thread pasward
Kent Borg writes: > On Wed, Nov 21, 2001 at 10:40:11AM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > In the same vein, but a different application, does anyone know what > > the state of the art is for detecting such tampering? In particular, > > when sitting at a PC doing banking, is there any mechani

Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"

2001-11-21 Thread pasward
R. A. Hettinga writes: > Everyone remember First Virtual's Nat Borenstein's "major discovery" of the > keyboard logger? > > 'Magic Lantern' part of new 'Enhanced Carnivore Project' > [etc] In the same vein, but a different application, does anyone know what the state of the art is for dete

Re: Rubber hose attack

2001-11-02 Thread pasward
P.J. Ponder writes: > The default settings will be the permanent settings for many users, and if > it is easier to buy something through a .Net affiliate than to shop > around, then the .Net sites will get a certain percentage of users just by > 'default'. They won't get all, certainly, but

Re: Rubber hose attack

2001-11-02 Thread pasward
Rick Smith at Secure Computing writes: > > While I would feel compassion for consumers > who are hurt or inconvenienced by some huge scam that exploited a poor > Microsoft security implementation, such a scenario would be entertaining to > watch. What makes you believe that you will not

Re: Security Research (Was: Scarfo "keylogger", PGP )

2001-10-17 Thread pasward
David Jablon writes: > > Not until vendors are held legally accountable for negligent design. > > Maybe someday, somehow, there will be a class action law suit. > (I saw a recent infosec conference flyer that had some silly quote > about the annual cost of viruses or something being in the

Criminalizing crypto criticism

2001-07-27 Thread pasward
David Jablon writes: > > Yet, on a sad note, public crypto research has to stop. > One might think it could survive in purely academic circles. > But no, you'd have to be a fool to criticise even an academic paper. > Anybody, perhaps the resentful author, could co-opt the work for > Copy P