I took a look at the MIT Guide to Lock Picking August 1991 revision at
http://www.lysator.liu.se/mit-guide/mit-guide.html
It says:
9.10 Master Keys
Many applications require keys that open only a single lock and keys
that open a group of locks. The keys that open a single lock are
called
At 09:12 PM 01/26/2003 -0500, Donald Eastlake 3rd wrote:
It's just silly to spend, say, $50 more, on a more secure lock unless
you are really willing, in the forseeable future, to spend hundreds or
thousands of dollars or even more on other weaknesses to make most of
them approximately as strong.
Chown [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)
You are coming at this from a software/computer mindset that just isn't
applicable to this sort of physical world security.
Matt's paper was about _locks_.
In case you
On Mon, 27 Jan 2003, Faust wrote:
Bribe a guard, go to bed with a person with access etc..
However, that is not the proper domain of a study of rights amplification.
I'm actually not sure of that. I think that an organized
case-by-case study of social engineering breaches would
be valuable
On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
Sure. But trying those combinations out can be automated -- I don't think
the kind of automatic lock pickers one sees in current action movies are
*entirely* fictional.
There are several types of devices that can convince a keylock
to open. One of
On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Pete Chown wrote:
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2003 11:53:23 +
From: Pete Chown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)
Len Sassaman wrote:
Most of the time, the lock is not the weakest point of attack
You are coming at this from a software/computer mindset that just isn't
applicable to this sort of physical world security.
Matt's paper was about _locks_.
In case you have forgotten, the title was Cryptology and Physical Security:
Rights Amplification in Master-Keyed Mechanical Locks.
To
On 24 Jan 2003, David Wagner wrote:
If those locksmiths didn't publish the vulnerability, phooey on them.
Matt Blaze deserves full credit for being the first to publish.
I'm fairly certain this has been published in locksmithing journals
previously, though I would have to do some digging to
Actually even in their Biaxial design the sidebar hole is always on the
bottom pin, and so the master shares the angle with the change keys.
-matt
There is, however, a newer medeco design that uses a drill-hole
instead of a groove. With that design you can have the pin twist be
different at
Matt Blaze [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I have no particular interest in seeing you eat crickets (and before
I went veggie I've eaten a few myself; taste like whatever they're
cooked in), but I've done it on Medecos; it's no problem.
Having taken apart Medeco's before, I have to agree with Matt
On Fri, 24 Jan 2003, Matt Blaze wrote:
I have no particular interest in seeing you eat crickets (and before
I went veggie I've eaten a few myself; taste like whatever they're
cooked in), but I've done it on Medecos; it's no problem.
Well, unfortunately I specified live, which probably
The fact that the hole is on the bottom pin is not important. What is
important is that the hole at the change-key height does not need to
be at the same angular position as the hole at the master-key height.
It's hard to draw ascii art to show what I mean, but because the twist
holes are at a
12 matches
Mail list logo
