Re: Extracting uniform randomness from noisy source

2002-08-12 Thread John Kelsey
At 10:56 AM 8/12/02 +0100, Paul Crowley wrote: ... >Here's the game. Our attacker selects an algorithm MUNGE which takes >an unbounded stream of random bits as input and generates random >strings as output. We then select a key K and reveal it to the >attacker. We take a secret unbounded stream

Re: Extracting uniform randomness from noisy source

2002-08-12 Thread Paul Crowley
OK, here's an attempt at a formal definition of how secure a keyed hash function is for entropy collection. Here's the game. Our attacker selects an algorithm MUNGE which takes an unbounded stream of random bits as input and generates random strings as output. We then select a key K and revea

Re: Extracting uniform randomness from noisy source

2002-08-11 Thread John Kelsey
At 11:09 PM 8/7/02 +, David Wagner wrote: >John Kelsey wrote: >>a. If my input samples have enough entropy to make my outputs random, then >>I need to resist computationally unbounded attackers. (Otherwise, why >>bother with distilling entropy; just use a PRNG.) >> >>b. If my input samples