-Caveat Lector- an excerpt from: Revelations of an International Spy I. T. T. Lincoln Robert M. McBride & Company©1916 New York --[7]-- CHAPTER VII THE DANGEROUS RUSE WHICH WON THE CONFIDENCE OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE WHEN Legationsrath Gneist, the German Consul at Rotterdam, reads these words he will understand the dangerous game I was playing and the necessity for deception that I had to practise even upon him. When it finally became clear, that life in England for me, and every other naturalized foreigner, had become impossible, the cumulative effect of the spy hunting epidemic, the impending ruin of my business and the personal insult to which I was subjected under the roof of my own club (the National Liberal) filled me with a bitter desire for revenge. I made up my mind to shake England's 'dust from my feet but not without "getting even." The plan I mapped out to achieve this will seem to many rather startling. It was certainly original. It was nothing less than a decision to find out important naval and military secrets and to betray them to Germany, and, having achieved that, to quit England forever, if still alive. This is no mere figure of speech. I knew that what I was going to do—was technically high treason, but my blood was boiling in me at all the calculated barbarities inflicted by a haughty, perfidious race upon innocent people. My aim as stated was simplicity itself, but to carry it out meant clever acting. Indeed, to effectively carry out my scheme it was essential that my plan of campaign should be known only to me. To obtain the secret information required in my hazardous undertaking necessitated a confidential berth in the War Office. This was not so easily accomplished. I offered my services in turn to the Home Secretary, to Sir Edward Grey and to Mr. Churchill, all of —whom I knew personally, but they were not accepted. Next I attempted to get into the Counter-Espionage Department (M. 0. 5 J.) at the War Office. Just what happened I will set out in some detail. On December 10, I called on Lieutenant-Colonel Bellamy at the War Office and asked him to introduce me to the Secret Service officers. Fortunately for my plans I had for several weeks at the outbreak of hostilities served under this officer as censor of all Hungarian and Rumanian correspondence and cables at the War Office and at the Mount Pleasant Post Office. My old chief at once presented me to Major Anderson in room 225 of the War Office, who next day presented me to Capt. P. W. Kenny, who is the acting chief of the Secret Service at the War Office, or rather of the military CounterEspionage service. Captain Kenny is an officer of rare intelligence and ability and is one of the best linguists I had met in England. But then he is an Irishman. As an ex-M. P. I was cordially received. Now my aim really was nothing less than to lure part of the British fleet into a certain quarter of the North Sea on a certain day and to have the German fleet within easy steaming distance. In order to procure this, I proposed just the reverse to Captain Kenny and laid before him a carefully prepared scheme, the ostensible purpose of which was to destroy part of the German navy. The plan I proposed to Captain Kenny was as follows: "You lose, as a risk of war, vessels of all description. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc. Why not sacrifice one or two of these with a view of destroying part of the German Navy?" "Now what do you mean?" he queried. "You will send two or three cruisers, or one dreadnought and two cruisers, with attendant destroyers and torpedo boats, on some errand in the North Sea. You will let me know three or four days beforehand. I will notify the Germans and they will naturally send a more powerful squadron to the same vicinity on the same day in order to destroy them. In order not to send your men to certain death, you will tell them what is going to happen. They will be prepared; they will fight. Surely, some of your vessels will be sunk, for the Germans, knowing the type and number of your vessels, will be well prepared to deal with you. Yet it is almost certain that some of your vessels, at any rate, will escape and it is equally probable that in the fight you will damage or sink a German vessel. The Germans will then see that my information was correct. Now we will do this twice more; each time you must be ready to sacrifice some war vessels of old types. "After we have done this, say, three times, you will send a bigger squadron in order to lure out a large, or the largest, part of the German High Sea Fleet. In addition to your 'bait' squadron, you will have a very powerful squadron of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers within easy steaming distance, but far enough that even with the most powerful glasses they cannot be discerned on the horizon. You will give instructions to your 'bait' squadron how to fight and in which direction to run during the fight, luring the Germans into a trap; of course, you must have this well out in the North Sea, otherwise the Germans will not follow you towards your own coast. You might make an apparent attempt to force Heligoland, or bombard Borkum, and then keep up a running fight towards Rosyth. You can then have a powerful squadron north and south of the prescribed fighting course and capture or destroy the pursuing Germans." This was the scheme submitted to Captain Kenny. My real scheme was as follows: Not to tell the Germans what I told the English. In secret service one must -not and cannot trust any one. I would have worked on the assumption that at the very first "bait" fighting the English would have had a powerful squadron waiting within steaming distance, so that the Germans would not have taken them by surprise, but would have found them adequately prepared in any event. The Germans would have taken the necessary precautions. Now, supposing the English had acted according to my scheme two or three times, and I knew that the next time would have been the big scoop, two ways were open for the Germans: either to be satisfied with the number of ships, they had destroyed during the previous two or three rendezvous, and keep away; or, send all their available ships to outnumber the English. They could have done what they considered best. Of course, if the Germans had -not turned up at the rendezvous after two or three smaller naval battles, the Admiralty would have known that I was a German spy and would have shot me if they had still found me in England. But they would not have found me there. To carry out my plan was not so simple. I could not possibly propose this audacious plan to the Germans, for they would have mistrusted me. It is one of the safeguards of diplomatic espionage to distrust your immediate and "most trusted" agents, as well. I was sure, however, that after a few weeks I could have worked it so that they would have followed my lead. Independent of everybody I intended managing the scheme myself as follows: I would have advised the Admiralty, with whom I was connected, that I knew from the Germans that they are going to raid the English coast again. How did I know this without creating the suspicion that I was a German spy? Oh, very easily. By telling the English at the very outset that I was indeed a German spy, but only in order to accomplish a very complicated and daring ruse for England. In corroboration of this I gave them valuable German information, including two codes, keeping one for myself so that I could communicate with the Germans. I hope the reader follows me in this tangled vein of cross-plotting. Now, then, I would have walked up to the Admiralty and said: "I met a German spy to-day and I got very valuable information from him, but I can only tell you if you do not arrest him, for that will give both of us away. He just tells me that he had orders to be in Seaton Carew, take a room facing the sea in a high building on such and such a day and signal during the night out to sea, because a raid will be made on the Hartlepools." It is certain that the English would have sent a squadron to deal with the supposed "German raiders," and naturally enough they would not have come too near to Hartlepools so as not to frighten away the Germans. I would have, indeed, sent one of the numerous Germans in London to Seaton Carew with instructions what to do. But what is more important, I would have immediately cabled to the Germans that a squadron will be near the Hartlepools on the night of such and such a day, because the English have information that the Germans are to make a raid. How could I have sent such a telegram out of England? Wait and see. All will be explained below. Now the Germans would have seen that I had advance naval intelligence of the English squadron, while the English would have seen that my information about a German raid somewhere at the Hartlepools was correct. Of course, I would have refrained from mentioning how many German warships would come; so that the Germans would have been at liberty to send ten or sixteen vessels of various types and descriptions. It is certain that the English would not have expected more than four or six raiders. The Germans would have won. Needless to say I could not repeat this very same operation; but I could have executed a second one like this: "I have information that in a few days' time the Germans will send during the night two fast battle cruisers to bombard Dunkirk." What arrangements would the British have made? It is certain that they would have made a twofold arrangement. First, to send a small squadron to fight the Dunkirk raiders; second, a big and powerful squadron would have been cruising about the North Sea to intercept these two raiders and prevent them reaching their bases. This would have been my opportunity. I would have advised the Germans that about six British war vessels will cruise off Dunkirk, and that a very large and powerful squadron will be north of Wilhelmshaven, or about there, on such and such a date. The Germans would have known the whole story, the English only a small part of it, and they would have been caught in a fearful trap. Why and how this scheme could not be carried out—I will explain further on. In order to succeed the easier I explained my alleged scheme to a friend of mine, an M.P., who was so struck with its feasibility that he promised to mention it to Mr. McPherson, M.P., who is Parliamentary Secretary to Lord Kitchener. He also spoke to Mr. McKenna, the Home Secretary, in the Commons. Needless to say, he did not know of my real intentions. If this should reach his eyes he will be not a little surprised. Of course Mr. McPherson and Mr. McKenna in reading this will immediately know to which M.P. I am referring. My object in doing this was to forestall Captain Kenny's probable inquiries. On December 7, I met Captain Kenny at the War Office by appointment. He told me my plan was under consideration and he then went once more into a discussion of my scheme. On December 16, I again met Captain Kenny. He told me that my plan, though most admirable could not be accepted, as it would necessitate disclosing to me the whereabouts of the British fleet, or part of it, which could not be disclosed to any one, no matter what advantages might result from it. I was balked. However, by my plan and other factors I had evidently gained the confidence of Captain Kenny, who told me of a possibility of sending me in a few weeks I time to a neutral country for certain purposes. It was evident that I must adopt a new line of procedure. I knew that the headquarters of the German Espionage for England were at the German Consulate in Rotterdam and that the English, too, had many agents in that country. "Incidentally," he remarked, "we might ask you to go to Rotterdam to find out how much cocoa and other foodstuffs are exported from Holland into Germany," adding that they had found it hitherto very difficult to find this out. This at once showed me an opening. I said to myself, if such a comparatively easy matter causes the Counter-Espionage difficulties, provided I could find out this or other more important things, surely that would enable me to get behind the scenes, and thus accomplish my purpose. Next day, December 17, I left London for Rotterdam, where I arrived on the evening of the 18th. My trip to Rotterdam was not known to any one. Once there I had to devise means to gain the confidence of the German Consul. For it was evident that I might prejudice my case if I should straightway offer my services to him. No matter how sincerely I wished to help him, he might consider me as an emissary of England, in which case the achievement of my purpose would be altogether impossible. Now my object was to obtain important secrets from the Germans which I would use as a means to get into the confidence of the English and find out and use things to their harm. Consequently I am constrained to admit that I worked the German Consul in Rotterdam as my tool, by not disclosing to him my true plan. I hope Consul Gneist will appreciate my explanation and not feel annoyed. But a word of advice to him. He must be more careful in the future. For indeed, if I had been an English agent the consequences might have been disastrous, so important were the official secrets he confided to me. Had I desired it to be so most if not all the German spies concerned would have been caught by the English. From the foregoing it will be clear that nothing was further from my thoughts. The information that would have enabled me to do this came unwittingly from the German Consul at Rotterdam, as we shall see. He knows now, of course, that while I could not carry out my scheme, I prevented the information he gave me from being of any real service to the English by warning him the very moment I saw my plan had miscarried. On December 30, I had so far succeeded that next day the German Consul promised me the delivery of certain documents. During my conversation with Captain Kenny in London he told me once on service that although he knew that there were many German spies in England, he could not "unearth" their organization nor discover the general methods by which they sent their information to Germany. The information. I got from the Consul on the 30th placed in my hands the absolute and unquestionable power and means to hunt down most, if not all, of the German spies in England-had I wished to do so. In passing, I should like to remark that the Germans are better informed of the Secret Service of England than the English of the Germans. I will only give two instances. On December 29, I had a conversation at the German Legation at The Hague with Lieut.-Col. Von Ostertag, Military Attache of Germany, who, as Major Ostertag, was for seven years prior to the war German Military Attache in London. Lieut.-Col. von Ostertag during our conversation complained about a slighting remark Captain Kenny made about him to some one, following the outbreak of the war. This was very significant, for, knowing Captain Kenny to be a gentleman, I knew that he would not make a remark of that nature about any one except to one in his confidence. It was obvious, therefore, that in Captain Kenny's entourage there was some one who was in Germany's service. The other instance was furnished by Herr Legationsrath Gneist, the German Consul in Rotterdam. He not only knew a great deal of the Secret Service work of England, and of the disposition of part of the British Fleet, but he also knew one of the principal codes used by Captain Kenny's agents. I had to see the German Consul at 10 A.M. on December 31 by appointment. When I called at the Consulate he was not there, but had left a message for me, explaining that he had left for Wesel, Germany, that morning specially in my behalf, but would be back at 6 P.m. When I said that he could not do the return journey in that short time I was informed that a German motor car from Wesel was to meet him at Arnheim, take him to Wesel, and bring him back there. Wesel, it should be pointed out, is the headquarters of the Nachrichtendienst (Information Service) connected with Great Britain. Accordingly I called at 6 P.m. This was my final interview with the German Consul, and he promised to have all my instructions and codes copied out for me and sent to my hotel next morning. It was considered advisable not to call again at the consulate as I might have been shadowed by English spies. Now I must describe the nature of the information and documents I obtained from the German Consul in Rotterdam, information-it should be borne in mind—by the use of which I hoped to obtain secrets of the British Secret Service for purposes already indicated: 1. Exact knowledge how and by what means German spies in England transmitted their intelligence to Rotterdam. 2. Two codes generally used by the German spies in England for the transmission of intelligence by cable and one code specially prepared for me. 3. Some addresses in Rotterdam to which information was being sent. 4. A questionnaire drawn up by the Nachrichtendienst in Wesel. 5. The means by which the German spies in England were being financed. A detailed description of some of the above points may be of interest. As will be pointed out later, when my plan miscarried, I took steps to notify the Germans and warned them to effect immediate changes all around. This was nearly ten months ago, so that no harm can result from disclosing these details now: Methods and channels of intelligence, are divided into two categories: Urgent and Nonurgent. All urgent information is sent by cable, of course. It may be asked how it is possible for a German spy in England to send a telegram to Rotterdam, since there is a strict censorship in England and nothing but plain language messages were passed. To the uninitiated this may indeed seem an insurmountable difficulty; in fact, however, it is the simplest thing imaginable. The three codes above referred to are known in the German Secret Service as the "family code," the "oil code" and the "Lagenscheidt" code respectively. The "family code" and the "oil code" are restricted to reporting movements of the British Fleet. These two codes had key words for steering eastward, westward, north and south and for various longitudes and latitudes. Why? Because it was used extensively on the ocean and in the North Sea during the first few months of the war by German spies who were passengers on board ships. Whenever one of them saw a British squadron passing he promptly sent a wireless to a prearranged address sending love or best love to father, Alice, Daisy, Dorothy or Elsie, giving exact information of the number and type of war ships, longitude and latitude and direction in which they were steering. I can state as an absolute fact that British ships transmitted wireless messages not knowing that they reported their own fleets' movements. This code was used frequently until one wireless spy was caught by the British and put away. EXAMPLES OF THE "FAMILY CODE" AND "OIL CODE" (1) WEBER ROTTERDAM Best love to May love to Alice and fondest love to Aunt in Rosendaal Do write JOE (2) SCHERENSKy AMSTERDAM Cable prices 5 consignments of vaseline, 8 paraffin 12 gasoil invoice per waggon need it KELLETT (3) VAN STAGEN CO ROTTERDAM Quote without delay linseed oil cod blueoil 30 days draft vaseline invoice per barrel BAXALL ________ TRANSLATIONS - Keywords Code (1) WEBER ROTTERDAM Dearest love to May = two Lord Nelson Class Battleships Best love to Alice = two Super dreadnoughts and fondest love to Aunt in Rosendaal do write = four Torpedo Boats in Harwich riding at anchor (2) SCHERENSKY ROTTERDAM Cable prices 5 consignments vaseline 8 paraffin = Dover 5 first class cruisers 8 seagoing destroyers 12 gasoil invoice per waggon need it = 12 torpedo boats (dummy) steaming out northly direction (3) VAN STAGEN Co ROTTERDAM quote without delay linseed oil c.o.d. blueoil 30 days draft = Tyne two dreadnoughts four battle cruisers 5 vaseline invoice per barrel = first class cruisers (dummy) repairing ______ As will be seen it is very easy once you have thekey. But if you have -not the key, no amount of ingenuity, experience, or patient effort could ever decipher any of these messages. I will now give for the benefit of my readers three full and actual codes, which have been used during the first seven months of the war. I feel at liberty of disclosing them, for every one of them has been withdrawn, after a hint from me. Designation of Ships, Family Code Oil Code Harbors, Etc. Key Words Key Words Super-Dreadnought Alice Shale oil Dreadnoughts Daisy Linseed oil Lord Nelson Class Battleships May, Benzin Majestic Class Battle- ships Hilda Kerosene King Edward VII Class Battleships Ethel Gasolene Triumph and Swift- sure (only these two exist of this type) Florence Crude oil Battle Cruisers Amy Blue oil First-Class Cruisers Rose Vaseline Second-Class Cruisers Ella Lubricating oil Third-Class Cruisers Pauline Petroleum Scouts Elsie Vegetable oils Seagoing Destroyers Father Paraffin Other Destroyers Uncle Residues Torpedo Boats Aunt Gas oil Submarines Sister Fuel oil Older Battleships (re- serve fleet) Brother Benzol The Tyne Amsterdam quote The Clyde Helder can you sell Rosyth Naval Base Utrecht can you deliver The Wash Tilborg have you on stock Grimsby Vlissingen how soon can you ship Hull Hook of Holland how quick can you deliver The Hartlepools Leyden when could you ship Harwich Rosendaal when do you expect Dover Harlem cable prices Folkestone Arnheim wire prices Chatham Dockyard Ymuiden can quote Portsmouth Dockyard Breda could you offer Portland Dockyard Zandvoord can you offer The Nore Schiedam can you ship Boulogne Gennep could you ship Calais Dortrecht buy for me Dunkirk Maastricht quote for me Cherbourg Bergen-op-Zoon why didn't you ship Havre Middleburg why didn't you send Brest 0ldenloe can you acquire Berehaven Venloe could you acquire in damaged condition am well tons repairing am quite well barrel riding at anchor do write cisterns steaming out am feeling well waggons passed squadron thinking of you cwt steaming north sending need it steaming south am sending need it much steaming east sending you very urgent steaming west sending to you urgently wanted cruising about hope all well much needed I love I or quickly 2 bestlove 2 or without delay 3 dearest love 3 or f.o.b. 4 fondest love 4 or c.o.d. 5 much love 5 or 30 days draft 6 deepest love 6 or 45 days draft 7 greetings 7 or 60 days draft 8 best greetings 8 or 75 days draft 9 heartiest greetings 9 or 90 days draft 10 greetings and love 10 or 120 days draft 11 love and greetings 11 or as soon as pos-sible 12 best regards 12 or by return immediately over 12 kindest regards The two codes given, the "Oil" and the "Family" codes, can only be used for naval intelligence; nothing else can be transmitted in them. How could I, then, notify the Germans of other matters? Supposing I wanted to send any of the following messages: 1. Raid will be made on Heligoland within week. or 2. Four divisions new troops leaving for France. or 3. Am suspected be careful advise changing all codes notify all your agents. or 4. New dreadnought added to navy. To enable me to send any messages on any subject, I bad a third code, known to the Secret Service as Dictionary Code, because I take the necessary words out of any dictionary—English-German, German-Englisb, French-English or German-French. I simply cable the numbers of page, column and place of word. To mislead the censor I put dummy words into the message. The addressee of my message, as already pointed out, did not possess the key to my message; he simply acted as go-between out of sympathy for the German cause. Any dictionary will do, as long as the recipient of my message has the same, the very same, edition of same year. Pocket dictionaries of Lagenschneidt are the best, for they do contain two columns of twelve words on each page, which, in view of the fact that a shilling has 12 pence, is rather an advantage. But it is not absolutely necessary. The examples to follow are taken out of Wessely's Hand Dictionary (Enghsh-German), revised edition. I will now translate all the four messages above: 1. WEBER ROTTERDAM Market on account of Russian reverses disorganized not much business done your holdings following quotations (raid) (will) (be) (made) (on) (island) (Fortress) 169/39 239/15 21/45129/10 144/22119/39 92/15 (Within) (week) 239/36 237/21 Advise you buy American war stock. Laming It will be noted I did -not code the word Heligoland, simply because my dictionary does not contain that word, so I had to describe it in some other way. It will be obvious that to mention Heligoland would have been sheer madness. The second message would read as follows: 2. VAN SPANGE UTRECHT Your letter received prices too high am willing to close as follows: (four) (divisions) (new) (troops) (leaving) (for) 92/02 70/019 140/07 217/033 124/026 91/13 (France) 93/15 Bullock The 0 signifies second column word 2, or second column 19, etc. The third message would read as follows: 3. VANDEN BERGH ROTTERDAM Goods despatched to-day via Batavier Line mailing invoice as follows (am suspected) (be) (careful) (advise) (changing) (all) 2060/19 21/45 340/36 6/022 38/4 9/10 (codes) (notify) (all) (Your) (agents) 43/17 1410/32 9/10 2420/4 7/017 Calvert It will be noted that 0 is in this message sometimes affixed to the first figure, sometimes to the second. It is a simple device to confuse the censor or the Counter-Espionage. The meaning is the same: second column. To take above message, for instance: Page 206, word 19 in second column; page 34, word 36 in second column. How does he know that it is not page 3407 Simply because my dictionary and his have only 250 pages. In other words, I can put the 0 to the first or second figure in numbers exceeding 250; but certainly not in numbers below 250, for that would cause not only confusion but might make the deciphering impossible. The fourth message would read as follows: 4. WEBER ROTTERDAM Upon publication of Field Marshall French's report market recovered (new) (dreadnought) (added) (to) (Navy) 1400/7 720/16 5/16 214/11 1390/25 Laming All words in dictionary codes are merely dummies. Needless to say, I was provided with various addresses and for each address another signature previously agreed upon. A word about non-urgent messages sent by mail. It is known that all letters coming into Great Britain, or leaving Great Britain, are opened by the censors and read. Yet for many months information reached the Germans in ordinary or business letters. These letters did not contain any indication that they were not bona fide. But between the lines, dealing with family, business or other matters, were written in invisible ink the messages of the spies. This went on during the first six months of the war. The boast of the English that they knew this and used it in the name of Kuepferle needs qualification. Indeed, I am bold enough to flatly contradict it, and I challenge both Captain Kenny of the War Office, and Captain Hall, R. N., Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty, to contradict me when I say that before January 32 1915, they had no idea of this, although they spent thousands of pounds trying to find it out. Another means of transmitting information through the mail from England was to write in invisible ink on the white margin of English daily papers, weeklies or magazines and then to send them in an ordinary wrapper to a, prearranged address in Holland. As Consul Gneist laughingly remarked to me: "They can open all the letters they like; I am getting most of my postal information on the Times and other English papers.'' Information to the spies in England from headquarters in Rotterdam was conveyed in the same manner and by messengers crossing from Holland. Two kinds of invisible inks are, most generally used, i. e., lemon juice and cream milk. They are preferred to chemical invisible inks on account of their simplicity of use. You write a letter to a supposed friend. Between the written lines you write in lemon juice or cream milk. When dry they are invisible. Your "friend," when receiving the letter, heats them and the writing immediately appears. Now I come to the questionnaire drawn up by the Nachrichtendiest in Wesel. It put several questions to me on which they desired information. This questionnaire disclosed the fact that the Germans knew but little about Kitchener's army, its recruiting, composition, organization, the transport of troops from England to France, the training camps in England, and about numerous matters connected with the Indian troops, their camps in France, etc. It was this document which evoked from Captain Kenny the following remark: "How interesting, how interesting. I must show this to Lord Kitchener at once. He will be awfully amused and interested." Having gathered all the information, as above described, or rather having known on the 30th that I should get it next day in writing, I had carefully to consider how to use it. There was the first difficulty of carrying the papers into England to face. I was not satisfied with sending this kind of information to Holland. My ambition went higher; to obtain the confidence I needed, I determined to pretend to the English that I had gone to Holland to get possession of important German secrets in order to be of service to England. I set out to accomplish something. To do it successfully I had to obtain the assistance of the German Secret Service agents. If I had disclosed my entire plan to the German Consul in Rotterdam he would not have entertained it for a minute: I, therefore, only told him part of my scheme. He quite understood, however, that I wanted to be and was going to be, of help to him and his service. I was not on his staff. I did not ask any remuneration for my services; indeed, I distinctly told him I wanted none. I was free to act to the best of my own judgment, and under these circumstances I felt justified in not disclosing to him the precise nature of my scheme. One thing, however, I was bound to consider: In case my scheme should miscarry I had to prevent any great or lasting harm resulting therefrom to the Germans. This I did. Indeed, there was only one chance that I would not succeed, one chance only. I knew how it could arise; whence it might come. It was indeed this one thing which nullified my efforts. It was not the cleverness of the English Secret Service, it was this accidental and incidental circumstance which for the time being enabled Captain Hall to stultify me. He will know what I mean. But he is not yet through with me. We shall meet at Philippi. I owe him yet a reply to the last interview I had with him in his room at the Admiralty on January 28, in reply to an official telegram I received from him. I will pay him in my own way and time. On December 30, 1914, I knew, as already remarked, that next day I should have the various codes, documents, etc. I sat down and wrote a letter to Captain Kenny somewhat on the following lines: "Dear Captain Kenny: "You will no doubt be surprised to get a letter from me from Rotterdam. Seeing that for some reason unknown to me you hesitated to employ me, I came here on the 17th inst. in order to prove to you that I could indeed be of great service to you. I prefer not to divulge in a letter the result of my work, but I can tell you so much that you will be astonished and pleased. I shall leave here on Friday, January 1, arriving in London Saturday evening, and if possible,. should like to see you the same evening. Please drop me a line to my club. "I shall call there on my way home. "I am sending this letter through the British Consul here so that it shall quickly and safely reach you." I want to draw attention to the last paragraph. There was a reason for this. In order to cross to England I had to have my passport viseed at the British Consulate General in Rotterdam. To avoid unpleasant questions about my sojourn in Rotterdam and in order to obtain unmolested access into England I put the letter in an envelope and addressed it as follows: Capt. P. W. Kenny, M. 0. 5 J. War Office. and headed straightway with it to the British Consulate. The mystic letters M. 0. 5 J. I knew would do everything for me. They did. Arriving at the Consulate General I asked to see the Consul General himself. The nature of my business? That was only for the Consul's ears. My card was taken in and forthwith I was shown into the Vice-Consul's room. I pulled the envelope from my inside pocket with studied deliberation and showed it to the Vice-Consul. When he saw the letters M. 0. 5 J. and the name of Captain Kenny, he thought I must be of the English Secret Service. He looked up at me like a shot, pulled a chair as close as possible and asked me to be seated. In whispering tones he asked me whence I came, what I had done, etc. I gave him such replies as I wanted. I told him my object in calling was to ask him to forward my letter at once in his official despatch bag to the Foreign Office in London for safe transmission to Captain Kenny and to vise my passport. He readily consented. We had quite an interesting conversation and he suggested that he introduce me to the Consul General. He took me into the Consul General's private room. He is Mr. E. G. B. Maxse, a brother of the notorious German eater, the editor of the National Review (London). We had about an hour's conversation, of which I must mention two details; first to show how inefficient the English Secret Service is, and secondly, how easily it is fooled. During our conversation the British ConsulGeneral complained to me that he had a certain letter (how obtained I do not know) which he had reasons to believe contained matters in invisible ink. Could I tell him how to make invisible ink visible? He had tried all kinds of thing's but could not make the ink visible. Comment unnecessary. I told him that I was returning to London in a day or two with very important documents and I wanted him to allow me to put them into his official envelope under his own official seal. He suggested that he should send them to the Foreign Office. To this I demurred. He then readily agreed to my request. Could he read them? I said he better not. He ultimately agreed. Next day, December 31,1914, 1 saw the German Consul after his return from Wesel and it was arranged that he would send everything I had asked for to my hotel next morning. Friday, January 1, 1 received through a messenger of the Consulate all he promised. Forthwith I drove to the British Consulate where the documents were put under seal without being read or even seen, and a code message sent to the Foreign Office, London, at my dictation, somewhat to the following effect. "Advise Captain Kenny, War Office, Mr. Lincoln leaving to-night with important documents." I left Rotterdam New Year's Day, arriving in London next day-Saturday evening. When I arrived at Folkestone all passengers were subjected to a close scrutiny, examination and search. When the Secret Service men there started questioning me, instead of replying to their questions I pulled out the large official envelope bearing the official seal of the British Consulate General in Rotterdam and showed it to the man at my left (there was a Secret Service man on each side). When he saw the seal and the address he let me pass, remarking to the one on my right, "M.O.5J." They both saluted me and I pas" through. I drove to my club (the National Liberal), where I found this letter from Captain Kenny: "2-1-115. "War Office, Whitehall, S. W. "Dear Mr. Lincoln: "I shall be very interested to hear your news. I am here till 7.30 P.m. From 7.30 to 9.30, p.m. Telephone No. 3460 Vic. will find me, if you care to call me up. To-morrow, Sunday, I can see you any time between 11 and 1, or between 3.30 and 6.30, only please let me know by 'phone when I may expect you. Yours sincerely, (Signed) P. W. KENNY, Capt." I accordingly called up the number indicated, but Captain Kenny had already left the place. I left a message for him that I would call at the W. 0. next day at 11 as suggested. I did. And I was closeted with Captain Kenny exactly three hours. Captain Kenny was keenly anxious to hear my story. First of all I told him that I went to Rotterdam because the British Secret Service would not employ me and I was desirous of showing him that I could be of great service to him. "You are a sportsman," remarked Captain Kenny. I then asked him the following questions: "What amount of money is the British Government willing to spend in order to obtain the following information and documents? "1. The code by which the movements of the British fleet have been and are being reported to Germany. "2. A code which is being used by German spies in England for the transmission of telegrams (in plain language) to Holland. "3. The means, methods and channels they employ to send intelligence through the mails. "4. Some addresses to which telegrams and letters are being sent. "5. A disclosure how they are financed and through what channels. "6. A document which would show what the Germans do and do not know of the British Army." Captain Kenny was speechless. Before be recovered from his evident surprise I pointedly asked him: "Do you know any of these things?" He hesitated to reply. "It is no use, Captain, I said, "to tell me that you do, for I know that you do not." "Mr. Lincoln," he replied, "it is no use to ask that question because it is impossible to obtain any of that information." "But supposing it were possible," I replied, "what are you willing to spend to obtain possession of it ?" "Granted for the sake of argument that it were possible-money would be no consideration." "Very well, then," I said, "I have much pleasure supplying all this to you free." Words fail me to describe the effect of my words upon the captain. "What do you mean? I cannot understand you," he said. "I mean that all this information is in this room," said I, reaching into my pocket, "and I have much pleasure in handing it to you unconditionally." I drew the large envelope from my pocket, pointed out that the seal was untouched and handed it to the captain. Captain Kenny broke the seals, eagerly read through all the documents, made copious notes and drew up a long report of all I told him. He was quite beside himself with excitement. He could not sufficiently express his thanks, his astonishment. Before I left it was agreed that I must be employed in connection with this matter, indeed he insisted I must continue to work the thing, which augured well for my success. He said he was going to make a report of the whole matter that very afternoon and present it to Lord Kitchener, who, he said, would be immensely pleased, and to the Admiralty, and would let me know next day. Next morning, January 4, I went to my club and found the following letter from Captain Kenny: "Dear Mr. Lincoln: "War Office. "A certain naval officer would very much like to see you. He proposes calling on you (with me) at your club between 12 and 1 to-morrow. He is an authority on oil. I hope you will be in the club then; in any case I shall expect you here at 3.30 P. M. "Yours sincerely, "(Signed) P. W. KENNY, Capt." The words "he is an authority on oil" were put into the letter as a "blind." Captain Kenny called at my club at 12.20 P. M. and told me that the naval officer would not be introduced to me by his name, as that must remain a profound secret. Indeed I do not know to this day who he is. He is simply known to me as "C." Captain Kenny also asked me not to be surprised if our meeting place be somewhat unusual. A few minutes later a page boy came to me and told us that a naval officer was waiting in a taxi downstairs. "This means, the captain said, that we shall 'have to go." We entered the taxi and drove about the streets of London one hour and twenty minutes. It was explained to me that this was done for absolute secrecy in order to prevent German agents shadowing us. The naval officer, I learned, is and has been for ten years the chief officer of England's Secret Service. When we met he thanked me profusely and promised to let me have matter which his department would ask me to transmit to Rotterdam to hoodwink the Germans. Here I must explain that I withheld from the British one piece of information which would enable me at any time things did not go according to my program to warn the German Consul in Rotterdam. Between January 4th and 7th nothing happened, and I took it that they were preparing and outlining work for me. On January 7th, not hearing anything from either the War Office of the Admiralty, I went to the War Office and remonstrated with Captain Kenny for the delay. I was growing uneasy about the silence on personal grounds. I was afraid the British might be acting behind my back to take the matter out of my hands and effectively deceive the Germans. Consequently, in order to play my role of pretending to serve them, I had to take a strong attitude; in other words, to whistle, because I was afraid. Captain Kenny rang up "C" in my presence and told him that I was there and that we (Captain Kenny and I) thought it important that something should be done. "C" said he was very busy that day, but in a day or two he would be ready for me. When two days later I still had no news I grew very uneasy and considered myself in constant danger. On January 9, I again rang up Captain Kenny. He promised me that he would attend to the matter at once and asked me to call at the War Office Monday, January 11. This I did. Captain Kenny could not give me a satisfactory reason for the delay and silence of "C." Indeed, I gained the impression that the captain, himself, did not know what was going on. The matter apparently had been taken out of his hands. I gave him a friendly ultimatum, saying that unless I heard from him by the morrow I would lay the facts of the case before the Right Hon. Sir Henry Dalziel Bart, M.P. I had to show plenty of courage and resentment. Indeed, I made up my mind to find out what was going on behind the scenes. If developments were proceeding contrary to my plan I could then disappear quickly from England and warn the Germans. Next day, January 12, there was still no news. It was evident that I would have to act quickly. I decided to see Sir Henry. This I did because I knew from my parliamentary days that Sir Henry is one of the few independent Radicals who fear nobody. He is the owner of the great radical weekly, Reynolds Newspaper, also a kind of unofficial leader of a small set of extreme Radicals below the gangway in the House, and he wields great influence. I saw Sir Henry twice that day and made him red hot. He was very indignant. He promised to take up the matter with Lord Kitchener himself. I was fully cognizant of the dangerous nature of my procedure and made all preparations to leave England at a moment's notice. I notified Captain Kenny, by letter, of my visits to Sir Henry. Late at night, on January 13, Sir Henry rang me up to say that he had a message from the War Office "that the matter is having most urgent consideration." I received two letters, one from Captain Kenny, and the other from "C," complaining that the secret codes I had furnished did not "fit 'I any of the messages "caught" by the British, and criticizing me for communicating with Sir Henry. On the following afternoon I again saw Sir Henry at the Hotel Cecil. That night I did not go home to sleep but went to a hotel under an assumed name, as I expected anything to happen. Next day at 1 o'clock I had another interview with Sir Henry and I learned from him that I was to receive a summons from the War Office that day. I gathered from him that there was as yet no suspicion about me. I waited till 4 o'clock—no news from the War Office. I then decided—with the previous approval and knowledge of Sir Henry—upon a supremely courageous step. I went to the Admiralty and asked to see Mr. Winston Churchill. I was taken at once to his quarters, and he sent out his principal private secretary (Mr. Marsh) to tell me that he was too busy; would I tell his secretary what I came to see him about. I handed a long typewritten statement to Mr. Marsh, addressed to Mr. Churchill, complaining bitterly about the delay in my case. Mr. Marsh, after reading the document, left me, as he explained, for a few minutes. I was left there in his room and felt as though I were in the very lion's den. I did not know what might happen the next minute. Mr. Marsh returned about fifteen minutes later and had me conducted to the director of naval intelligence. This post is one of the most important of the Admiralty and is, as a rule, a stepping stone to the First Sea Lordship. Lord Fisher and Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg were directors of naval intelligence before becoming First Sea Lords. I was very well received. The Director, of course, knew everything. During a conversation lasting more than an hour, I was led to understand that nothing had yet been done except to send a letter to Holland pretending to come from me, telling the German Consul that I was laid up with pneumonia and consequently "I" must ask him (the Consul) to be patient for a while. I clearly saw that as yet they did not suspect me and that nothing had yet been found out. So I decided to wait a few days but to be on guard in case they should meanwhile either do something against me or the Germans. I waited six days and, not having word from any one, on January 21, I went up to the War Office and saw Captain Kenny, who asked me to come and see him next day between eleven and twelve. Accordingly, I called at the War Office on January 22. Captain Kenny definitely promised to write to me within two days. "Within two days" sounded just a trifle too definite not to arouse in me a suspicion that something was going on. All this time I kept in touch with Sir Henry. On January 25, I received a letter from Captain Kenny notifying me that my case had passed out of the jurisdiction of the War Office, and asking me to communicate with the Admiralty where I was expected. The tone of this letter was different from the preceding ones. Immediately after the receipt of this note I went up to the Admiralty, where I had a long talk with the Director. It was evident, from this conversation, that things were not proceeding according to my wish or in my favor, and I then decided to leave for New York by the first American liner sailing. This was on a Monday. There was no boat available before Saturday, hence I had to put them off for a while. This I succeeded in doing by hammering at them for recognition through Sir Henry and by addressing a letter to Mr. Churchill. On January 27, I received a reply, referring me to the Director and then came this official telegram: "Lincoln, 51 Torrington Sq., W. "Please call and bring your passport. Direc-tor of Intelligence." I was puzzled by the request to bring my passport with me. As it turned out, it was a trap. I called upon the Director of Intelligence. Before I was taken into his room and after my arrival had been announced to him, I saw two gentlemen being let into his room. I may remark that at my interviews with the Director, Lieutenant Herschell, R. N., was always present. When I entered this room I surmised at once that something had gone wrong. In addition to Lieutenant Herschell, as usual in his uniform, two gentlemen in civil attire were present. One of them was pretending to be busy with some books; the other, with his face turned away, pretended not to be interested in the conversation at all, though furtively taking shorthand notes. Captain Hall,. the Director, put an innocent-looking question to me. This showed me that the game was up. I expected to be arrested at once. Indeed, I cannot understand even now why they did not arrest me. However, I kept up the play and finally after a clever tactical conversation, left the room unmolested. They let me go, thinking that they had me in any case due to the fact that all passports in circulation were declared void. Indeed Captain Hall, who at first wanted to keep my passport, returned it to me with the ironical remark: I I All right, you can have it back, it is only valid two more days." (The decree above referred to demanded new passports from the first of February.) In order to be able to flee I "played" information into their hands that I would try to escape to Holland. Next morning I left London and sailed on the steamer Philadelphia the following day, January 30th, for New York, where I arrived on February 9th, and at once got in touch with a certain German. Through him I got my cable to Berlin past the English censor without delay. Before leaving London I sent a note by circuitous route to the German Consul at Rotterdam, telling him in a prearranged code of all that had happened and advising him immediately to take the necessary steps. In spite of the failure of my chief plans I dis-covered during my dallying with the War Office some plans of tremendous moment to the German Intelligence Department. Through some inad-vertences of Captain Kenny's, I learned that the Secret Service of England was then considering and elaborating a plan to blow up all the railway bridges and important railway stations of the Rhine by sending into Germany emissaries with false passports. I also discovered that there were Russian Secret Service men at this time in Lon-don, who held daily conferences at the War Office with Captain Kenny and the two colonels, devis-ing a plan of military espionage in Germany. There was a naturalized American citizen (native of Holland) in London, holding the temporary rank of Lieutenant in one of the Indian regiments. He was for a while in Marseilles and afterwards in one of the Indian troop camps near Orleansbut was on furlough in England. It was decided to send him into Germany. He was to go first to Holland and make the necessary arrangements to enable him to travel in Germany as a Dutch commercial agent and so organize a thorough system of espionage there. My warnings to Berlin soon made this plan ineffectual. I also obtained accurate information about the mobilization of Kitchener's army and forwarded it to Germany. This was of great value to the General Staff, for in spite of the activities of their spies in England they had but meager knowledge of the new armies. Having escaped from the admiralty detectives by a mere chance, you can imagine my mingled emotions when I read in a New York morning paper two months later this paragraph: CODE OF SPY USED TO SPY ON GERMANS British Correspond with Kaiser's Workers Under Name of Kuepferle, a Prisoner LONDON, April 19.—Anton Kuepferle, the American citizen of German birth, who hails from Brooklyn, and is held for trial on a charge of supplying Germany with information concerning the movements of British troops and ships, is said to have been the means of affording British detectives much inside information concerning the workings of the German spy system, with headquarters in Holland. Kuepferle's arrest was kept a secret for nearly two months. Meantime it is reported that Scotland Yard men were using the prisoner's name as a means of communicating with German officials in Holland. In Kuepferle's baggage sheets of paper for use with invisible ink were found. Imitating Kuepferle's handwriting, the detectives are said to have written letters to German spy chiefs, between the lines of which they traced in invisible ink all sorts of questions asking further instructions. A rapid fire correspondence is reported to have continued until Kuepferle had actually been in jail for many weeks. A plain recital of facts like a police inspector's notes, yet of personal and moving interest to me! There is, however, dramatic surprise in the report lying hidden in the statement that Scotland Yard actually did correspond with German officials in Holland in the name of Kuepferle—unknown to the German Secret Service. This is indeed interesting. The climax, however, is to be found in the facts that the German Secret Service knew that Kuepferle's alleged reports came from Scotland Yard and the requested instructions they ostensibly sent to Kuepferle were indeed meant to mislead the British officials. As for my old friend Captain Hall of the Intelligence Department, I only wish I could witness his chagrin when he reads this narrative of one of the chief actors in this drama of plot and counterplot. Only now will he understand why his "dummy " messages in the name of poor Kuepferle were taken at their true value and the replies he got were fashioned by keener wits at Wilhelmstrasse. pps. 235-277 --[cont]-- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. 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