-Caveat Lector-
http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?d=/commentary/CentralAsia-20070526.xml
CLAN POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA
Oxford Analytica
May 26, 2007
SUBJECT: Informal power structures in Central Asia.
SIGNIFICANCE: In all Central Asian states, most formal executive
authority is vested in the president. However, despite the outward
appearance of strong Soviet-style governance structures, Central
Asian politics is often settled by compromises between influential
elite groups, usually referred to in local nomenclature as clans.
ANALYSIS: Clan-type sociopolitical structures based around kinship
ties date back to the Middle Ages. Traditional clans evolved into
their modern form during the Soviet era by adapting to, and
exercising much of their power through, the administrative structure
of the Communist Party. The subsequent seamless transformation of
Soviet republics into independent states in the early 1990s owes much
to the continuity of clan influence.
Clan purpose. The chief purpose of a clan is to ensure the collective
economic and physical security of its members from depredations of
other clans. To achieve this, clan members cooperate through
established patronage and mutual support networks to aggregate
economic and political power.
Modern clan membership is generally determined by some, though rarely
all, of the following factors:
common ethnicity;
kinship ties;
place of origin—by region, city, village, or district;
place of education;
place of work (e.g., police force, government ministries); and
vertical business relationships.
In several respects, clan linkages in Central Asia are no different
from social and business networks that exist in most other societies.
However, the significance attributed to clan affiliation in Central
Asia is often much stronger than elsewhere.
Although clans have limits to their membership, often defined by
geographical region, they are not immutable structures. An outsider
without prior attachments to other clans and who proves himself loyal
may be admitted to a clan. For example, it is not unusual to find
ethnic Russian, Tatar, or Korean members of Uzbek clans. On the other
hand, it is relatively difficult for a disaffected insider to leave,
because his social support network is tied to his clan.
Internal strife. The hierarchical structure, coupled with the
personal nature of allegiances, can result in fissures emerging after
the death of a prominent clan member, as loyalties are renegotiated.
Thus, although charismatic family members or close associates of clan
leaders are often groomed as successors, there is no guarantee that
the anointed successor will in fact become leader. Prolonged, fragile
transition periods can occur. Yet public manifestations of interclan
rivalry are rare: typically, the only signs are the unexpected
replacement of officials or their flight into exile.
Successfully navigating between the competing interests of clans and
avoiding overt challenges to central power are the hallmarks of
durable leadership in the region at all levels. Tactics adopted by
Central Asian presidents to head off challenges to their power have
usually focused on destroying competing clans by sacking, imprisoning
or driving into exile their leaders. In extremis, military force has
been used. Such “clan decapitation” attempts have frequently failed,
forcing presidents to rescind or significantly alter their decisions.
Clan strength. Generally, market reforms have not restricted the
clans’ ability to command economic power. In fact, clans have often
propelled economic reform to strip state enterprises of their assets.
By contrast, political reform has tended to weaken clans by
increasing public accountability.
The strength of clan structures varies across the region, being
historically most robust among Uzbeks and Tajiks, and somewhat more
nebulous among Kazakhs, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz, owing partly to their
nomadic antecedents:
1. Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s elites are traditionally cast around the
three ‘juz’ (hordes), each representing a vast swathe of the country.
Juz antecedents are still sometimes relevant, but, with less than two-
thirds of the population being ethnically Kazakh, have relatively
little significance on the modern political scene. Allegiances within
provincial power structures are more important. Moreover, several
oligarchic elites that emerged in the early 1990s have become a real
political force.
2. Kyrgyzstan. The principal clan cleavages in Kyrgyzstan reflect the
geographical divide between north and south. Within each area,
provincial allegiances remain important. During and since the Soviet
era, as increasing numbers of Kyrgyz settled in major urban centers
and took on more government posts, the influence of Kyrgyz elites has
grown at the expense of Uzbek clans and Russians.
Since southerner President Kurmanbek Bakiyev ousted his northern
predecessor Askar Akayev in 2005, he has consolidated southern
influence over central government. Among other things, he emasculated
the post of prime minister, which he conceded to a northern
politician as part of the settlement with the opposition.
3. Tajikistan. The country’s main clans, Garm and Kulyab, were the
main protagonists in the civil war of the 1990s. Most other clans
also participated, including ethnically Uzbek clans in the north and
west, which frequently received military help from neighboring
Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan’s provincial clan structure is complicated by internal
population transfers in the Soviet era. The president hails from
Kulyab and heads a government that attempts to exclude other clans
from sharing power, so far as this is possible while maintaining
relative stability.
4.Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan’s five traditional tribal groupings
formed the basis for its modern clan structure. By 1991, Turkmen
clans included Moscow-educated technocrats, who formed the basis for
the country’s central and provincial governments. However, late
President Saparmurat Niyazov emasculated this intelligentsia through
systematic dismissals and arrests.
Turkmen clans are now weak, with no single geographical clan having
strong leadership or deep and broad political influence. The most
important elites are probably those on whom Niyazov relied to
maintain his rule: the National Security Committee, and the Defence
and Interior ministries. Their role in raising Gurbanguly
Berdymukhammedov to the presidency is now likely to ensure that they
will be the principal beneficiaries of his rule.
5. Uzbekistan. Along with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan has the most
sophisticated and entrenched clan structure in the region. Divisions
lie mainly along provincial lines, with strong semi-autonomous clans
arising out of the power ministries. Uzbek clan influence also
extends into ethnically Uzbek areas of neighboring states. In recent
decades, the central government has been controlled by clans from
Samarkand, Jizzak, and Tashkent. Challenges have also been typically
mounted from one of these provinces or from the Ferghana Valley. Like
their Tajik counterparts, certain Uzbek clans have used Islamist
militancy as a cover for their essentially secular agendas.
President Islam Karimov, whose weak clan background made him an ideal
compromise candidate for Soviet and postindependence regimes alike,
has shrewdly maneuvered between powerful competing clans, keeping
most elites content. He has also sought, albeit less successfully, to
build a clan of his own. He remains perilously close to being removed
and probably survives only because it is in no clan’s interest to
have the country descend into a Tajik-style civil war.
CONCLUSION: The impact of clans on Central Asian politics varies
significantly across the region, according to traditional social and
cultural practices, ethnic identity and homogeneity, and the
structure of formal political power. So far the clans, coupled with
self-interested economic reforms and the virtual absence of political
reforms in the region, have strengthened elites at the expense of the
majority of the population. There is little sign that this trend will
be reversed in the years ahead.
Keywords: EE, RUCIS, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, economy, politics, social,
corruption, coup, crime, election, ethnic, government, human rights,
infrastructure, opposition, party, policy, population, poverty,
private sector, public sector, reform, regional, regulation, riot,
security, talks, welfare
Oxford Analytica is an international, independent consulting firm
drawing on a network of over 1,000 senior faculty members at Oxford
and other major universities and research institutions around the
world. For over 20 years, Oxford Analytica has been providing timely,
objective and authoritative analysis of the implications of major
global economic, political, strategic and public policy developments
for leading corporations and governments. Current clients include
more than 35 governments, major international institutions and more
than 160 multinational corporations and financial institutions. This
expertise is made available to clients of Oxford Analytica on a daily
basis via the on-line Daily Brief services and via specifically
commissioned Consultancy and Research.
All rights reserved. Copyright © 2007 Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc
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