| http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/yspace/articles/bmd/chomsky.htm
July 2001 Hegemony or Survival By Noam Chomsky At the end of June,, the UN Conference on Disarmament concludes the second of its year 2001 sessions. Prospects for any constructive outcome of disarmament efforts are slim. Discussions have been blocked by US insistence on pursuing ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, against near-unanimous opposition. On the purpose of BMD, there is a fair measure of agreement across a broad spectrum. Potential adversaries regard it as an offensive weapon. Reagan's SDI ("Star wars") was understood in the same light. China's top arms control official simply reflected common understanding when he observed that "Once the United States believes it has both a strong spear and a strong shield, it could lead them to conclude that nobody can harm the United States and they can harm anyone they like anywhere in the world. There could be many more bombings like what happened in Kosovo" -- the reaction of most of the world to what was perceived as a reversion to the "gunboat wars" of a century ago, with the "colonial powers of the West, with overwhelming technological advantages, subduing natives and helpless countries that had no ability to defend themselves," doing as they choose while "cloaked in moralistic righteousness" (Israeli military analyst Amos Gilboa). The reaction to the US-UK Gulf War was much the same among the traditional "natives and helpless countries." Fortunately for its self-image, Western ideology is well-insulated from such departures from right thinking. China is also well aware that it is not immune. It knows that the US and NATO maintain the right of first use of nuclear weapons, and knows as well as US military analysts that "Flights by U.S. EP-3 planes near China...are not just for passive surveillance; the aircraft also collect information used to develop nuclear war plans" (William Arkin, Bull. of Atomic Scientists, May/June 2001). Canadian military planners advised their government that the goal of BMD is "arguably more in order to preserve U.S./NATO freedom of action than because U.S. really fears North Korean or Iranian threat." Prominent strategic analysts agree. BMD "will facilitate the more effective application of U.S. military power abroad, Andrew Bacevich writes (National Interest, Summer 2001): "By insulating the homeland from reprisal -- albeit in a limited way -- missile defense will underwrite the capacity and willingness of the United States to `shape' the environment elsewhere." He cites approvingly the conclusion of Lawrence Kaplan: "Missile defense isn't really meant to protect America. It's a tool for global dominance," for "hegemony." That this goal should be embraced by all right-thinking people follows at once from the principles of the "respectable" opinion that "defines the parameters within which the policy debate occurs." The spectrum is very broad: it excludes only "tattered remnants of hard-core isolationists" and "those few beleaguered radicals still pining for the glory days of the 1960s," and is "so authoritative as to be virtually immune to challenge" (Bacevich). The first principle is straightforward: "America as historical vanguard." According to this authoritative principle, "history has a discernible direction and destination. Uniquely among all the nations of the world, the United States comprehends and manifests history's purpose," namely, "freedom, achieved through the spread of democratic capitalism, and embodied in the American Way of Life." Accordingly, US hegemony is the realization of history's purpose; the merest truism, "virtually immune to challenge." The principle is by no means novel, nor is the US unique in history in basking in such praise from domestic thinkers. In contrast, the goal offered the public -- protection from "rogue states" -- is not taken very seriously. Unless dedicated to instant collective suicide, no state would launch missiles at the US. And there are far easier and safer means to inflict enormous damage on its territory. "Anyone who doubts that terrorists could smuggle a nuclear warhead into New York City should note that they could always wrap it in a bale of marijuana," one prominent analyst comments sardonically. Another points out that "a nuclear bomb that could easily wipe out Manhattan and kill 100,000 people is a ball of plutonium weighing about 15 pounds. It is a little bigger than a softball. One such bomb could be carried into the United States in a suitcase. And if one could, many could." Nuclear weapons are, of course, not the only weapons of mass destruction (WMD): chemical and biological weapons are arguably a greater threat to the rich and powerful. The 1997 treaty banning chemical weapons is languishing in large measure because the US has not funded inspections and other action, while Washington has "made a mockery" of the treaty by effectively exempting itself, a senior analyst of the Henry Stimson Center observes. Biological weapons bans have been undermined by US insistence on limiting inspections "in order to protect American pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies." The Bush administration reportedly intends to reject the draft treaty resulting from six years of negotiations on means of verifying compliance with the 1972 treaty banning biological weapons (NYT, April 27, May 20, 2001). All this aside, it is widely recognized that the most serious threat to US (and world) security is the huge Soviet nuclear weapons system, with safeguards and command-and-control systems deteriorating severely as the economy has collapsed under neoliberal reforms. Clinton negotiators encouraged Russia to adopt Washington's launch-on-warning strategy to alleviate Russian concerns over BMD and annulment of the ABM treaty, a proposal that is "pretty bizarre," one expert commented, because "we know their warning system is full of holes." Accidental launch has come perilously close in recent years. Clinton had a small program to assist Russia in safeguarding and dismantling nuclear weapons, and providing alternative employment for nuclear scientists. A bipartisan Energy Department task force called for sharp increase in funding of such programs. Co-chair Howard Baker, former Republican Senate majority leader, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April that "it really boggles my mind that there could be 40,000 nuclear weapons...in the former Soviet Union, poorly controlled and poorly stored, and that the world isn't in a state of near-hysteria about the danger." One of the first acts of the Bush administration was to reduce these programs, increasing the risks of accidental launch and leakage of "loose nukes" to other countries, including Washington's favorite "rogue states," followed by nuclear scientists with no other way to employ their skills. Russian proposals to reduce missiles sharply, well below Bush's proposals, have been rejected. A common argument is that BMD won't work. A much more dangerous possibility is that it may seem feasible; appearance is interpreted as reality on matters of survival. US intelligence predicts that any deployment will impel China to develop new nuclear-armed missiles, expanding its nuclear arsenal tenfold, probably with multiple warheads (MIRV), "prompting India and Pakistan to respond with their own buildups," with a likely ripple effect to the Middle East. The same analyses, and others, conclude that Russia's "only rational response would be to maintain, and strengthen, the existing Russian nuclear force." At the UN conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty in May 2000 there was broad condemnation of BMD on grounds that it would undermine decades of arms control agreements and provoke a new weapons race. Both political parties insist on it, though at different rates. General Lee Butler, former head of the US Strategic Command (1992-94), regards it as "dangerous in the extreme that in the cauldron of animosities that we call the Middle East, one nation [Israel] has armed itself, ostensibly, with stockpiles of nuclear weapons, perhaps numbering in the hundreds, and that inspires other nations to do so. An October 1998 "Memorandum of Agreement" between the US and Israel, upgrading their military and strategic relationship, was widely interpreted to mean that the US regards Israel's nuclear arsenal "not only as a positive factor in the regional balance of power, but also as one it should support and enhance" (Foundation for Middle East Peace Special Report, Winter 1999). From 1998, unofficial US policy has been to increase military aid to Israel by $60 million a year. In January 2001, the outgoing Clinton administration announced that the policy is to continue through 2008, at which point the previous $1.8 billion annual level will have increased to $2.4 billion. Clinton also recommended that Israel be among the first recipients of the F-22 jets now under development. In June the Israeli air force announced the purchase of 50 F-16 jets at a cost of $2 billion, to be financed largely through US military aid, shortly after its US F-16s were used to bomb Palestinian civilian targets. The US and Israel conduct regular secret joint exercises, as Israel is being converted into an offshore US military base (on these programs, see William Arkin, Washington Post, May 7, 2001). According to the Israeli press, one of these joint exercises, in September 2000, was devoted to plans for Israeli reconquest of the enclaves transferred to Palestinian administration; US marines provided training in weapons that Israel lacked and "American fighting techniques." What is already "dangerous in the extreme" will become even more so as the renewed US impetus to proliferation of WMD has its predictable effects, again increasing the threat to everyone's security, even survival. The actual plans may seem irrational, but that is only if one values survival above hegemony. The history of the arms race reveals quite a different calculus. 50 years ago, the only threat to US security, then only potential, was ICBMs. It is likely that the USSR would have accepted a treaty terminating development of these weapons, knowing that it was far behind. In his history of the arms race, McGeorge Bundy reported that he could find no record of any interest in pursuing this possibility. Recently released Russian archives strongly reinforce assessments by high-level US analysts that after Stalin's death, Khrushchev called for mutual reduction of offensive military forces, and when these initiatives were ignored by Washington, implemented them unilaterally over the objection of his own military command. US archives reveal that the Eisenhower administration had little interest in negotiated disarmament and other moves to relax international tensions. Kennedy planners doubtless shared Eisenhower's understanding that "a major war would destroy the Northern hemisphere." They also knew of Khrushchev's unilateral steps to reduce Soviet offensive forces radically, and also knew that the US was far ahead by any meaningful measure. Nevertheless, they chose to reject Khrushchev's call for reciprocity, preferring to carry out a massive conventional and nuclear force build-up, thus driving the last nail into the coffin of "Khrushchev's agenda of restraining the Soviet military" (Matthew Evangelista, Cold War International History Project, Dec. 1997). Without continuing, the record shows that there is little novelty in Clinton-Bush preferences. PART TWO European observers find it "a paradox" that "a country willing to spend more than $100bn on an unproven project to blow up incoming nuclear warheads as they enter the atmosphere would opt not to pay less than a thousandth of that amount to help prevent plutonium falling into the hands of `rogue states'," while knowing full well that "any `rogue bomb' is far more likely to arrive in a suitcase or by truck or boat than in a conspicuously launched missile that has a return address clearly marked on it" (Julian Borger, Guardian Weekly, May 24). The other current choices that enhance the threat to survival seem, on the surface, equally paradoxical. The paradox is resolved when the values of hegemony and survival are properly ranked, and other advantages of military programs to which we return are factored in. As Vijay Prashad pointed out in his recent commentary on SDI and BMD (June 18), the primary issue is not BMD but control of space, also a bipartisan program. These crucial facts reached general public awareness with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's announcement of overhaul of the Pentagon's space programs, "sharply increasing the importance of outer space in strategic planning." The new plans call for "developing weapons systems for outer space" a "power projection" from space, which means "putting offensive weapons into space" (NYT, May 8; Christian Science Monitor, May 3). The plans were outlined in the report of the second Rumsfeld panel, released in January (the first, in October 1998, warned of missile attack threats, apparently influencing Clinton's decision to accelerate BMD programs). The report of the second panel concludes that space warfare is "a virtual certainty," and calls for the development of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) (in violation of the 1972 ABM treaty) and placing weapons in space (in violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty). Reviewing these plans in Foreign Affairs (May 2001), Michael Krepon, former President of the Henry Stimson Center, notes that they contain an internal contradiction: ASATs are far easier to develop than BMD, and an adversary's ASATs will nullify any BMD program by disabling the satellites on which it relies. The contradiction can be overcome only "by utterly dominating space in the ways suggested by the Rumsfeld report," with offensive weapons and an escalating arms race in space as others inevitably take countermeasures. He recommends, instead, strengthening the existing treaties -- which have been observed, he notes. That would make good sense if the goal were survival rather than hegemony. The US Space Command holds that "In the future, being able to attack terrestrial targets from space may be critical to national defense. U.S. Space Command therefore is actively identifying potential roles, missions, and payloads for this probable new field of battle." The basic rationale was explained in its brochure "Vision for 2020." The primary goal is announced prominently on the front cover: "dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment." This is the next phase of the historic task of military forces. "During the westward expansion of the continental United States, military outposts and the cavalry emerged to protect our wagon trains, settlements, and railroads" -- acting solely in self-defense, we are to understand, perhaps pursuing the well-intentioned but failed efforts "to lead, guide and help Native Americans [among others] toward the right side of history" (Bacevich), America's historic mission for the world. And "nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests." The next logical step is space forces to protect "U.S. National Interests [military and commercial] and Investments." The US role in space should be comparable to that of "navies protecting sea commerce," though now with a sole hegemon, far more overwhelming than the British Navy in centuries past. The Space Command is of course aware of Krepon's dilemma, and plans to overcome it by "Full Spectrum Dominance": overwhelming military dominance on land, sea, and air as well as space, so that the US will be "preeminent in any form of conflict," in peace or war. The need for such dominance will mount as a result of the increasing "globalization of the economy," which is expected to bring about "a widening between `haves' and `have-nots'," an assessment shared by US intelligence in its projections for 2015 (contrary to the underlying economic theories, but in accord with reality). The widening divide may lead to unrest among the have-nots, which the US must be ready to control by "using space systems and planning for precision strike from space" as a "counter to the worldwide proliferation of WMD" by unruly elements -- a predictable consequence of the recommended programs, just as the "widening divide" is an anticipated consequence of the preferred form of "globalization." The Space Command could have extended its analogy to "navies protecting sea commerce" and the military "defending" expanding interests. Navies, and the military generally, have played a prominent role in technological and industrial development throughout the modern era. Also to corporate consolidation: the noted pacifist Andrew Carnegie relied heavily on naval contracts in building the first $1 billion corporation, US Steel. Militarization of space offers similar opportunities for the current era. "In terms of international technological potential," economic historian Clive Trebilcock writes, "the ability to produce the largest gunmountings around 1910 was roughly equivalent to the ability to manufacture space vehicles around 1980." The task of constructing huge machines to fire projectiles from a moving platform at a moving target was one of the most complex engineering problems of the day, leading to major advances in metallurgy, electronics, machine tools and manufacturing processes. Quick-firing guns and advanced rifle production also posed challenging tasks for engineering and manufacture, which could be undertaken by "civilian" industry thanks to government contracts, which "played a vital part in removing the risk barriers from mass production" and preliminary research and development (R& D). The results were transferred directly to the automotive and other major modern industries. These developments a century ago were a large step forward from earlier stages, when the "American system of Manufactures" astounded the world, based on 40 years of investment and R&D in the US Ordnance Department at the Springfield Armory and elsewhere, laying the basis for "a world revolution in mass production." Earlier, advances in guncasting from the mid-18th century laid the basis for iron production and use of steam engines, and were "instrumental in facilitating the rise of large-scale industry, indeed in creating the factory system." The same factors persisted after World War II, but with a qualitative leap forward, this time primarily in the US, as the military provided a cover for creation of the core parts of the modern high tech economy. None of the beneficiaries want to see the closing of what Trebilcock calls "the military bank, spending through the public purse, [which] has proved a massive paymaster of scientific development," technological and industrial as well. Promoting advanced industry has been a leading objective of military planning since World War II, when it was recognized by business leaders that high-tech industry could not survive in a competitive "free enterprise" economy and that "the government is their only possible savior" (Fortune, Business Week). Reagan's SDI was peddled to the business world on these grounds. Maintaining "the defense industrial base" -- that is, high-tech industry -- was one of the factors brought to congressional attention by President Bush when he called for maintaining the Pentagon budget immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall had eliminated the Russian pretext. Militarization of space is a natural next step, which will be propelled further by the anticipated arms race. Others too are well aware of its economic potential. Retreating from his earlier critical stance, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stated in March that Germany would have a "vital economic interest" in developing BMD technology, and must be sure that "we are not excluded" from technological and scientific work in the field. Participation in BMD programs could strengthen domestic industrial bases generally in Europe, it is expected (see Defense Monitor, March 2001). For such reasons, the US has recently refused to join the rest of the world in reaffirming the Outer Space Treaty (joined in 1999 and 2000 by Israel, in 2000 by Micronesia), and has blocked negotations at the UN Conference on Disarmament since its current sessions opened in January. China and Russia have called for demilitarization of space; Russia proposed further moves, including reduction of warheads to 1500 and creation of nuclear-free zones. "The U.S. remains the only one of the 66 member states to oppose launching formal negotiations on outer space," Reuters reported in February; also reported in the Deseret News (Salt Lake City), in virtually the only coverage of the Conference in the US media. On June 7, China again called for banning of weapons in outer space, but the US refused, having "consistently blocked the start of negotiations in the UN disarmament conference on preventing an arms race in outer space" (Financial Times, June 8). Again, that makes good sense if hegemony, with its short-term benefits to elite interests, is ranked above survival in the scale of operative values. |
