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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ARTICLE 01 - Ten More Things I Do Not Know Or Understand ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- By Matthew Dodd Since writing my original list of ten subjects on which I freely confessed my ignorance (DefenseWatch, Dec. 19, 2001), I've come to realize that my situational awareness is constantly being challenged. I also discovered that I am not so much ignorant as I am curious about my environment and the people around me. So as a result of personal observation, casual conversation in the Pentagon and - most important, DefenseWatch reader Feedback messages - I am proud to present a new Top 10 roster of things I do not know or understand: 10. Why do so many people complain about ineffective and inefficient meetings, yet when most of those same people run their own meetings, they repeat the same ineffective and inefficient practices about which they previously complained? 9. Why is it probable on any given day in the Pentagon to see U.S. Air Force personnel wearing the following uniforms and accessories: shoe taps; civilian backpacks, gym bags, computer carrying cases (hung from shoulders or slung on backs); varying shades of black umbrellas; at least a half-dozen variations of black shoes; regular and desert camouflage utilities (sleeves up or down and trousers bloused or tucked into their boots); short or long-sleeve shirts; parkas, flightsuits (sleeves up or down), tanker jackets, Gore-Tex jackets, overcoats, trenchcoats, varying shades of leather fighter jackets (zippers up or down for each); V-neck, crew neck, and button/cardigan sweaters (buttoned or unbuttoned); around-the-neck and retractable pocket-clipped badge holders; berets, flight caps, garrison covers, ball caps with various unit logos and slogans, many types of black gloves - cloth, leather and civilian? (I guess when it comes to uniform combinations, no one comes close to the Air Force.) 8. Why are there no more libraries or bookstores and only one gym/athletic center in the Pentagon, but over a dozen places to eat? 7. Why, after the attack on the Pentagon last Sept. 11, do we continue to value personal convenience over physical security for our senior defense leadership (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior staff, the service secretaries, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Richard Myers, Vice Chairman Gen. Peter Pace, the four service chiefs) by keeping their offices on the outermost ring of the Pentagon - the ring most vulnerable to outside attacks from the ground, vehicles and the air? 6. Why are there about 50,000 active badges allowing access to the Pentagon for the approximately 20,000 personnel stationed there? 5. Why is the World Trade Center "memorial" a public media issue but I have not even heard any discussion about a comparable Pentagon memorial? (A few appropriate words on a small wall at the recently opened Pentagon metro transit station is nice: "In memory of all those whose lives were forever changed by the events of Sept. 11, 2001" - but it is not enough.) 4. Why are there so many similar sounding and related words (not found in the latest version of the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) used interchangeably in papers, briefings, meetings and conversation without consensus understanding of the differences and similarities among them? Some examples: measures of performance/measures of effectiveness/key performance parameters; goals/objectives/aim points/desired end-state/desired results; common operational picture/common relevant operational picture; spectrum of conflict/range of operations? 3. Why do most of the bizarre phone calls requesting unusual things and actions come after 1530? 2. Why does it seem that the Defense Department prefers technologies to compensate for inferior tactical skills instead of using technologies to complement superior small-unit expertise? 1. Why do so many senior officials (O-6 and above) use such glowing terms to describe the reserve component, but so many juniors (O-5 and below) express a general unease and skepticism when talking about reserve component capabilities (e.g. Total Force vs. Total Farce)? Looking back on my newly-expanded list of the 20 things I do not know or understand, I recall the words of Carl T. Rowan, Jr. in an eloquent 1963 New Yorker magazine article discussing press conference questions. Rowan wrote, "There aren't any embarrassing questions - just embarrassing answers." Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] Table of Contents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ARTICLE 02 - Gender Equality Has Weakened, Paralyzed the Military ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- By Jon Barrett III After years of social experimentation in the U.S. military, fueled by societal trends towards "gender" equality, a disturbing situation has emerged: The sexes are still unequal! How did this happen? Can we really be so inept at our attempts to level the playing filed as to put in a decade of hard work to zero effect? Proponents of feminism and equality will point to the ever-increasing numbers of females in the military and claim success, as if numbers tell the real story. Yet the evidence mounting from military sources supports the anecdotes from the sailors: women in ships is a recipe for disaster. Statistically, women are fully integrated in the Navy and other services today. Currently, female promotion rates are equal to or better than those of men, and many women are now serving in high-ranking leadership positions in the Department of Defense and the services. Only recently, however, have women been serving in positions that are even remotely combat-related. The growing evidence is that this is not beneficial to combat units. So where are these "leaders" coming from? When I was commissioned, I was told that we were in training to be combat leaders. The mission of the military is, after all, combat. Yet the forces are looking more like corporations lately. Equality as a measuring stick is certainly appropriate in the corporate world. When we work with computers, minds, ideas, and products, women certainly suffer no disadvantage. In the military environment, the arguments against female integration in combat units are all too well known, particularly the gap in physical strength between male and female personnel. It is now a proverbial question to ask, "Can this 120-pound slip of a girl carry me or my other 200-pound buddies out of a firefight?" When the military has to set different, lower standards for women, they have de facto declared the inadvisability of putting women into combat roles. And with different standards, what does that do to the ideal of being "equal" to men? This is not to argue that women have no place at all in the military today. There are parts of the military that are administrative in nature, such as the Navy Supply Corps, and JAG, where physical differences are not so important. For years, women in the military honorably served in these positions and functioned well. Retired Army Lt. Col. Robert R. Maginnis has written about the Navy's "tendency to ignore longstanding screening standards to accommodate the limited physical ability of women; even after significant training, the strength of women does not improve and they suffer up to three times as many back injuries as men. Navy policy also embraces pregnancy as an "acceptable" readiness problem." Acceptable? Since when? The rash of pregnancies that occurs immediately before ships with large female contingents go to sea is another fact of modern Navy life. Is it possible that they get pregnant purposefully in order to avoid their duty? Maginnis recently wrote, "At any given time, up to 18 percent of Navy women are pregnant and a study of two ships showed a pregnancy rate as high as one in three. That's nearly 8,423 women, or enough to crew almost two aircraft carriers." "During Desert Storm, 1,145 women on ships needed to be reassigned because of pregnancies, at an average of 95 per month," he added. That sounds like they really don't want to be in combat units after all." Maginnis cited data about the USS Eisenhower, which was the test case, where pregnancies grew from five to 39 in just a couple of months. "In all, 13 percent of the female crew became pregnant." According to naval policy, the "sailor" had to leave her shipboard duties. This experience has been echoed throughout the fleet, and stories of women getting pregnant to avoid deployment remain common a decade after the Gulf War. For those who argue that shipboard duty is not the same as ground combat, the issue of physical strength, especially for lifting, is vital in determining a sailor's chance for survival if his or her ship is hit. Ships are made of metal and everything in them is heavy. Strength can be the difference between life and death for other crewmembers. Civilian policemen and firemen are forced to live with these facts, also. Another unfortunate byproduct of placing women in warships units is that sexual harassment claims are in danger of becoming a tool to unprincipled women. My own Navy Reserve unit recently had a case where charges were made in order to facilitate the transfer to a different unit of a male and female who were involved in a relationship. Why? It turned out the transfer would place them in a unit with a lower operational tempo and thus they could enjoy unrestrained access to each other. The career of an otherwise outstanding commander was damaged as a result. One officer who is a friend has told me in no uncertain terms that he is so afraid of the possibility that sexual harassment charges could be leveled against him that he will only speak to female sailors in response to a greeting - "Good Morning Petty Officer," or to give a direct order. That is not equality - it is a paralyzed command. Another unpleasant reality is that in the Navy today, with harassment you are guilty until proven innocent. No career can survive an accusation where there is a presumption of guilt and no way to respond. The fact is, the current climate admits of harassment based on how the woman feels, not on what the male actually did. The current situation is shameful. With a war on against terrorism, the Pentagon leadership should keep in mind the actual mission of the U.S. military force. The military is intended to be a ready combat force capable of rapid deployment to trouble spots -- not a social laboratory. We are supposed to land anywhere - ready to fight - not serve as a job corps for "disadvantaged" females. Contributing Editor Jon Barrett is the pen name of a Naval Reserve officer who has served in both the surface Navy and Naval Special Warfare. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] Table of Contents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ARTICLE 03 - Tomorrow's Submarine Fleet: The Non-nuclear Option ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- By Robert G. Williscroft The U.S. Navy nuclear fast attack submarine fleet is the most awesome suite of weapons ever built, but gains in non-nuclear propulsion technology over the last few decades raise the question of whether we should augment our nuclear submarine fleet with equally effective and dramatically less expensive non-nuclear submarines. We currently float 55 fast attack submarines. Thirty are Los Angeles class and 23 are of the Improved Los Angeles class - quieter, with improved weapons, retractable bow planes instead of sail planes, especially suited for under ice operations. The remaining two are the new Seawolf class - significantly quieter, faster, with even more weapons. The Seawolf class originally was planned for 29 subs, but with the end of the Cold War, it was truncated to three, with two built and one scheduled. This was done to make way for a new, more versatile, less expensive submarine, the Virginia Class. The USS Virginia is expected to be launched sometime in 2004, costing about $1.6 billion, followed by the USS Texas, USS Hawaii, and the USS North Carolina. By comparison, the USS Seawolf cost about $2.1 billion, and the average cost of Los Angeles class subs was around $1 billion. The annual operating cost for any of these subs is approximately $21 million. The typical service life of a nuclear sub is about 30 years. Refueling and modernizing at the half-life point costs about $200 million. Near the end of the service life, another refueling and extensive overhaul for about $410 million will extend the life another 12 years, for a total service life of 42 years. This totals to about $3.6 billion in constant dollars over the lifetime of a Seawolf class sub. These are impressive numbers, on one hand for how long a nuclear submarine can be an effective weapon platform, and on the other for how much it actually costs. Nuclear submarines are designed to operate in "blue water," out in the open ocean. They can run fast and deep, using thermal layers and other characteristics of deep water to disguise their movements and mask their noise. In shallow water, a nuclear submarine often is longer than the water is deep, severely restricting its maneuverability. Like a large whale in the surf, it can fall victim to a swarm of smaller, more maneuverable subs, unable to detect and outmaneuver them, unable to deploy its weapons effectively. While the new Virginia class is designed to operate closer to shore, especially for delivery of Special Forces and other tactical in-shore options, these operations are short lived, and the sub quickly returns to deeper, safer water. A nuclear sub uses a compact nuclear reactor to generate steam to drive a turbine to turn the propeller. Except for modern adaptations, this differs little from old coal driven turbines. They are much quieter now, but they still make a lot of noise. Diesel submarines use reciprocating engines on the surface and while snorkeling, and battery driven electric motors while submerged. The first is noisy, the latter extremely quiet. Near the end of World War II, Germany experimented with several methods for driving a submarine independent of surface air. Several Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine prototypes ended up with the Russians, the British, and in our own hands. Over the next half-century vast improvements were made with AIP systems. In the 1950s, however, under the firm hand of Adm. Hyman Rickover, the United States turned towards nuclear power for submarine propulsion, and never turned back. Elsewhere, AIP progress continued on four different fronts. German Thyssen Nordseewerke (TNSW) developed a closed-cycle diesel using liquid oxygen, diesel oil, and argon. The same diesel is used as a conventional air-breathing engine for surface propulsion. These systems are suitable for both retrofitting and new construction. Howaltswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) in Germany has developed a hybrid fuel cell system for a diesel-electric sub. High-speed operations run off the conventional battery, while the fuel cell recharges the battery, and provides energy for low-speed operations. Typical submarine cost using either HDW or TNSW AIP systems is $250 million. Hybrid diesel-electric units propel Swedish Gotland Class subs, supplemented with Kockum Stirling engines running on liquid oxygen and diesel oil to turn a generator to produce electricity for propulsion and to charge the vessel's batteries. Typical cost for a Gotland class sub is $100 million. The French "MESMA" (Module d'Energie Sous-Marine Autonome) AIP steam-turbine system burns ethanol and liquid oxygen to make steam to drive a turbo-electric generator. The design permits retrofitting into existing submarines by adding an extra hull section. Typical cost for a new submarine powered by MESMA is $250 million. Each of these designs has its own advantages and disadvantages, but they all allow for about a month submerged operating capability for 25 to 40 crew members, extended operating range, and capabilities limited only by hull strength, and installed electronics and weapons suits. In particular, the HDW and MESMA systems are extremely quiet - far quieter than any nuclear/steam plant. Combined with a state-of-the art sensing system and appropriate weapons, such a sub would be a formidable opponent for any nuke. AIP submarines costing between $100 and $300 million compare favorably to nuclear submarines costing from 5 to 16 times as much - $1.6 billion. We won the Cold War, in large part, because of the important role played by both fast attack and ballistic missile nuclear submarines. Our large fleet of submarines, however, no longer serves its original intent. As we overhaul these behemoths and build newer versions, we are changing them to serve our current needs better - hence the Virginia class with its multi-mission capability and lower cost. But $1.6 billion still is a lot of money. Can we do better and still meet our needs in today's world of armed incursion, coastal surveillance, and special operations? When operating in littoral waters, ice margins, straits, and other global "choke points," AIP submarines can be particularly formidable. New underwater weapons will help equalize any remaining differences between AIP and nuclear subs. The U.S. Navy may wish to reassess its plan to build a fleet of 18 new Virginia class subs for a total of about $29 billion, when, for about half this cost, it could build a fleet of 30 AIP subs and the four already budgeted Virginia class subs. More than twice the muscle for half the cost is a no-brainer. Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. 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