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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ARTICLE 06 - The First Transformation Task: Define the Term ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- By Matthew Dodd What the heck does transformation of the U.S. armed forces mean, and what are we doing about transforming? The answer to the first part of the question is, "It depends on who you ask and in what office that person works." The last part of the question is more complex: holding a lot of meetings, struggling to define transformation, searching for the elusive "lightening-bolt" nugget of transformation wisdom from above, and running down the path of putting the cart before the horse by trying to assign objective measurement criteria to something we cannot even describe. For over a year, the Department of Defense (DoD) has been trying to understand what transformation of the armed forces means. What we have to show for our efforts are similar sounding, but decidedly different descriptions and definitions of transformation. Transformation is described in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the last Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The president and the secretary of defense (SecDef) have articulated their visions of transformation, retired Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski (SecDef's director of the office of force transformation) has his own vision of transformation, each Service has a plan to transform its own forces, the Joint Staff is working on proposing a new definition, and the Office of the SecDef (OSD) is hoping to publish the definitive definition of transformation in the next DPG. Since we still do not have an acceptable definition of transformation, and it seems that anyone can contribute to the discussion of transformation, I would like to offer some thoughts as a passenger on this transformation train. According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, transformation is "an act, process, or instance of transforming or being transformed." Also, to transform means, "to change in composition or structure; to change the outward form or appearance of; to change in character or condition." Unfortunately (and not surprisingly), the latest DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not contain either term. As Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps War College said in a 1996 "Perspectives on Warfighting" paper, the lack of a common language results in "a confusion which cannot help but inhibit precision of thought and clarity of communication at all levels of war throughout the DOD community." How much longer will briefers say, "Well, this is our definition of … " or, "This is what we mean by … " without being challenged or silenced? We must collectively fix this language problem once and for all. If I were the King of Transformation, here is how I would officially define transformation for all of DoD. I'd start by locking the same people involved in the yearly transformation efforts in a room to refine a starting definition of transformation computer-projected on a screen. Then, like the television show, "Survivor," every fifteen minutes we would vote someone out before continuing to refine the definition. This cycle would repeat until I emerge from the room with a single definition. We should critically examine our current transformation efforts. Specifically, if transformation is a long-term, ongoing, synergistic process of continuous or quantum-leap improvements to our warfighting effectiveness, how can we possibly measure it using objective metrics? Warfighting effectiveness is a subjective condition relative to our adversaries. It seems to me that applying peacetime objective assessment criteria to transformation is a tremendous waste of time, manpower, and resources. Why do we want or need to measure transformation? The answer is what unfortunately drives most DoD decisions: dollars. Everyone knows that transformation is now anted up into the high-stakes congressional budget poker game. Everyone knows that the definitions are wild and the congressional transformation pot is large. Everyone wants a piece of that pot. When Congress calls, your cards better contain checks in your metrics blocks or you will not get a piece of the transformation pot. If we assign metrics to transformation with transformation tied to funding, then we run the very real risk that achieving those metrics will become the focus. Forcing transformation's long-term focus into a short-term process is counter-productive and a self-defeating prophecy. A related problem with transformation metrics is that without a common definition and a clear vision of what the transformed force will either look like or be capable of, there is a very real chance that our metrics may lead us to something short of or different from a truly transformed force. Another troubling aspect of our transformation efforts is the almost exclusive emphasis on technology and senior leadership's information management and decision support systems and processes. Why do we not focus on institutionalizing maneuver warfare with distributed and decentralized decision-making that facilitates multiple, simultaneous, interdependent operations guided by commander's intent? Most service and joint doctrine leads you to believe that we routinely operate in this maneuver warfare environment. I submit that our legacy organizational structure and processes, and our leaders nurtured within this legacy, do not facilitate the required human dimensions for future warfighting success. These required human dimensions include, but are not limited to trust, initiative, implicit communications, acceptance of risk, friction and uncertainty, and non-attribution critique and feedback up, down, and lateral within our command structures. Historically, the human dimension is much tougher for us to understand, and precisely why we should expect our future adversaries to continue to focus on ways to exploit this critical vulnerability. A lesson we should learn from the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks is that it is possible for our enemies to use our own technological superiorities against us. A technologically focused transformed force must be prepared to adapt to opponents who willingly operate in environments below our technological 'high bar.' Instead of thinking of transformation in terms of what we could do, we need to first focus on what we should have been doing all along. Given today's realities, my vision of our transformed force is one that should share a common language and future vision, should not allow funding to divert us from effectively transforming to that vision, and should shift maneuver warfare from doctrinal concepts to everyday practice. To do any less is dangerous, and to try to do any more is ridiculous. Contributing Editor Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] ARTICLE 07 - It's Time to Consider Ending the No-Fly Zone Patrols ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- By Paul Connors Since the end of the Persian Gulf War more than ten years ago, the United States and Great Britain have maintained a constant patrol over the northern and southern "no fly" zones imposed on Iraq as terms of the ceasefire. Every day since, American fighter aircraft (primarily Air Force) have bored holes in the sky as they flew endless (and mindless) patrols over Iraqi airspace. The patrols, designed to deny Iraq's armed forces two-thirds of their sovereign airspace, have cost the United States millions of dollars in fuel and maintenance costs as well as millions of man-hours as American service personnel deployed and re-deployed in support of the contingency operations. Operation Northern Watch missions are flown out of Incirlik Airbase in Adana, Turkey. The USAF and RAF fighter sweeps patrol the northern no-fly zone to ensure that Saddam's fighters and helicopters do not fly. For the most part, the patrols are uneventful and the allied aircraft return home unchallenged and unharmed. These periods of inactivity are made more lively by the unpredictability of Saddam Hussein and his air defense commanders. Without warning, Iraqi air defense systems will illuminate with radar the patrolling American or British fighters. On those occasions, the USAF almost always retaliates by interdicting the offending radar sites. The same happens to U.S. and British aircraft patrolling as part of Operation Southern Watch from aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and from bases in Saudi Arabia. There are hidden costs to this on-going war of nerves. After Desert Storm, the U.S. armed forces went through a significant downsizing. As the Air Force reduced the number of active-duty fighter wings, the very units that would be used to patrol the new no-fly zones, it became readily apparent that the operational tempo could not be sustained with the smaller active force. Consequently, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve fighter squadrons would need to fill in the gaps, so that sorely pressed active-duty crews, maintainers and aircraft could be rotated back to the continental United States or Europe for rest and re-fitting. In that same decade, the Guard and reserve units have stepped up to the plate countless times to give their active-duty brethren much needed breathing room. The patrols over the no-fly zone have been tough on equipment as well as personnel. By some official estimates, the constant usage of F-15s and F-16s has shortened the useful life of these expensive weapons systems by as much as ten years per airframe. In the late 1990s, the constant deployments were cited as the single largest factor for people leaving the Air Force. Departures by both pilots and highly skilled maintenance personnel created such a problem that the Air Force considered almost every idea, no matter how far-fetched, as it attempted to stop the hemorrhage of highly skilled maintenance personnel and pilots. As the active component lost personnel, reserve component units stepped in to the maximum extent possible. But these deployments weren't just restricted to fighter units. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve rescue units and their personnel were also called upon to provide vital rescue and recovery skills for pilots who might be forced down in hostile territory. While these deployments were staffed primarily with volunteers (many of whom traveled to the Gulf region for as little as 15-18 days), a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up was instituted while the United States was also flying bombing missions against the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. A number of the Guard and reserve rescue aircrews did back-to-back deployments from Northern Watch to Southern Watch due to the lack of capability within the active component rescue units to fulfill all of their worldwide commitments. The fact is, these constant patrols are costly, time-consuming and ultimately wasteful of both human and material resources. Flying in less than optimum conditions is extremely tough on men and equipment. The constant overseas deployments are tough on individuals, units and the families they leave behind. The downsized active Air Force cannot meet all of its commitments with the resources allotted to it and consequently, the longest consistent use of reserve component personnel in the republic's history (other than wartime) has also caused retention problems as citizen-airmen have had to choose between service, civilian job and family commitments. As the United States and its Air Force continue to pursue the war against terrorism, more and more Guardsmen and reservists are being recalled to active duty to support homeland defense and other contingency operations around the world. It is long past time to instigate a thorough reappraisal of the U.S. military's ongoing operations in Saudi Arabia and Turkey with a view toward drastically reducing - if not curtailing altogether - the no-fly zone patrols. What is clear with the ongoing war against terrorism is that the resources are needed elsewhere. If the no-fly zones must be patrolled, then the U.S. government should have the Royal Saudi Air Force, the Turkish Air Force and the air forces of Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates accept responsibility for those mission areas. After all, these very same air forces are equipped with expensive American and British equipment. Since they have the most to lose should Iraq attack again, isn't it time we asked them to put it to good use in their own common defense? Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] Table of Contents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ARTICLE 08 - Joint Strike Fighter Program Requires a Dose of Reality ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- By John Szelog Some of the reports and studies coming from the Air Force and other supporters of the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs begin to blur the line between reality, and fiction. In a 1998 article in The Stars and Stripes, a Rand Corp. study was cited as saying that in the event North Korea invaded South Korea, two squadrons (about 48 aircraft) of F-22s could gain air superiority by themselves, switch to the ground-attack role, and using Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS),halt the North Korean ground assault on their own. I'm not making this up: If the Air Force, Rand Corp., and other proponents of the programs are to be believed, the aircraft will be able to do anything, anywhere, anytime, anyhow. And so it goes with the JSF, now type-classified as the F-35. I fully agree that the United States needs to continuously improve it's military capabilities and equipment, as the art of waging, and deterring, war, is always evolving. . However, history has also proven that the KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) method works best. And that's the problem with the JSF: It is a violation of the KISS doctrine. The JSF is intended to be a fast strike fighter, and in the case of the British, a fighter, at low and medium altitudes. But it is also expected to take over the job of the A-10, i.e, low-altitude, low-speed, not to mention high-flak close air support. Added to these aerodynamic demands are the requirements to have a land-based fighter, a carrier-based fighter, and a vertical take-off and landing fighter, all derived from the same-airframe. The desire for a common airframe makes sense, and should be done whenever possible, but also within reason. One question that begs asking is, why the Air Force and the Navy won't use the same version? The F/A-18 operates superbly in both the land-based (Marine Corps, Canada, Spain, Australia, Kuwait) and the carrier-based roles, with no major design changes; but the Air Force and Navy will use two different versions of the JSF. The other question that comes to mind is how well the Navy version is going to hold up to the physically and environmentally brutal conditions of carrier operations, because it is simply "beefed-up" from the lighter-framed Air Force version. As to the V/STOL version, it seems that the effort to develop a better V/STOL engine was given up in favor of expediency, which is sad. The promise of a better engine, without having to resort to a separate lift engine, meant that a more effective V/STOL fighter-bomber could have been designed around that engine. The Marines, RAF, and Royal Navy will have to settle for a not-quite-as-good-as-it-should-be aircraft instead. The desire of the Air Force to replace the A-10 with the JSF is laughable at best. The basic design of the A-10 is perfect, for lack of a better word, for the job it does: loitering over the battlefield for extended periods, and providing close air support for ground forces. The JSF, on the other hand, is designed with a high-speed wing, a design that doesn't work well at low speeds and low altitudes, which means it won't have the loiter capability, or the low-altitude performance, that the A-10 has. Another side-effect of that design, combined with the effort to keep the whole aircraft light, results in the airframe not being able to handle battle damage well, as it loses its structural strength, and its efficiency, very quickly. Additionally, by it's design, the JSF will be dependent on computers to fly properly, and those computers are very susceptible to damage from things like bullet and missile fragments. Without the flight-control computer, many modern aircraft turn into flying paperweights, and thereafter, rapidly succumb to the law of gravity. Lastly, the JSF is going to be very hard to sell outside of the U.S. and British militaries. Cost considerations are driving many European nations, and surely other nations in the world who are watching, to move to aircraft that are smaller, less expensive to buy and maintain, and less technologically advanced, and relying more on missile and bomb systems that are more advanced and longer ranged, rather than stealth technology. The JSF is expensive, compared to European designs, and it's not designed to have long-range interceptor capabilities, which most countries have a need for in addition to strike-fighters. That would mean buying the F-22, F/A-18E/F, or some other fighter to complement the JSF, and that's something that many can't afford. There are some alternatives that could make the program more realistic, and supportable. First, use the Navy airframe for both the Navy and the Air Force JSF models. This, of course, makes just about everything, except service specific avionics, common. One additional advantage that this could provide is allowing the Air Force and Navy to rotate aircraft. After a certain number of flying hours, aircraft are sent to a depot for repainting, upgrades, and inspections. At that time, Air Force aircraft could be refitted for Navy service, and vice versa. This would have the result of extending the lifespan of all of the aircraft in service, as Air Force aircraft are not routinely subjected to the severe physical stresses and environmental conditions that Navy aircraft are. Second, the Pentagon and the British Ministry of Defense should push the development of a new V/STOL engine and then design a new airframe around it. The new airframe could still be based on, and have a lot of commonality with, the JSF design, but be tailored, and properly designed, to take full advantage of the new engine and unique V/STOL capabilities, such as VIFFing (Vectoring In Forward Flight. The AV-8 Harrier uses turnable nozzles to direct thrust down for takeoff and hovering, back for forward flight, and slightly forward for moving backwards while hovering. (VIFFing is a defensive air-to air combat tactic, used when the Harrier is in forward flight, with an enemy aircraft chasing it. The Harrier pilot rolls the aircraft upside down, and moves the nozzles fully forward - reverse thrust - which has the effect of rapidly decelerating the aircraft, causing the chasing aircraft to fly past.) Lastly, the Pentagon should explore dropping the requirement for the Air Force JSF to replace the A-10, and look into the possibility of re-opening production of A-10s. John M. Szelog is a Contributing Editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? Write at [EMAIL PROTECTED] for a menu of our lists! 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