-Caveat Lector- from: Elite Deviance (Fifth Edition) David R. Simon Allyn & Bacon(C) 1996,1993,1990,1986,1982 A Simon & Schuster Company Needham Heights, Massachusetts 02194 ISBN 0-205-16460-9 ----- An interesting book. Om K ----- Preface This fifth edition of Elite Deviance is written at a time of crisis and corruption almost without precedent in U.S. history. The President of the United States faces lawsuits for both conflict of interest and sexual harassment. Both incidents took place before his election as President. Thanks to its recent scandals, Congress is now held in such low esteem that many of its members refuse to seek reelection. Corporate life is marked by one scandal after another--a billion-dollar plus fraud scam at Prudential and the laundering of drug money by major New York banks, to name just two. Scandal seems everywhere present in U.S. life: A rabbi is indicted for laundering drug money. Rock idol Michael Jackson paid $100 million to buy the silence of a - family whose child he is accused of molesting. Football icon, former broadcaster, and actor O. J. Simpson is indicted for killing his ex-wife and her friend. The Jackson and Simpson cases demonstrate that the private lives of elites may indeed turn into scandal, if their deviance or suspected deviance becomes public knowledge. The purpose of Elite Deviance has always been to underscore two central concerns. 1. Scandal in contemporary U.S. life is an institutionalized sociological phenomenon. It is not due primarily to psychopathological and/or bio- pathological variables. Rather, scandal is built into the very fabric of U.S. institutions, which means that scandals will occur regularly. This institutionalization of elite wrongdoing is a major focus of the book. 2. Many of the scandals that have occurred in the United States since 1963 have been fundamentally interrelated; that is, the same people and institutions have been involved in a number of scandals (e.g., the Kennedy assassination and Watergate). The interrelationship of these various scandals warrants systematic, dispassionate analysis by social scientists, but so far, very little interest has been directed to this issue. We hope that this will begin to change soon. This edition of Elite Deviance is written in the hope that those students who read it will begin to develop a true sociological imagination.(1) American students of social science tend to place much emphasis on individual deviance, individual rights, and individual cases; thus, the realization of how societal variables affect people's values and behaviors has been lost. The notion that society shapes individual character is especially unappreciated. If the problems related to elite deviance are ever to be resolved, we must begin to analyze and attack them at their roots. We believe that overwhelming evidence shows that these roots are sociological in nature. THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS BOOK Chapter 1 addresses the problem of defining elite deviance. In doing so, we review the representative forms of wrongdoing by wealthy and powerful individuals and organizations that are encompassed by the concept elite deviance. Chapter 2 discusses the higher immorality as an aspect of the U.S. elite, a sort of systemic violation of the laws and ethics of business and politics. This includes everything from hiring prostitutes to close business agreements to hiring members of criminal syndicates to gain a business or political advantage. In addition, the term refers to special advantages that business executives receive from government, including tax breaks and subsidies, as well as special salary arrangements that bypass tax laws. The term also applies to the violation of antitrust laws. Hence, it covers a host of illegal and unethical practices. The Kennedy assassination is introduced in this chapter. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted exclusively to economic deviance. Specifically, Chapter 3 details the problems generated by the monopolistic structure of the economy, including price fixing, price gouging, deceptive advertising, and fraud. Chapter 4 discusses the more dangerous aspects of corporate deviance, including hazardous products, pollution, dangerous working conditions, and resource waste. Chapter 5 examines the international dimensions of corporate and political deviance. We discuss U.S. defense policy, including defense contracting and arms sales, the bribery and product dumping of multinational corporations, and violations of human rights as they relate to U.S. foreign policy and the questionable practices of multinational corporations. Chapters 6 and 7 deal exclusively with various dimensions of political deviance. Chapter 6 focuses on the types of political corruption that have characterized the history of U.S. domestic politics. Chapter 7 explores political repression in the United States, including the bias of the criminal justice system, as well as the abuses of power perpetrated by such agencies as the FBI, the CIA, and the Internal Revenue Service. Domestic assassinations are examined in this context. We believe that scientific objectivity and questions about values are interrelated and cannot therefore be divorced from each other. To this end, Chapter 8 offers a theory of elite deviance, relating the various elements of social structure and social character responsible for causing much of the deviance described in this book. The theoretical propositions we advance are both measurable in the scientific sense and moral in the humanistic sense that they address harm to both society and its citizens. We have prepared this chapter because the field of corporate or white-collar elite deviance remains quite new and has barely moved beyond the stage of classifying various examples upon which a theory could be based. Chapter 8 represents our effort to both summarize and synthesize extant empirical examples and theoretical viewpoints in order to begin the construction of a coherent theory of elite deviance. Chapter 9 addresses what has been called "the scandalization of America," focusing on the series of interrelated scandals that has wracked the United States in recent history. The chapter begins with a discussion of the emergence of the so-called secret government, an entity characterized by a code that far exceeds the deviance Mills outlined in his description of the higher immorality. The Iran-Contra affair is described in some detail, illustrating how this scandal was related to a number of other incidents of wrongdoing, generally involving the same players. The Kennedy assassination is included in this review of interrelated incidents. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the implications of the scandalization of the United States for the theoretical and empirical study of elite deviance. The Epilogue grew out of my experiences with students. Often students become fatalistic about resolving social problems that relate to the distribution of wealth and power in the United States. My conviction is that the United States is democratic in form and that meaningful solutions to the problem of elite deviance can come through democratic processes. I do not believe that the necessary changes will be easy, but we insist that they are worth struggling to attain. The Epilogue describes one plan for making significant changes in the economic system. I feel that this proposal will eliminate or at least minimize the forms of elite deviance discussed in this book. We invite the reader to consider this plan seriously and to think of other alternatives that might be effective in diminishing elite deviance. NOTE 1. See C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), and David R. Simon, Social Problems and the Sociological Imagination (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995) for extended discussions. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris 3 Corporate Deviance Monopoly, Manipulation, and Fraud Sociologist Stanton Wheeler, in his presidential address to the 1975 annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, chided his colleagues for their neglect of one particular area of criminality--"the patterns of illegal activity that lie at the core of large-scale corporate, industrial society."[1] The magnitude of this omission was revealed in 1978 by the first comprehensive investigation of corporate crime. Sociologist Marshall Clinard and his associates gathered data on the illegal actions of the 582 largest publicly owned corporations in the United States. Among their findings were that, during a twenty-four-month period: 1. 60 percent of these corporations had a legal action instituted against them by a federal agency for criminal activity; of those corporations having had at least one violation, the average number of violations was 4.2 with one corporation being formally accused by the government on sixty-two occasions; almost one half of all the violations occurred in the oil refining, auto- mobile, and drug industries (a rate 300 percent greater than their size in the sample indicated).[2] Corporate crime, which includes antitrust, advertising law, and pollution law violations, costs U.S. consumers an estimated $200 billion per year, forty times more than estimated losses from street crime.[3] Studies of punishment in corporate crime cases reveal that only about two percent of corporate crime cases result in imprisonment. Item: A 1990 study by Amati Etzioni found that between 1975 and 1984, 62 percent of the Fortune 500 companies were involved in one or more incidents of corrupt behavior (bribery, price fixing, tax fraud, or violations of environmental regulations).[4] Item: In a Multinational Monitor study of the 25 largest Fortune 500 corporations' activities between 1977 and 1990, all of the corporations were either found guilty of criminal behavior or fined and required to make payment for civil violations.[5] The fact that so few studies have been done on corporate crime rates speaks volumes concerning the way powerful corporate interests have been able to define U.S. crime problems as a "street" (i.e., lower class) problem. The neglected subject of corporate deviance is the focus of this chapter, as well as the next. Specifically, this chapter is devoted to five areas of corporate deviance: the problems generated by (1) monopoly, (2) price fixing, (3) price gouging, (4) deceptive advertising, and (5) fraud. First, however, to understand why corporate crime is such a neglected problem requires an understanding of the power and influence of criminal corporations in making public policy. Consider, for example, the case of General Electric. General Electric is a massive multinational conglomerate, with 107 factories in the United States and 103 overseas plants in twenty-three foreign nations. It employs 243,000 U.S. workers and has about 500,000 stockholders. About 300 major retail stores (e.g., Levitz furniture and Montgomery Ward) use its credit card system, and its NBC television network has about 200 affiliate stations in the United States. General Electric is the third largest defense contractor, and has been involved in developing most major weapons systems in the past two decades; including the MX missile, B-1 bomber, the Stealth Aircraft, and "Star Wars" (satellite defense system) program. GE is also a major builder of nuclear weapons. It has even received government contracts to estimate Soviet military strength. On GE's board of directors sit General David Jones retired head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William French Smith, former attorney general of the United States. GE is the nation's second largest plastics manufacturer, the owner of RCA, has its own cable television network is a stockbroker (it owns Kidder Peabody), and has its own bank (GE Capital, which has $91 billion in assets).[6] Moreover, GE is a major Washington lobbyist because it sells many items to the government. It is directly affected by government regulations in the areas of defense contracting, environmental law, securities oversight, and many others. General Electric is also among the most lawless U.S. corporations: Item: Between 1981 and 1983, GE had net profits of $6.5 billion, but received a tax rebate of $283 million from the debt-ridden federal government due to favorable tax legislation. In fact, from 1981-1987, GE saved over a billion on its taxes, but created virtually no new U.S. jobs. It was busy shrinking its U.S. workforce by 50,000 employees, selling off its U.S. subsidiaries, and aggressively buying other firms, Utah Construction, RCA, and NBC. In 1986 alone, G.E. spent $11.1 billion to buy 338 companies, while it closed 73 of its own plants and offices. As will be noted, such corporate "restructuring" has contributed mightily to the economic decline of the United States since 1970. Since the repeal of the law that gave GE all those tax advantages, the company has been carrying a $3.5 billion tax deferment on its books. It does this legally because, as a defense contractor it doesn't have to pay its taxes until some future date. - In 1988, GE was indicted on 317 counts of fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud the Army of $21 million on a logistics computer contract. Moreover GE has a very long history of corporate crime: 1957-1961: GE was convicted of price-fixing and other charges for electrical equipment valued at $1.74 billion per year, the largest price-fixing case in the history of the Shermam Antitrust Act to that time. In 1981, GE was convicted of paying a $1.25 million bribe to a Puerto Rican official to obtain an electrical plant contract. Three GE executives were imprisoned in the case. In 1986 and 1987, GE was involved in a number of instances of defense contracting fraud and related charges. (Please see Chapter 5.) GE's stock brokerage firm, Kidder Peabody, paid $25.3 million to settle an insider trading complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission. GE Capital paid a $275,000 civil penalty in 1989 for discriminating against low- income consumers, the largest fine ever under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. GE itself paid a $32 million settlement to women and minorities in an employment discrimination case, and its Canadian subsidiary was convicted (along with Westinghouse and other firms) of conspiring to fix prices on light bulbs.[7] GE is also a major environmental polluter. Four of its factories are on the Environmental Protection Agency's list of the most dangerous industrial sources of toxic air pollution, and GE has been identified as responsible for contributing to the damage of forty-seven sites in need of environmental cleanup. The company has also paid tens of millions of dollars in out of court settlements for its toxic dumping of chemicals, which can cause cancer and other diseases (e.g., birth defects) in humans. If GE were an individual, it would be considered an habitual criminal under U.S. law. Instead, it tries to undo laws and cultivate a favorable public Image by engaging in a host of image making activities: Item: GE acts as a social philanthropist by giving away about $19 million per year through its tax-exempt foundations. Most of the money goes to scholarships for poor and minority college students. It also donates money to certain charities, like the United Way. Even charitable contributions further GE's political and economic aims. Some of GE's tax exempt contributions go to Chris Walker's American Council for Capital Formation (an "educational" front group that campaigns against the corporate income tax and for a national sales tax), the Institute for International Economics (a "think tank" promoting procorporate positions on economic policy and trade), and Americans for Generational Equity (which campaigns for issues like reducing Social Security entitlements). GE also funds other causes promoting political socialization and propaganda, including: Sponsoring the McLaughlin Group--a right-wing TV talk show. Membership in the Business Roundtable--the policy formation activities of which disseminate the views of the largest 500 American corporations. - The Committee on Present Danger--a defense industry financed group whose propaganda promoted the massive defense spending of the 1980s.[8] Item: Many large corporations also cultivate political goodwill by greasing the campaigns of members of congress. In 1988, GE's political action committees gave $595,000 to various congressional campaigns. Before limitations were placed on outside income by congressional members GE paid an additional $50,000 directly to representatives and senators as speaking fees before the practice was ended (with a huge congressional pay raise) in 1990. Most of these speeches are given to members of armed services and other defense-related committees. The company has about two dozen permanent lobbyists and a large support staff in Washington overseeing such contributions. GE is thus a symbol of how widespread corporate crime by one firm can be, and how corporations can buy their way out of being effectively punished for their deeds by lawmakers. GE is also symbolic of corporate efforts at placating an otherwise outraged public through public relations. However, these deeds are only the beginning of the harms done by corporate crime. Consider the fmancial harm done by corporate monopolies. THE COSTS OF MONOPOLIES As noted in Chapter 1, the United States has moved from competitive capitalism to a stage of monopoly capitalism. Karl Marx, well over one hundred years ago, correctly predicted this current stage.[9] Free enterprise, he argued, would result in some firms becoming bigger and bigger as they eliminated their opposition or absorbed smaller competing firms. The ultimate result of this process would be the existence of a monopoly in each of the various sectors of the economy. Monopolies, of course, are antithetical to the free-enterprise system because they determine the price and the quality of the products, interfering with the balance of supply and demand. This, as we will see, increases the benefits for the few at the expense of the many. For the most part, U.S. society upholds Marx's prediction. Although a few corporations are virtual monopolies (e.g., IBM with mainframe computers), most sectors of the U.S. economy are dominated by shared monopolies. Instead of a single corporation controlling an industry, the situation is one in which a small number of large firms dominate an industry. When four or fewer firms supply 50% or more of a particular market, a shared monopoly results, one which performs much as a monopoly or cartel would. Most economists agree that above this level of concentration--a four-firm ratio of 50%--the economic costs of shared monopoly are most manifest.[10] According to a government report, in 1982, the following industries were dominated by shared monopolies: razors and razor blades (the four largest firms control 99 percent of the market); light bulbs (91 percent); cigarettes (90 percent); electronic calculators (90 percent); linoleum (90 percent); clocks and watches (84 percent); refrigerators (82 percent); cereals (80 percent); sugar (67 percent); and roasted coffee (66 percent).[11] Shared monopolies raise the costs of products to consumers. For example, in 1980, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released the results of an eight-year study that showed that consumers paid more than $1.2 billion in higher prices for ready-to-eat cereals over a fifteen-year period. The commission alleged that these overcharges of 15 percent were the direct result of the monopoly in the cereal industry held by three companies: Kellogg, General Mills, and General Foods. In just one year, consumers paid $100 million more for cereals than they would have had there been a more competitive market.[12] Two processes account for the super concentration of assets among a few corporations: (1) growth through competition, where the fittest survive, and (2) growth through mergers. Of the two, the latter is the most significant. The Corporate Frankenstein Corporate mergers have become identified with a new type of Wall Street crime: insider trading. A study by Data Resources examined some 130 stocks, 70 percent of which ran up sharply in value just before corporate takeovers, "suggesting that insider trading is rampant" among investors.[13] Moreover, from 1981 to 1988, the volume of leveraged buyouts increased from $3.1 billion to $67.4 billion per year, with the largest taking place in 1988 when RJR Nabisco was purchased by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts for nearly $25 billion. This, the largest purchase in financial history, came after the same Henry Kravis had already purchased Wometco Enterprises (the first billion dollar buyout), Beatrice Foods ($6.2 million), Safeway Stores ($4.1 billion), Owens-Illinois ($3.7 billion), and Jim Walter ($2.4 billion). Kravis was able to make all of these purchases by borrowing heavily. Once in control, he dismantled the firms.[14] Corporate mergers continued into the 1990s. In 1991, AT&T, a $37 billion corporate giant, bought NCR Corporation for $7.4 billion, and Capital Cities/ABC announced its intention to buy a company in the communications field for $1 billion. In 1980, the total value of conglomerate mergers was $44.3 billion. By 1989, the total had increased to more than four times that amount to an astonishing $240.9 billion.[15] The Reagan administration encouraged such mergers by relaxing antitrust law enforcement on the grounds that efficient firms should not be hobbled. These moves prompted some observers to predict that the buyouts of the 1990s will involve large companies purchasing firms of lesser size for premium prices, creating few new jobs and potential financial disaster should deals collapse or prove unprofitable.[16]) Merger mania has continued into the 1990s, with the price of the average merger reaching record levels. In 1989, Sony Corporation bought Columbia pictures for $3.4 billion. In 1991, the Bank of America bought Security Pacific Bank for $4.0 billion, and in 1994, Bank of America purchased Continental Bank Corporation for $1.9 billion. By 1993, the predicted new round of merger mania reached full throttle. Bell Atlantic purchased Telecom, Inc. for $33 billion, AT & T purchased McCaw Cellular for $12.6 billion, and Merck purchased Medico for $6.0 billion. Bank mergers alone in 1993 totaled $22.5 billion.[17] The goal of bigness appears to be control. Eugene Rostow has summarized this phenomenon: The history of corporations is the best evidence of the motivation for their growth. In instance after instance [it] appears to have been the quest for monopoly power, not the technological advances of scale.[18] The great concentration of power and resources in a few corporations has important negative consequences for U.S. society, exacerbating many social problems. Foremost is the overpricing that occurs when four or fewer firms control a particular market. A study by the FTC estimated that, if industries with the four largest firms were reduced in control from 50 to 40 percent of sales, prices would fall by at least 25 percent. When industries are so concentrated that four or fewer firms account for 70 percent of sales, they are found to have profits 50 percent higher than the less concentrated industries.[19] The existence of monopolies is costly to consumers in other ways, since they ultimately bear the costs of advertising and product changes. The irony is that consumers, even though squeezed by monopolies, are forced to finance the continuation of monopolies. Overpricing leads to lost output because of fewer sales and excess capacity. Lost output is detrimental for three reasons. First, it reduces potential economic activity. Second, lower output substantially reduces tax revenues that, if not reduced because of lower output, could either reduce the tax burden for all or be spent to alleviate social problems. Third, another negative consequence of overcharging by monopolies is inequitable transfer cost. Excessive prices bring excessive profits. These profits then redistribute income from purchasers to the stockholders of the corporations, and 47 percent of stocks are owned by the wealthiest 0.5 percent of the population.[20] The result is that a relative handful of stockholders (the already wealthy) reap the dividends. Thus, overcharging redistributes wealth but in the direction of greater inequalities. As Newfield and Greenfield concluded: It is this tiny minority of shareholding Americans that gather in the super- profits generated by the power of big business to stifle competition and manipulate prices without fear of challenge. When we recognize that officers of these superbusinesses often collect more money from their stockholdings and stock-option privileges than from their salaries, we can see where much of our money goes: not to the community at large, not to wage earners, not into more efficient products, but into the bank accounts, trust funds, and holdings of the richest 1.6 percent of Americans.[21] Put another way--and one that is stronger and even more compelling--two Stanford economists have argued that, if there were no monopolies: (1) 2.4 percent of U.S. families would control not 40 percent of the total wealth but only 16.6 to 27.5 percent, and (2) 93.3 percent of U.S. families would be better off. Only the wealthiest 6.7 percent would be worse off. According to these estimates, without monopoly, the current maldistribution of wealth in the United States would be as much as 50 percent less.[22] Heavily concentrated industries are also sources of inflation. When consumer demand falls, for example, the prices of products in concentrated industries tend to rise. This occurs in such different industries as automobile manufacturing and professional sports. As evidence: Economist John Blair studied 16 pairs of products, one from a concentrated industry [i.e., where a shared monopoly existed], the other from a more competitive one (e.g., steel building materials vs. lumber, pig iron vs. steel scraps). During the two recessions of the 1950s, the price of every unconcentrated product fell, while the price of 13 of the 16 concentrated products actually rose.[23] In other words, when a few corporations are large enough to control an industry, they are immune from the rules of a competitive economy. The immediate consequences for consumers is that they will pay artificially high prices. Shared monopolies also cause inflation because they can automatically pass on increased labor costs or increased taxes to the consumer. In competitive industries, on the other hand, a corporation may be forced to reduce its profit if it wants to continue to get a share of the market. Moreover, the tendency toward parallel pricing in concentrated industries means that prices only rise. When an industry leader like General Motors (GM) or U.S. Steel announces a price increase of 7 percent, within a few days, similar increases are announced by their so-called competitors. As Ralph Nader and his associates have noted, "Each firm gladly increases its profit margin by getting the same share of a larger pie. There is no incentive to keep prices down, for then all the other firms will have to come down to that price which means the same share of a smaller pie."[24] It is impossible to know exactly how much monopolies contribute to inflation. Certainly, the profits generated by lack of competition rather than efficiency or product superiority are hidden contributors. The existence of monopolies also has important political consequences. The concentration of economic power undermines the democratic process in two fundamental ways. The first is overt, as the powerful marshal! their vast resources to achieve favorable laws, court decisions and rulings by regulatory agencies. They have the lobbyists, lawyers, and politicians (as noted in Chapter 1) to work for their interests. More subtly (but real, nonetheless), the powerful get their way because of the bias of the politico-economic system. Such time-honored notions as "our economic interests abroad must be protected" and "tax incentives to business will benefit everyone" and "bigness is goodness" go unchallenged because we have been socialized to accept the current system as proper. Thus, decisions continue to be based on precedent, and the idea that "what is good for General Motors is good for the country" prevails. As long as such notions guide decision making, the interests of the wealthy will be served at the expense of the nonwealthy.[25] For defenders of a competitive free enterprise system, the existence of monopolies and shared monopolies should be attacked as un-American because the economy has become neither free nor competitive. Green made the following observation: Huey Long once prophesied that fascism would come to the United States first in the form of anti-fascism. So too with socialism--corporate socialism. Under the banner of free enterprise, up to two-thirds of American manufacturing has been metamorphosed into a "closed enterprise system." Although businessmen spoke the language of competitive capitalism, each sought refuge for themselves: price-fixing, parallel pricing, mergers, excessive advertising, quotas, subsidies, and tax favoritism. While defenders of the American dream guarded against socialism from the left, it arrived unannounced from the right.[26] In summary, the negative consequences of shared monopolies are important to our understanding of elite deviance in two ways. First, monopolies are themselves deviant because they disproportionately redistribute wealth and advantage toward the already advantaged. And second, the existence of monopolies aids in creating an environment in which deviant acts are encouraged. An examination of the automobile industry will illustrate these interrelated phenomena. Case Study: The Automobile Industry Sales data (1993) for the top 500 U.S. industrial corporations listed General Motors first (with $133.622 billion in sales) and Ford as second (with $108.521 billion). The major oil companies, whose fortunes are directly related to automobile usage, were also ranked near the top: Exxon was third, Mobil was sixth, Texaco was ninth, Chevron was eleventh, and Amoco was thirteenth. Together, these five oil companies had sales of $246.2 billion.[27] The pivotal position of the industry in the U.S. economy is underscored by such considerations as the following: One out of every seven workers in this country is said to be dependent directly or indirectly on the automobile industry, the industry consumes about one-fifth of the nation's steel production, one out of every fourteen tons of copper, more than two out of every five tons of lead, more than one out of every four tons of zinc, one pound in seven of nickel, one-half of the reclaimed rubber, almost three- fourths of the upholstery leather, and substantial proportions of total national output of glass, machine tools, general industrial equipment, and forgings.[25] The important point is that the automobile industry is one of the nation's most highly concentrated. In the early 1900s, 181 companies manufactured 1. Stanton Wheeler, "Trends and Problems in the Sociological Study of Crime" (June, 1976), 525. This criticism has been made by others, as well. See especially Alexander Liazos, "The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts, and Perverts," Social Problems 20 (Summer, 1972),10-20. 2. Marshall B. Clinard, Illegal Corporate Behavior (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1979). See also Marshall B. Clinard and Peter C. Yeager, "Corporate Crime: Issues in Research," Criminology 16 (August, 1978), 255-72. 3. J. Donahue, "The Missing Corporate Rap Sheet: Missing Government Records of Corporate Abuses," Multinational Monitor (December, 1992):14-16. 4. Amati Etzioni, "Is Corporate Crime Worth the Time?" Business and Society Review 36 (Winter 1990), 33, and J. Donahue, 17. 5. J. Donahue, 19. 6. William Greider, Who Will Tell The People? The Betrayal of American Democracy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 335ff is the major source of the following discussion. See also David R. Simon, Social Problems & The Sociological Imagination: The Analysis of Social Problems. (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1995), Chapter 2. 7. Greider, 350. 8. Greider, 339. 9. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (New York: International Publishers, 1967). Originally published in 1866. 10. From The Closed Enterprise System, by Mark J. Green, Beverly C. Moore, Jr., and Bruce Wasserstein, 7. Copyright (C) 1972 by The Center for Study of Responsive Law. Reprinted by permission of Viking Penguin Inc. 11. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 Census of Manufactures: Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), Table 9. 12. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 524. 13. Amiti Etzioni, "Is Corporate Crime Worth the Time?," 33. 14. Hanes Johnson, Sleep Walking through History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 433. 15. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991): 540. 16. James Flanigan, "New Corporate Merger Wave Is Rolling In," Los Angeles Times, 8 May 1991, D-1, D-8. 17. R. Farrighetti, (Ed.) World Almanac & Book of Facts 1994. (Mahwah, NJ: Funk & Wagnalls, 1993):76, 112. The New York Times (29 January, 1994), A-17. 18. Quoted in Green, Moore, and Wasserstein, 13-14. 19. This section on the consequences of shared monopolies is taken primarily from Green, Moore, and Wasserstein, 14 26; and Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield, A Populist Manifesto (New York: Warner Paperback Library, 1972), 48-56. 20. Green, Moore, and Wasserstein, 14, and Richard B. DuBoff, "Wealth Distribution Study Causes Tinge of Discomfort," In These Times (5-11 December 1984), 17. 21. Newfield and Greenfield, 51. 22. William Conner and Robert Smiley, quoted in Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 216. 23. Green, Moore, and Wasserstein, 15. See also "The Monopoly Inflation Game," Dollars and Sense (23 January 1977), 12-13. 24. Nader, Green, and Seligman, 213. 25. For comparison see Michael Parenti, Power and the Powerless (New York: St Martins Press, 1978). 26. Mark J. Green, "The High Cost of Monopoly," The Progressive 36 (March: 1972), 4, 22. "The Forbes Sales 500," Forbes, 25 April 1988, 136-37. 27. See The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995 (New York: Funk & Wagnalls 1994): 120. 28. Robert F. Lanzillotti, "The Automobile Industry" in The Structure of America' Industry, 4th ea., ed. Walter Adams (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 256. 29. "The Forbes Assets and Earnings 500,"' Forbes (25 April 1988), 144, 163 30. Green, Moore, and Wasserstein, 244 31. David Hapgood, The Screwing of the Average Man: How the Rich Get Richer an You Get Poorer (New York: Bantam, 1975), 152. 32. "The Monopoly Inflation Game," 12. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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