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Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War!

The Role of Regional Armed Forces
Because no all-embracing set of principles for security policies will provide
clear guides for action by all concerned nations in every circumstance, future
security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region will need to be adaptable.
Groups of nations will want to act when their interests are engaged—as they
always have. Authority for military enforcement should normally come from
the UN, although occasions may arise where nations of the region may seek
logistic and other help from their neighbors to deal with communal violence
It would be preferable to promote ‘security communities.’

and transnational threats. Although individual countries will not agree with
all actions by other groups of nations, the cumulative effect over time of 
these
actions will promote norms of international behavior based upon principles of
nonaggression and respect for human dignity.
Much of this process of developing shared expectations of peaceful
change is the business of policy and diplomacy, but it has a significant 
mili-tary
component. The armed forces of the region tend to harbor unwarranted
fears of neighbors and regional powers. Regional security would be improved
if the armed forces of the region tailored military capabilities and plans and
conducted unilateral exercises in ways that increased transparency and
warning times, raised thresholds for military action, and supported peaceful
solutions over time.
Military dialogue and rudimentary exercises on common tasks such as
search-and-rescue operations promote under-standing
and build confidence. The United
States conducts peacekeeping exercises with
Russia and search-and-rescue exercises with
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-gion
that includes Chinese participation. Ja-pan
also conducts naval search-and-rescue
exercises with Russia, and, recently, Japan
and South Korea combined naval forces to
provide humanitarian assistance. Japan and
other regional maritime forces are cooperat-ing
to improve submarine rescue capabilities
that would provide a more rapid response to submarine tragedies such as
one that Russia recently experienced. The information sharing and proce-dures
developed through such interactions prepare armed forces to work
side by side when their nations have the political will.
Beyond the political challenges, there are many practical challenges to
conducting combined military activities. The armed forces of the Asia-Pa-cific
region have worked out procedures for bilateral operations but have
not framed standardized procedures to serve as a basis for working together
in multinational operations. Communications are difficult because equip-ment
is not fully interoperable and because of language difficulties; yet,
these are challenges that can be surmounted.
The developments in East Timor have brought attention to the need for
the armed forces of the region to develop capabilities to work side by side in
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. As Australia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and other
nations of the region contributed to the international force in East Timor,
Security communities will erode zero-sum approaches to regional security.

they faced a broad array of questions about how to move and sustain their
forces, as well as questions of rules of engagement and operating procedures
that they had not previously addressed.
Operations in East Timor demonstrated that Japan, South Korea, and
China could play a constructive role in Southeast Asia. South Korea provided
a battalion of troops for the initial international forces sent to secure 
peace in
East Timor and strengthened their battalion to support the UN Transition
Authority. Japan provided C-130 aircraft for transporting humanitarian 
sup-plies
within Indonesia, and China provided policemen to the UN Transition
Authority in East Timor. In the future, armed forces from these nations should
routinely participate in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and noncombatant
evacuation operations with the nations of Southeast Asia.
The Role of the United States
The armed forces of the United States, in conjunction with allies and other
partners in the Asia-Pacific region, have undertaken several initiatives to
enhance regional readiness for combined operations. These include expand-ing
regional participation in formerly bilateral exercises, improving 
commu-nications
among the armed forces of the region, and focusing foreign
assistance on capabilities to contribute to combined humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations, in addition to national defense.
Initiatives are underway to merge bilateral exercises into regional exercises
through linkage and involvement of several participants. In Northeast Asia,
efforts to link bilateral search-and-rescue exercises to involve more regional
partners are ongoing. This year in Southeast Asia, Singapore will participate
in the formerly bilateral Thai-U.S. exercise Cobra Gold, and plans are in 
place
to link U.S. exercises with Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore next year
into an exercise called Team Challenge focused on peace enforcement and
humanitarian assistance. Malaysia has expressed an interest in participating 
in
future years, and other nations, including Mongolia, China, Japan, and South
Korea, have been invited to send observers.
To improve dialogue, the U.S. Pacific Command and component com-mands
host many multinational conferences, including an annual confer-ence
bringing together the chiefs of defense from the region. The
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies provides a venue for senior mili-tary
officers and defense executives to exchange security perspectives dur-ing
conferences, one-week senior-executive courses, and 12-week
executive courses.
A recent conference of communications officers from the region proposed
to create a coalition-wide Asia-Pacific area network in which the armed
forces can coordinate planning, operations, and routine activities. This 
re-sulted
in the creation of an Asia-Pacific Area Network in which all armed
forces with which the United States maintains relations may participate. In
the future, increasing liaison-officer participation in headquarters’ staffs,
and thus developing the capability to form combined staffs for operations,
will also improve communications among the armed forces in the region.
Underlying these initiatives is the need for sustained exchanges of officers
for military education. The experience of U.S. officers who have attended
foreign military colleges provides an unparal-leled
understanding of how foreign armed
forces see their role and approach opera-tions.
Foreign officers who attend U.S. mili-tary
colleges develop an understanding of the
value of a professional armed force, divorced
from politics and subordinate to democratic
government authority. They come to appre-ciate
that reliance on force rather than po-litical
accommodation to resolve internal
disputes stokes the fires of rebellion and
drives away investment needed for national
development. They also acquire a deeper appreciation of U.S. interests in
maintaining international security so that all may prosper. The network of
contacts they develop with Americans and officers from their region informs
dialogue and becomes particularly valuable as they assume leadership roles
within their armed forces. Education is a long-term investment. As in 
Indo-nesia
and Pakistan, those who support reform in their armed forces often
have attended U.S. military courses.
Security partnerships support U.S. interests in sharing responsibilities for
international security and ensuring the international legitimacy of military
action. U.S. allies and friends should have confidence that they are full 
part-ners,
rather than viewing the United States as “the lone superpower,” acting
without consultation, coordination, and appreciation of their views. 
Consul-tation
and coordination in the harried pace of events leading to a crisis are
not enough. Instead, they must be developed and honed in the course of
routine dialogue and exercises. Success requires a habit of cooperation.
Fundamental Reconstruction
The fundamental security challenge in the Asia-Pacific region is to trans-form
the balance-of-power approach proposed by those who advocate a mul-tipolar
global power structure into one that instead aims to produce security
U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan do much more than deter North Korean
aggression.

communities in which disputes are not resolved by threats or the employ-ment
of force. The process will be one of building upon bilateral security 
re-lationships
to form a web of regional relationships and capabilities that
reinforce security for individual states, discouraging armed aggression as a
way of settling disputes, and developing habits of regional military 
coopera-tion
and professional military behavior.
The challenge is to nurture a security approach in Asia in which the
nations
• genuinely do not plan or intend to fight each other;
• are willing to put collective efforts into resolving regional points of 
friction;
• are willing to contribute armed forces and other aid to UN-mandated 
op-erations
to support diplomatic solutions;
• are willing to contribute to humanitarian operations; and
• are willing to plan, train, and exercise their armed forces together to 
build
trust and confidence and capabilities to conduct these kinds of operations.
Rivalries and centers of power in Asia do exist. The challenge is to channel
the energies of these centers into working together on the problems that 
af-fect
the security and prosperity of all our states and away from intimidation
and armed conflict. We cannot be naïve on this score. There is a great deal
of historical distrust and antagonism in the region; a natural tendency to
look for short-term, unilateral gain; and a concern that compromise and 
ne-gotiation
will be interpreted as weakness. Habits of regional cooperation are
only rudimentary.
Inaction also poses dangers. Major social and economic changes are under
way in China and Indonesia. Japan and India are formulating new approaches
to regional security. The Korean Peninsula faces the prospect of major
changes. Afghanistan is promoting a militant form of Islam and serves as a
training ground for militant groups from Chechnya to the Philippines. Russia
eventually will return its attention to its Far East. Unless patterns of 
security
cooperation and combined military activity are established and nourished,
there is a danger of unilateral and bilateral actions raising tensions and 
rival-ries
in the region, which could risk conflict and inhibit peaceful development.
On the other hand, security communities that share dependable expecta-tions
of peaceful change will erode zero-sum approaches to regional security
by creating habits of cooperation and demonstrating the benefits of 
partici-pation.
As with our allies, discussions of regional security in the future
should be dominated by what we can do together to enhance security rather
than what we should not do to each other.
If pursued skillfully, efforts to change mindsets in Asia over time will take
hold and build durable security that will support prosperity and improve-
communities in which disputes are not resolved by threats or the employ-ment
of force. The process will be one of building upon bilateral security 
re-lationships
to form a web of regional relationships and capabilities that
reinforce security for individual states, discouraging armed aggression as a
way of settling disputes, and developing habits of regional military 
coopera-tion
and professional military behavior.
The challenge is to nurture a security approach in Asia in which the
nations
• genuinely do not plan or intend to fight each other;
• are willing to put collective efforts into resolving regional points of 
friction;
• are willing to contribute armed forces and other aid to UN-mandated 
op-erations
to support diplomatic solutions;
• are willing to contribute to humanitarian operations; and
• are willing to plan, train, and exercise their armed forces together to 
build
trust and confidence and capabilities to conduct these kinds of operations.
Rivalries and centers of power in Asia do exist. The challenge is to channel
the energies of these centers into working together on the problems that 
af-fect
the security and prosperity of all our states and away from intimidation
and armed conflict. We cannot be naïve on this score. There is a great deal
of historical distrust and antagonism in the region; a natural tendency to
look for short-term, unilateral gain; and a concern that compromise and 
ne-gotiation
will be interpreted as weakness. Habits of regional cooperation are
only rudimentary.
Inaction also poses dangers. Major social and economic changes are under
way in China and Indonesia. Japan and India are formulating new approaches
to regional security. The Korean Peninsula faces the prospect of major
changes. Afghanistan is promoting a militant form of Islam and serves as a
training ground for militant groups from Chechnya to the Philippines. Russia
eventually will return its attention to its Far East. Unless patterns of 
security
cooperation and combined military activity are established and nourished,
there is a danger of unilateral and bilateral actions raising tensions and 
rival-ries
in the region, which could risk conflict and inhibit peaceful development.
On the other hand, security communities that share dependable expecta-tions
of peaceful change will erode zero-sum approaches to regional security
by creating habits of cooperation and demonstrating the benefits of 
partici-pation.
As with our allies, discussions of regional security in the future
should be dominated by what we can do together to enhance security rather
than what we should not do to each other.
If pursued skillfully, efforts to change mindsets in Asia over time will take
hold and build durable security that will support prosperity and improve-
ments in the Asian standard of living. This is a worthy goal for those who
live in, are engaged in, and care about the region.
Note
1. E. Adler and M. Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge
University Press, 1998); and A. Archarya, “The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defense Community’?” Pacific Affairs 
(Summer
1991): 159–177.



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