-Caveat Lector- > Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend > or colleague. > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > 7 July 2003 > > by Dr. George Friedman > > U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategies in Iraq > > Summary > > The appointment of Gen. John Abizaid as head of U.S. Central > Command opens a new phase in both the Iraq campaign and the war > on al Qaeda. In order to wage follow-on operations against al > Qaeda, an effective counterinsurgency operation must be launched > against the Iraqi guerrillas. This is a politico-military > imperative. Politically, the United States must demonstrate its > effectiveness against the full spectrum of opponents. Militarily, > the United States must show it can project forces from Iraq while > the base of operations remains insecure. Directly suppressing an > insurrection without indigenous support historically has been > difficult, but Iraq has a built-in opposition to the guerrillas: > the Shiites in the south. But their desire to dominate an Iraqi > government -- and their ties to Iran -- runs counter to U.S. > policy. This means Washington will have to make some difficult > choices in Iraq, and in the end will give away some things it > does not want to give away. > > Analysis > > U.S. Army Gen. John Abizaid will officially take over as head of > Central Command during the week of July 7. His mission will be > not only to stabilize the situation in Iraq, but also to command > the main U.S. offensive against al Qaeda. The summer offensive > that Stratfor has written about has begun, and Abizaid's mission > will be to wage war, integrate the various operations into a > coherent whole and achieve the goal of the offensive: to further > undermine al Qaeda's ability to strike at the U.S. homeland. > > In war, no plan unfolds as expected. This war began in a > completely unexpected fashion on Sept. 11, 2001. As is > inevitable, the course of the war has taken unexpected turns. The > most recent and significant turn of this war has been the > emergence of a guerrilla war in Iraq. To be more precise, it > appears to us that in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the fighters on > the ground understood that they could not win a conventional war. > Rather than engage in the sort of conflict at which the United > States excels, they put up token conventional resistance, all the > while planning to engage the United States in unconventional > warfare over an extended period. > > In other words, the Iraqi forces understood that they could not > defeat the United States in conventional war. Instead, the Iraqi > war plan consisted of declining conventional engagement and > subsequently engaging U.S. forces in operations in which their > advantages were minimized and their weaknesses were exposed. > > This has left the United States with the following battle > problem: It must wage the broader summer offensive while > simultaneously containing, engaging and defeating the Iraqi > guerrillas. This is not an easy task, not only because it spreads > U.S. forces thinner than planned, but also because the challenge > posed by the guerrillas has trans-military implications, > politically and psychologically. Abizaid must not ignore these > considerations and must integrate them into his war plan. This is > neither easy nor optional. > > It is useful to begin by recalling the overarching strategic > purpose of all of these operations: the disruption of al Qaeda > and potential follow-on groups to prevent further major attacks > on the United States. The Iraq campaign was an element in this > broader strategy, designed to achieve these three goals, in > increasing importance: > > 1. The elimination of a regime that potentially could support al > Qaeda operations. > > 2. The transformation of the psychological architecture of the > Islamic world. The perception in the Islamic world, developed > since the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 and reaffirmed by > events since then, was that the United States was incapable of > resolute action. The United States was seen as powerful > militarily, but as lacking the political will to use that power. > U.S. forces withdrew after taking minimal casualties in Beirut > and Somalia. In Afghanistan, the United States halted operations > after seizing major cities, apparently because it was unwilling > to engage in more extended conflict. The U.S. invasion of Iraq > was designed to change the Islamic world's perception -- > accepting anger at the United States in exchange for greater > fear. > > 3. The creation of a base of operations that would allow the > United States to bring political and military pressure to bear on > a cluster of nations the U.S. administration sees as directly or > indirectly sustaining al Qaeda operations -- in particular Saudi > Arabia, Syria and Iran. Riyadh began shifting its position prior > to the Iraq invasion. Immediately after the end of the campaign, > the United States turned its attention to follow-on operations > against Syria and Iran. These operations have been primarily > political since the end of the Iraq campaign, but the constant > threat exists that they could move to a military phase at any > point. > > The guerrilla war in Iraq strikes directly at the second > objective of the Iraqi campaign. It is what Stratfor has called a > trans-military goal: It is rooted in a military operation but > ultimately arrives at an issue that transcends the purely > military -- namely the psychological perception of the United > States and the credibility of U.S. military threats. As a > secondary matter, it also complicates the logistics of follow-on > operations after Iraq. At the moment, that is not the primary > issue -- although it should be emphatically noted that an > evolution in the conditions in Iraq very well could undermine the > U.S. ability to use Iraq as a base of operations. > > The problems that have arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq are rooted > in U.S. strategy. The United States invaded both countries as a > means toward other ends, rather than as ends in themselves. The > invasion of Afghanistan was intended to disrupt al Qaeda's main > operational base. The invasion of Iraq was intended to bring U.S. > power to bear against al Qaeda's enablers in the region. In > neither case did the United States have an intrinsic interest in > either country -- including control of Iraq's oil. > > The United States could achieve its primary purpose in each > country without complete pacification. In Afghanistan, the U.S. > administration accepted from the beginning that the complex > tribal and ideological conflicts there would make pacification > impossible. U.S. forces seized the major cities and a few > strategic points, kept most forces in protected garrisons and > conducted military operations as opportunities to combat al Qaeda > arose. U.S. forces avoided any attempts at pacification projects, > understanding that the level of force and effort required to > achieve any degree of pacification far outstripped U.S. interests > and probably U.S. resources. The United States had a limited > mission in Afghanistan and ruthlessly focused on that, while > publicly professing ambitious and complex goals. > > The Iraq campaign took its primary bearings from the Afghan > campaign. The goals were to shatter the Iraqi army and displace > the Iraqi regime. These goals were achieved quickly. The United > States then rapidly pivoted to use its psychological and military > advantage to pressure Syria and Iran. As in Afghanistan, > pacification was not a primary goal. Pacification was not > essential to carrying on the follow-on mission. But the U.S. > reading of the situation in Iraq diverged from that of > Afghanistan. The U.S. administration always understood that the > consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan would be the > continuation and intensification of the chaos that preceded that > invasion. The underlying assumption in Iraq was that the postwar > Iraqi impulse would be toward stability. The U.S. administration > assumed that the majority of the Iraqi public opposed Saddam > Hussein, would welcome the fall of his regime, would not object > to an American occupation and, therefore, would work harmoniously > with the United States in pacification projects, easing the > burden on the United States tremendously. > > The U.S. administration expected the defeat of the Taliban to > devolve into guerrilla warfare. The United States did not expect > the defeat of the Baath regime to devolve into guerrilla warfare. > It did not expect the Shiites to be as well-organized as they > are, nor did they expect this level of Shiite opposition to a > U.S. occupation. In other words, the strategic understanding of > the Iraqi campaign took its bearings from the Afghan campaign -- > and the United States had no interest in pacification -- but at > the same time, the United States did not expect this level of > difficulty and danger involved in pacifying Iraq, because U.S. > intelligence misread the situation on the ground. > > At its current level of operations, the guerrilla war does not > represent a military challenge to the United States. Therefore, > the first and third goals are for the moment achieved. The United > States has displaced the Iraqi regime, limiting its ability to > engage in strategic operations with the United States, and U.S. > forces can conduct follow-on operations should they choose to. > But the United States is in serious danger of failing to achieve > its second goal: transforming the psychological perception of the > United States as an irresistible military force. > > It certainly is true that the guerrilla war does not represent a > strategic threat to the United States. But on one level, the > reality is irrelevant. Perception is everything. The image that > the U.S. Army is constantly taking casualties and is unable to > cripple the guerrillas undermines the perception that the United > States wanted to generate with this war. The reality might be > that the United States is overwhelmingly powerful and the > guerrilla war is a minor nuisance. The perception in the Islamic > world will be that the United States does not have the power to > suppress Saddam Hussein's guerrillas. It will complicate the > politico-military process that the United States wanted to put > into motion with the invasion. It is therefore a situation that > the United States will have to deal with. > > The United States has, in essence, two strategic options: > > 1. Afghanistize the conflict. Move into secure base camps while > allowing the political situation on the ground to play itself > out. Allow the tension between Shiite and Sunni to explode into > civil war, manipulating each side to the U.S. advantage, while > focusing militarily on follow-on operations in Syria, Iran and > elsewhere. In other words, insulate the U.S. military from the > Iraqi reality, and carry on operations elsewhere. > > 2. Try to engage and defeat the guerrillas through > counterinsurgency operations, including direct military attacks > and political operations. > > The dilemma facing the United States is this: From a strictly > military perspective, Option 1 is most attractive. From a > political and psychological perspective, Option 1 is > unacceptable. It also creates a military risk: The insurgency, > unless checked, ultimately could threaten the security of U.S. > forces in Iraq no matter how well-defended they were in their > secure facilities. On the other side of the equation, > counterinsurgency operations always require disproportionate > resources. The number of insurgents is unimportant. The number of > places they might be and the number of locations they might > attack dictate the amount of resources that must be devoted to > them. Therefore, a relatively small group of guerrillas can tie > down a much larger force. A sparse, dispersed and autonomous > guerrilla force can draw off sufficient forces to make follow-on > operations impossible. > > The classical counterinsurgency dilemma now confronts the United > States. The quantity of forces needed to defeat the guerrillas is > disproportionate to the military advantage gained by defeating > them. Failure to engage the guerrilla force could result in a > dramatic upsurge in their numbers, allowing them to become > unmanageable. The ineffective engagement of guerrillas could > result in both the squandering of resources and the failure to > contain them. The issue is not how large the guerrilla force is > but how sustainable it is. At this stage of operations, the > smaller the force the more difficult it is to suppress -- so long > as it is large enough to carry out dispersed operations, has > sufficient supplies and the ability to recruit new members as > needed. At this point, the Iraqi guerrilla force is of > indeterminate size, but it is certainly well-dispersed and has > sufficient supplies to operate. Its ability to recruit will > depend on arrangements made prior to the U.S. occupation and the > evolution of the conflict. This sort of guerrilla warfare does > not provide readily satisfactory solutions for the occupying > power. > > The classic solution of a guerrilla threat to an occupying power > is to transfer the burden of fighting to an indigenous force. Not > accidentally, the Iraqi guerrillas in recent days attacked and > killed seven Iraqis being trained for this role. Inventing a > counterinsurgency force beyond your own forces in the midst of > conflict is not easy. Nevertheless, successful containment of a > guerrilla force must involve either an indigenous force motivated > to suppress the guerrillas or, alternatively, forces provided by > a faction hostile to the guerrilla faction -- an ethnic or > religious group that shares the occupier's interest in > suppressing the guerrillas. > > The greatest threat the United States faces in Iraq is not the > guerrillas. It is the guerrillas combined with a rising among the > Shiites south of Baghdad. If the guerrilla rising combines with > an intifada -- a mass rising that might not use weapons beyond > stones, but that could lead to a breakdown of U.S. controls in > the south -- it would represent a most untenable situation. An > intifada, apart from its intrinsic problems, could complicate > logistics. Demonstrators likely would clog the supply routes from > the south. Suppressing an intifada not only is difficult, it has > political and psychological consequences as well. > > It is imperative that the United States prevent a rising among > the Shiites. It is also imperative that the United States find a > native faction in Iraq that is prepared to take on some of the > burden of suppressing the primarily Baathist guerrillas. The > United States is afraid of a Shiite uprising, but could use the > Shiites in suppressing the Baathists. The Shiites are the center > of gravity of the situation. > > Shiite leaders have made it clear that they want to dominate any > new Iraqi government -- and that they expect the United States to > create such a government. The United States has been concerned > that Iran influences and even might control the Shiites and that > handing over power to the Iraqi Shiites would, in effect, make > Iran the dominant force in Iraq and ultimately in the Persian > Gulf. That is a reasonable concern. Indeed, it violates the core > U.S. strategy. The United States invaded Iraq, in part, to coerce > Iran. To argue that the only way to stay in Iraq is to strengthen > Iran makes little sense. On the other hand, if the United States > continues to refuse to create a native government in Iraq, the > probability of a Shiite rising is substantial. > > The key to a U.S. strategy in Iraq, therefore, rests in Iran. If > regime change in Iran could be rapidly achieved or a substantial > accommodation with the Iranian government could be negotiated, > then using the Iraqi Shiites to man an Iraqi government and bear > the brunt of the counterinsurgency operation would be practical. > The key is to reach an agreement with Iran that provides the > United States with substantial assurances that the Iranian > government would neither support nor allow Iranians to provide > support to al Qaeda. > > The regime in Tehran has no love for the Sunnis, nor do the > Sunnis for the Shiites. The events in Pakistan show how deeply > sectarian religious violence is rooted in the Islamic world. The > United States cannot supplant Islamic fundamentalism. It can > potentially manipulate the situation sufficiently to control the > direct threat to the United States. In other words, if the United > States can reach an understanding with Iran over al Qaeda and > nuclear weapons, then the Shiites in Iraq could become a solution > rather than a problem. > > If there is to be an agreement with Iran, the United States must > demonstrate to Iranian hardliners first that it has the ability > to destabilize the Islamic Republic, and second that it is > prepared not to do so in return for Shiite cooperation. Without > this, any alliance with Iran over Iraq rapidly would spiral out > of U.S. control, and Iran would become uncontrollable. The key > for the United States is to demonstrate that it has leverage in > Iran. The United States does not want to overthrow the Iranian > government. It simply wants to demonstrate its ability to > destabilize Iran if it chose to. If it can do that, then other > things become possible. > > It follows that the United States likely shortly will work to > reignite the demonstrations in Iran -- in all probability in the > next few days. The purpose will not be to overthrow the Iranian > government -- that is beyond U.S. capabilities. Instead, it will > be designed to persuade Iranian leaders -- including Supreme > Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- that some form of cooperation > with the United States over issues that matter to the Americans > is in their interest, and could result in something that the > Iranians have longed dreamed of: a Shiite-dominated Iraq. > > This strategy is extraordinarily convoluted and fraught with > difficulties. But the prospect of fighting a counterinsurgency > campaign in Iraq, alone, without indigenous support, is equally > fraught with danger. So too is attempting an Afghan solution -- > packing forces into air bases and army camps and allowing the > insurrection to evolve. There are few good choices in Iraq at the > moment. Alliance with the Shiites is extremely difficult and > risky, but the other choices are equally difficult. If the > Iranian/Shiite play fails, then it will be time to choose between > counterinsurgency and enclaves. > ................................................................... > > STRATFOR SERVICES NOW AVAILABLE: > > Join decision-makers around the world who read Stratfor for daily > intelligence briefs, in-depth analyses and forecasts on a wide range of > international security, political and economic affairs. > > Stratfor Premium is our flagship product providing comprehensive > global intelligence including daily analyses, special reports, > intelligence alerts, premium analyses, situation reports, country > and regional net assessments as well as Stratfor's sought after > Annual and Quarterly Forecasts. Corporate or multi-user volume > discount packages available. Visit this web page for details: > http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=c > > Stratfor Basic offers daily analysis, situation reports and ongoing > coverage of global events. 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