_________________________________ STRATFOR, "Among the firms making the biggest splash" in the field of open source intelligence. Time magazine, January 25, page 48 _________________________________ Global Intelligence Update Red Alert January 25, 1999 Rising Danger of Simultaneous Crises in Iraq and Kosovo Summary Something odd is going on. The Iraqis are not allowing the latest crisis to die down, but are challenging U.S. aircraft with missiles and are deploying forces southward. Their newspapers are full of threats directed toward Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the Serbs deliberately carried out a massacre that was intended to be detected, and then intentionally exacerbated the crisis by trying to expel a senior diplomat. There is now the real possibility that Baghdad and Belgrade are coordinating their actions to simultaneously pose challenges that strain U.S. military capabilities. At the same time, Russia has taken on a much more assertive role, demanding that the U.S. not attack either Iraq or Serbia. The U.S. Post-Cold War coalition has completely broken down. Russia, France and China are all resisting the U.S. A window of opportunity has opened here for the Iraqis and Serbs. We see signs that they are now taking advantage of it, perhaps in concert. Analysis One of the major predictions STRATFOR made in the Annual Forecast was that Russia would become much more assertive in 1999. One of the consequences of this new assertiveness would be an increased willingness on the part of Russia to challenge the United States. We went on to say that, "the first confrontation will come, we think, over Serbia, where we expect Russia to increase direct aid to Serbia openly, thereby challenging U.S. policy in Bosnia and Kosovo. Serbia, watching U.S. fumbling over Iraq, and emboldened by Russian support, is clearly preparing a new challenge to the United States over Kosovo. Serbia is calculating that the United States will not risk a major confrontation with Russia, and France may choose to oppose a full-scale anti-Serbian intervention. The dangers of a new confrontation with Serbia rise as Russian nationalism intensifies. There is particular danger if Serbia and Iraq challenge the United States simultaneously." Barely three weeks into the new year, we are now witnessing a crisis with Serbia over Kosovo at the same time as U.S. warplanes are engaged in almost daily combat against surface to air missile launch sites in Iraq. The game's afoot. Let's first consider the old game, since there is a new one starting. The old game was built around George Bush's New World Order doctrine. According to this doctrine, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that great power conflict had been effectively abolished. The United States was the only superpower and all other major powers (the Europeans, Japan, China, Russia) basically shared a common interest in international peace and prosperity. Major international conflicts were no longer possible. There were only two types of military problems. There were nations that would suffer internal instability, which required the international community to intervene in order to prevent suffering. Then there might be some nations that might seek to create regional hegemonies. Somalia was an example of the former; Iraq, the latter. The solution to these problems was the same. The international community had a common interest in preventing regional conflict and national instability and in alleviating human suffering. Therefore, when such problems occurred, the international community, using multilateral institutions like the United Nations or NATO, would intervene in order to maintain the status quo. The United States would take a major role in such interventions, as was its obligation as the only superpower, but it would share responsibility with other nations. Most important, it would only act where there was an international consensus that such intervention was necessary. This led to a series of operations including Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia – to name the most important. The tempo of interventions carried out by the United States actually increased after the end of the Cold War. More important, the geographical distribution of these interventions was, under normal circumstances, extremely dangerous. The United States was committing troops both simultaneously and sequentially throughout Eurasia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Under the best of circumstances, the frequency of these operations and their geographical diversity would have strained the logistical capabilities of the United States. Given the fact that the United States was simultaneously decreasing resources available to the military while increasing the tempo of operations, the strain on the U.S. military was quite intense. The strategic reality alleviated these dangers to a great degree. Because there was general consensus in favor of intervention, the target country was isolated. Its military capabilities could only decrease. Second, since there was no major power supporting them, the probability of coordinated action was minimal. The great risk was always that two geographically diverse powers, like Iraq, North Korea, or Serbia, would simultaneously strike at U.S. forces. This would pose a dangerous problem for the United States. With U.S. troops simultaneously engaged in combat in three different theaters, it was not clear that the United States could reinforce and resupply all theaters. However, under the strategic reality for most of the nineties, this was a theoretical, not a real problem. The overwhelming international consensus supporting these interventions guaranteed that target nations would lack the resources with which to initiate intense operations on their own, let alone coordinate their actions with nations continents away. Thus, even though two of these interventions, Serbia and Iraq, have turned into long-term commitments, joining Korea in dispersing U.S. forces, the actual risks appeared small. It is interesting that Iraq and Serbia have adopted almost identical strategies for dealing with the U.S.-led interventions, which is reasonable since both want to achieve similar goals: to become the dominant power in their region. Without U.S. intervention, this goal was in the reach of both nations. After the intervention, not only wasn't that goal attainable any longer, but the very survival of the regimes and the territorial integrity of their nations were in doubt. It would have appeared rational for both to capitulate to the international coalition arrayed against them. Neither did. Both Serbia and Iraq adopted the same view. First, both regimes felt that capitulation would mean their destruction as well as the abandonment of their dream of regional hegemony. Their perception was that any attempt at conciliation with domestic minorities or enemies across their borders would mean their utter destruction, and that continued conflict actually protected their interests better than a genuine peace. Second, they felt that time was on their side. The United States and its allies did not have fundamental interests at stake. Having viewed U.S. behavior elsewhere, it was both Iraq's and Serbia's perception that, over time, the United States would lose interest and drift away. They simply had to wait. More important, they read the U.S. coalition as inherently unstable. If only one major power were to break away from the coalition, then both Iraq's and Serbia's isolation would be done away with. Moreover, at that point, the ability of the United States to act under the cover of the international community would dissolve, leaving Baghdad and Belgrade with room for diplomatic maneuver, trade opportunities, and even access to arms. The key for both Iraq and Serbia, therefore, was simply to survive without capitulating. This meant maintaining the state of belligerence without conceding anything substantial and without triggering an overwhelming military action. Both Iraq and Serbia adopted the same strategy. They would press forward continually until challenged. On being challenged, they would make a concession that would forestall military action. After a while, they would break whatever promises they made and continue to press forward. At times they miscalculated, triggering an easily endurable series of air strikes, which actually helped perpetuate the regime by creating a sense of embattlement and victimization among the populace and increasing support for the regime. This strategy was facilitated by the inability of the United States to put forward any meaningful demands beyond that Iraq and Serbia stop doing some particular thing. This allowed them to stop doing whatever was demanded, causing the U.S. to stand down its forces. When the carriers and planes went home, they resumed their actions in an endless series of challenges designed to exhaust the United States. All the while they waited for the coalition to break. The coalition has broken. This is a very different situation than before. Russia is no longer part of the U.S. led coalition, but is now crafting its own independent foreign policy, one strongly opposed to military actions against both Iraq and Serbia. China is supporting the Russian position. France, although it has backed off somewhat in the case of the Serbs, following the recent massacre, is also opposed. Following the unsanctioned bombing of Iraq in December 1998, the United States lost the cover of its coalition. More important, it moved into a period of grave danger. Madeleine Albright is heading to Moscow on January 24 to repair the damage. There will undoubtedly be toasts and a warm communique. But Albright has nothing to offer the Russians. Nothing will come of the meetings. The hidden nightmare of U.S. strategy has been the possibility of coordinated action between Iraq and Serbia. Imagine the havoc if Iraq moved south into Kuwait at the same moment that Serbia launched an offensive against Bosnia. In both cases, U.S. troops would be immediately involved. Which would receive priority for reinforcements? Could the U.S. fight two high-intensity conflicts simultaneously without allied support and with the active opposition of Russia, perhaps with it even shipping weapons to both Iraqis and Serbs? It is not clear to us that the Iraqis are explicitly coordinating with the Serbs, although these two pariahs would be foolish not to begin some sort of secret coordination. We have no direct evidence of such coordination, but it if this is all mere coincidence, it is inspired coincidence from the Iraqi and Serbian point of view. Our guess, for what it is worth, is that this is not coincidence and that we are seeing skillful coordination between Baghdad and Belgrade. Something is going on. The Iraqi crisis did not end as such crises normally do, with Iraq standing down. Rather, Iraqi SAMs are locking on to U.S. aircraft daily, while reports persist of Iraqi troop concentrations along the Kuwaiti border. The Iraqi press is filled with claims against Kuwait and condemnation of Saudi Arabia. Thus, rather than ending the last crisis, the Iraqis have deliberately prolonged the crisis. They are behaving very differently than before. At the same time, the Serbs have decided to challenge the United States in Kosovo. The perpetrated a massacre that was clearly intended to be detected. They threatened to expel a diplomat, deliberately infuriating the United States. They have gone out of their way to make it clear that they intend to do everything necessary to keep Kosovo inside Serbia, whether the United States likes it or not. Suddenly and simultaneously, Iraq and Serbia are doing everything possible to provoke the United States. What has happened? Time has run out on U.S. post-Cold War policy. The coalition has shattered and both Serbia and Iraq see a window of opportunity. The outcry against the December bombing of Iraq was not only intense, but seems to have broken the coalition permanently. Most important, Russia is now taking a much more active role, demanding that the United States not repeat its bombing of Iraq or Serbia. While working publicly to calm the crisis, there are continual reports coming from the region of Russian weaponry flowing into Serbia. In effect, the Russians, committed to working with China and France to limit U.S. global power, see an opportunity to block U.S. power in two critical regions. If the simultaneous Iraqi and Serbian crises are not pure coincidence, then there is a tremendous danger emerging. Iraqi military behavior over the past few weeks is extremely hard to explain. They are clearly both more confident and more aggressive. Their apparent deployment of forces seems to indicate some sort of aggressive intention. The Serbs have deliberately provoked a crisis with the United States at the same time. Both situations could explode at any minute. Both countries have a reason to want the situation to explode, since this is very much the situation they have been waiting for since their confrontation with the United States began. Neither country is in a position to confront the United States alone. They stand a much better chance of achieving their goals if they challenge the United States simultaneously. With overt and covert Russian support, they have the ability to pose a tremendous challenge to American military capabilities. The Iraqis and Serbs are clearly up to something. What has changed? The Russians are no longer passive. We are now passing out of the post-Cold War world into a new, longer-lasting era in which the United States is no longer leading a passive, subservient international coalition in crusades against isolated rogue nations. A coordinated resistance to U.S. power has begun to emerge and function. U.S. military deployment is based on the assumption that there will be no geographically dispersed, coordinated resistance to U.S. military actions. The U.S. is even less prepared for coordinated initiatives by its enemies that places the U.S. on the defensive and in which military action takes place at the time and choosing of Washington's opponents. It appears to us that we are moving into such a period. If there is Serbo-Iraqi coordination going on, or if this is mere coincidence, the U.S. may find itself in a two- theater confrontation which could strain its military resources to the limits. The problem: whether this happens is not up to Washington but to planners in Baghdad and Belgrade. This is a very new game that's afoot. ___________________________________________________ To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates, sign up on the web at http://www.stratfor.com/mail/, or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR, Inc. 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
