___________________________________________ What's going on in your world? Find Out. Visit Stratfor's Global Intelligence Center http://www.stratfor.com/world/default.htm ___________________________________________ OTHER FEATURES ON STRATFOR.COM Third Front Opens in India-Pakistan Face-Off http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special46.htm Somalia: A Situation Report http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/specialreports/special5.htm Kazakh President Nazarbayev Reins in Defense Ministry http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9908102325.htm Gilman's Statements Threaten U.S. Management of China-Taiwan Dispute http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/c9908102245.htm __________________________________ STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update August 11, 1999 Israel Keeps An Eye on Syrian Missile Programs Summary: Israel's Haaretz newspaper cited Israeli military sources on August 10 as saying that Syria is developing a long range surface-to-surface missile capable of striking targets as far away as Ankara. In acknowledging this development, the Israeli government was not attempting to undermine the peace talks, but to point out that Israel remains aware of Syria's military potential and will not abandon security for peace. Analysis: The Israeli newspaper Haaretz on August 10, quoting unnamed Israeli military officials, reported that Syria is developing a new class of surface-to-surface missiles. The new missiles are reportedly being developed with technical assistance from Iran and will have a range of more than 500 kilometers (310 miles). Fired from mobile launchers, of which Syria has 60, these missiles will be able to strike any point inside Israel and reach targets as far away as Ankara, Turkey. In 1983, the Syrians received a batch of SS-21 Scud-B missiles from the Soviet Union. These only have a range of 120 kilometers (75 miles) and are accurate to within 50 meters. This means that only Syrian Scuds placed close to the Golan cease-fire line dividing Syria from Israel could hit southern Israel where the Israelis are believed to have their strategic missiles deployed. This makes the Scud, Syria's main strategic deterrent, very vulnerable to Israeli air power. Rumors have persisted since 1989 that Damascus was attempting to import the M-9 short-range ballistic missile from China to alleviate this tactical problem. The M-9 is a very accurate, advanced, mobile, solid-fuel missile with a 500 kilometer (310 mile) range. However, after receiving a substantial amount of U.S. pressure, Beijing reportedly backed out of the deal. Iran however, is believed to have developed its new indigenous missile, the Shahab-3, with assistance from Pakistan, who, in turn, is believed to have copied the missile from China's M-9. One significant improvement offered by the Iranian missile is better guidance. Another is, of course, longer range. If the new Syrian missile under production is anything like these other "indigenously" developed missiles, then the strategic situation will shift dramatically. This would mean that Syrian Scuds could hit any part of Israel from a larger launching box and, more importantly, that the missiles could hit their targets more precisely. But despite the possible technical advancements, it is important to note that the development of this missile does not inherently raise the chance that the Israeli-Syria peace deal will fall through. Syrian President Hafez Assad is known to hedge his bets, always pursuing multiple and simultaneous tracks in his foreign policy. On one hand he is making peace with Israel. On the other he is equipping his nation to gain greater strategic flexibility. This is neither surprising, nor necessarily alarming to the Israelis. So why mention it? The reasons for reporting this story are three-fold. First, this is a simple acknowledgement that Israel is well aware of what is going on and is nobody's fool. Israel is not going into negotiations blindly, and when dealing with Syria, Israel will verify more than trust. This is a message to Damascus, but it is also a message to the Israeli public. Ironically, reporting the new Syrian missile capability is an attempt to undermine opposition to the peace process. In acknowledging the story first, the Barak administration can play down any possible political land mines that the Israeli opposition could lay on the road to peace. It does not mean that the issue will not come up during the process, but it does portray the administration as pragmatic and aware of the strategic environment in which it is negotiating. The report also serves to reinforce Turkish-Israeli relations. As mentioned before, the new missiles, if mounted on mobile launchers, have the capability to hit a large portion of Turkey, including Ankara. In reporting that Syria is developing a new missile, Israel is signaling to Turkey that it has not completely forgotten its military cooperation agreement with Turkey. Similarly, this message is intended to resonate in Damascus as well. While Lebanon is up for grabs, Israel does not want the Israeli-Syrain peace to come at the expense of Turkey. Moreover, the U.S. does not want the Israeli-Syrian peace to come at the expense of Turkey, and Israel is not yet ready to abandon U.S. support. By publicly conceding the fact that Syrian missile programs are continuing, the Barak government is not making excuses for ceasing the peace process, but rather is making it perfectly clear to the Israeli people, Israel's allies and Syria that peace will not come at the expense of security. __________________________________________________ SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR.COM 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________ (c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
