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HUNTING BIN LADEN - FAILED ATTEMPTS IN THE PAST
To watch the video go to: http://www.MiddleEast.org
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS FAILED IN 1998 and 1999 LEADING TO 11 SEPT
MID-EAST REALITIES © - MER - www.MiddleEast.Org - Washington - 10/05:
Now we know that a few years ago, when President Bill Clinton was meeting
privately one-on-one with the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, the
U.S. "hired" the agents of the infamous Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) to
assassinate Osama bin Laden. That was after the infamous American CIA has failed in
its many attempts to do the job, and after the Pentagon sent a volley of some 66
cruise missiles which also landed with a thump, and before Massoud (last month
assassinated probably by bin Laden) was subsequently hired to give it a try. The
payoff for Pakistan was going to be many billions in economic assistance, "action"
regarding Kashmir (remember how Clinton made coy statements about this "other
occupation"), and a closer overall U.S.-Pakistani relationship. This was all super
top secret then and may help explain the extraordinary meeting on American
independence day, July 4th 1999, when Sharif rushed to Washington quite unscheduled
for an emergency meeting with Clinton.
September 11th didn't happen in a vacuum. Osama bin Laden and much of his cabal
are goners now as there's no way they are going to be able to defy the full might of
the American empire enraged, moblized, and on the war path. But they have already
done the dasterdly deeds of their choosing, changed history, further militarized
America, and unleashed forces and passions whose results are no longer predictable
when they themselves are gone from the scene. Whatever happens now, this sordid
history needs to be better known, and better understood. Thus this insightful article
primarily about the ISI, from The Sunday Times two Sunday's ago, in addition to those
published in the past few days:
THE SPIES WHO COULD SAVE PAKISTAN
THE LOYALTY OF THE PAKISTANY ARMY IS UNDER EXTREME STRAIN
A formidable intelligence machine is
fighting to douse the fires of revolt,
says Mark Adkin*
[The Sunday Times (U.K.) - September 23, 2001] : Suddenly, it's back to the old
days. For any operations inside Afghanistan, the Americans need their old allies:
Pakistan's feared intelligence agency, the Inter- Services Intelligence, or ISI.
Once they were so close that their agents trekked across the Hindu Kush together on
reconnaissance missions (or to mingle with mujaheddin, as the Americans put it). It
was the time of the Soviet war on Afghanistan, and the CIA was utterly dependent on
the ISI to pass on arms and training to the guerrillas in their struggle against the
Russians.
The ISI has the reputation of being the most effective intelligence organisation in
the Third World. It is headed by a director-general, now Lieutenant-General Mahmood
Ahmed, who has direct, daily access to the president. He is almost certainly the most
powerful man in the military, responsible for all political, military, internal,
external and counter-intelligence operations in Pakistan.
Until very recently the Afghan bureau of the ISI has been something of a command post
in supporting the Taliban. As part of a policy of "Islamic debts", a campaign to
buttress its defences against India, Pakistan has used the Taliban's support to
project power north.
The Afghan opposition claims that Pakistani pilots often carry out air raids on behalf
of Taliban forces; independent sources also say that Pakistani special forces take
part in military operations inside Afghanistan. It is said that around 30% of
Pakistani military remain sympathetic to the Taliban cause: something General
Musharraf, the president of Pakistan, and President Bush will be painfully aware of.
A vast organisation, divided into several bureaux, the ISI is based in a heavily
guarded headquarters in Islamabad. The main operational department is the Afghan
bureau, but of almost equal importance will be the bureau for Kashmir, the region over
which Pakistan and India remain in bitter dispute.
The CIA's collaboration with the ISI began in 1984. Brigadier Mohammed Yousaf was the
head of the Afghan bureau during that time. "From 1984 to 1987 over 80,000 mujaheddin
went through our training camps," he says. "Hundreds of thousands of tons of weapons
and ammunition were distributed, and active operations were planned and carried out in
all of Afghanistan's 29 provinces."
These weapons were supplied covertly by the CIA, and the training sanctioned by them
too. Why? In 1985 the American congressman Charles Wilson said: "There were 58,000
[American] dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one . . . I thought the Soviets
ought to get a dose of it."
This stance is essential to understanding why America supported the mujaheddin against
the Soviet Union. But it could not do it alone - just like today, without the full
backing of the ISI the US would blunder into Afghanistan blind. Then, as now, the CIA
had no agents on the ground, had no Pushtu-speaking personnel and would rely on what
their satellite cameras told them. Cameras may not lie, but they seldom give answers
to the critical questions of who, when, why and how.
With its superior knowledge, the ISI told the CIA what weapons and ammunition were
required, then distributed these along with food and clothing to the various guerrilla
groups. Yousaf and his staff were in daily contact with the mujaheddin and developed
good relationships. They trained them in tactics, in the use of weapons, explosives
and radio communications.
Mujaheddin commanders would be selected, brought into Pakistan, briefed on the target
they should attack and then trained for the mission. They then went back into
Afghanistan, sometimes accompanied by Pakistan army advisers, to carry it out.
The ISI also planned operations, briefing commanders on specific tasks, such as
destroying an oil pipeline or ambushing a convoy. But it was a cardinal rule that no
American ever became involved with the distribution of funds or weapons once they were
in Pakistan. No Americans ever trained, or had direct contact with, the mujaheddin. It
was galling to the Americans that they paid the piper but could not call the tune.
To assist the mujaheddin, Pakistan operated inside Afghanistan in up to 11 groups.
They provided vital intelligence, not only on enemy activities but also on the
competence or otherwise of mujaheddin commanders.
The ISI has been doing exactly the same with the Taliban forces ever since, and the
information it has will now be essential to any troops in Afghanistan.
The CIA, meanwhile, was based discreetly at the embassy in Islamabad. The ISI's
relations with the CIA were sometimes polite, but more often strained. This was
because CIA officials continually wanted to become involved in details of arms
purchases and what targets should be attacked. According to Yousaf, the relationship
was often problematic: "Invariably the CIA failed to meet our needs. I am sure these
bureaucratic snarl-ups would not have been accepted had it been American troops in the
firing line."
After the Soviet Union pulled out, America rapidly lost interest in Afghanistan and
funds dried up. The ISI, as a result, became intensely disillusioned with America - it
felt badly let down.
Just as the guerrillas were on the verge of victory in the field, the Americans
abandoned them. They cut off the money supply and thus the flow of weapons just at the
time that the Soviet Union, although no longer present in Afghanistan, poured in a
huge supply of tanks, guns and other equipment to keep its Afghan army fighting. A
stalemate developed. The mujaheddin's feuding became more important than their
fighting.
"The more I look back, the more convinced I am that it was the deliberate policy of
the American government that we should never achieve a military victory in
Afghanistan," says Yousaf now. "Once the Soviet Union was out, the Americans had
avenged Vietnam; she then only concerned herself with bringing about a stalemate . . .
I feel the only winners in the war in Afghanistan are the Americans . . . the losers
are most certainly the people of Afghanistan."
Into the vacuum came the Taliban, came Bin Laden. In 1990 America strained relations
with Pakistan even further. Fearful that Pakistan was too close to making an atomic
bomb, it cut off all military contact.
Now, if America is to find Bin Laden, track his movements and use Pakistani
facilities, it will once again have to cultivate the ISI, and in particular its Afghan
bureau.
* Mark Adkin is the author of Brigadier Yousaf's biography
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