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Helicopter Down
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| Ray McGovern, a 27-year veteran of the
CIA, regularly briefed George H. W. Bush as vice president
and, earlier, worked with him closely when he was director of
CIA. Mr. McGovern is on the Steering Group of Veteran
Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. He is now co-director
of the Servant Leadership School, an outreach ministry in the
inner city of Washington. |
The killing of 18 U.S. troops and the wounding of 21
others in Iraq on Nov. 2 brings to mind the successful attack by
Viet Cong guerrillas on U.S. forces in Pleiku, Vietnam on February
7, 1965.
The Johnson administration immediately seized on that attack, in
which nine U.S. troops were killed and 128 wounded, to start bombing
North Vietnam and to send 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam. Unlike the
U.S. advisory forces already in country, the Marines had orders to
engage in combat, marking the beginning of the Americanization of
the war. By 1968 U.S. forces had grown to over 536,000.
From the outset, my colleagues in CIA were highly skeptical that
even with a half-million troops the United States could prevail in
Vietnam. They were quick to remind anyone who would listen of the
candid observation made by General Philippe LeClerc, dispatched to
Vietnam shortly after World War II. The French general reported
that, mainly because of the strong commitment of the Vietnamese
nationalists/communists and their proven proficiency in guerrilla
war, a renewed French campaign would require 500,000 men and that,
even then, France could not win.
In 1965, similar warnings were blissfully ignored by Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara and the civilian whiz kids with whom he
had surrounded himself. Then as now, the advice of our professional
military was dismissed.
Civilian Whiz Kids vs. Military Professionals
While today's civilian leaders at the Defense Department hobbled
through what passed for post-war planning for Iraq early this year,
Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki warned the Senate Armed Services
Committee that post-war Iraq would require "something on the order
of several hundred thousand soldiers." He was immediately ridiculed
by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz
for having exaggerated the requirement. This evokes vivid memories
of how McNamara and his civilian whiz kids dismissed our
professional military—and at such a high eventual price.
The poet George Santayana warned, "Those who do not learn from
history are doomed to repeat it." What is increasingly clear is that
neither the present-day Pentagon whiz kids nor their patron, Vice
President Dick Cheney, have learned much from history. They
encourage President Bush to insist, "We are not leaving;" and
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to protest that this war is "winnable."
But most of those with a modicum of experience in guerrilla warfare
and the Middle East are persuaded that the war is not
winnable and that the only thing in doubt is the timing of the
U.S. departure.
After many weeks of refusing to admit the word "guerrilla" into
evidence, Rumsfeld seems to have made his peace with it. Yet, when
asked this past weekend on television who are the guerrillas are, he
foundered, admitting in so many words that he hasn't a clue. I was
actually embarrassed for him. A terrific debater and otherwise
reasonably smart man, Rumsfeld was reduced to telling us once again
that Iraq is the size of California and bemoaning the deficiencies
in "situational awareness" and lack of "perfect visibility" into who
it is that are killing our troops.
At least we were spared the usual claims that we are "moving
forward" and will prevail "at the end of the day." Apparently even
Rumsfeld could see how incongruous such banalities would have
sounded after such a disastrous week.
Recent sloganeering is eerily reminiscent of a comparable stage
in our involvement in Vietnam. We would have to "stay the course."
We could not "cut and run"-though that is precisely what we ended up
doing in 1975 after 58,000 US troops and 3 million Vietnamese had
been killed. Why did we leave? Because Congress, at last, came to
realize that the war was unwinnable.
Is This Guerrilla War Winnable?
When Rumsfeld was asked when he thought it might be possible to
draw down U.S. troop strength in Iraq, he employed one of his
favorite adjectives, saying that this was "unknowable"-that it all
depends on the security situation. It is a no-brainer that U.S.
troop reductions are unlikely anytime soon, but apparently we shall
have to wait for Rumsfeld to acquire better "situational awareness"
before he and his whiz kids are willing to admit this.
Instead of drawdowns, pressure will inexorably grow from those
neo-conservatives already pushing for a larger troop commitment.
Having learned nothing from history, from the U.S. intelligence
community, or from the professional military, Rumsfeld's whiz kids
may persuade President Bush that the best course is to send more
troops to "get the job done"—(and thereby seal his fate!). One small
problem, of course, is the unwelcome fact that all too few troops
are be available for reinforcement. But this kind of military
"detail" would not likely affect the urgings of advisers like
William Kristol and Kenneth Adelman.
A Bush administration decision to escalate (to exhume that
familiar word from Vietnam) in that way would only provoke more
widespread guerrilla attacks in Iraq and terrorist acts against U.S.
personnel and facilities elsewhere as well. The U.S. troop presence
in Iraq is the problem, not the solution.
And someone needs to dispel Rumsfeld's confusion regarding who is
the enemy. It is every Iraqi with weapon or explosive who means to
make the occupier suffer. The tools are readily available, and the
guerrillas, whether homebred or from neighboring states, will not be
quelled—even if 500,000 troops are sent.
Imperial Rome was able to work its will on lesser states, but for
the most part Rome had a corner on the weapons. None of the
subjugated peoples had rockets, mortars, or missiles—and long lines
were rare at guerrilla recruiting stations.
"No One Knows"
The most embarrassing part of Rumsfeld's interview with ABC's
This Week came when he attempted to answer a question about
how to reduce the number of terrorists. "How do you persuade people
not to become suicide bombers; how do you reduce the number of
people attracted to terrorism? No one knows how to reduce that," he
complained.
Over a year ago, CIA analysts provided an assessment intended to
educate senior policy makers to the fact that "the forces fueling
hatred of the US and fueling Al Qaeda recruiting are not being
addressed," and that "the underlying causes that drive terrorists
will persist." The assessment cited a recent Gallup poll of almost
10,000 Muslims in nine countries in which respondents described the
United States as "ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily
provoked and biased." And that was before the war in Iraq.
How can we be so misunderstood, you might ask? A major factor is
the Bush administration's one-sided support of Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon, whether he is bulldozing Palestinian homes,
encouraging new Israeli settlements in the occupied territories,
building huge walls to make impracticable any viable Palestinian
state, or bombing Syria. Someone needs to tell Rumsfeld that Muslims
watch it all on TV—and then line up at the recruiting stations.
But no one will. There is no longer any sanity check. Sad to say,
over the past year the director of the CIA and his malleable
managers have shown a penchant for sniffing the prevailing winds and
trimming the sails of their analysis to the breezes blowing from the
Pentagon and White House.
The president's father had an acute appreciation for the
essential role of unbiased intelligence, but there is no sign that
the son understands this. Whether he realizes it or not, the
analysis of the intelligence community has been thoroughly
politicized, leaving him no place to turn for a check on
Rumsfeld's/Cheney's whiz kids.
It is a Greek tragedy; with the major character flaw of hubris
planting the seeds of the ruler's own destruction. Rumsfeld
eventually will write his memoir—his own version of McNamara's "We
were wrong; terribly wrong"—but this will bring no consolation to
what may be the next one-term president back in Texas.
It is also tragic that the president does not read very much, for
he would have found the following in his father's memoir:
"Trying to eliminate Saddam... would have incurred incalculable
human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably
impossible... we would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in
effect, rule Iraq... there was no viable 'exit strategy' we could
see, violating another of our principles... Going in and occupying
Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United Nations' mandate, would
have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression
that we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the
United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a
bitterly hostile land."
Real Power To The U.N.
As long as the occupation continues, so will the killing of U.S.
troops and others. The way to stop the violence is to end the
occupation; the only way to protect our troops is to bring them
home. Whether or not U.S. policymakers can admit at this point that
they were "terribly wrong," they need to transfer real authority to
the United Nations without delay and support the U.N. in overseeing
a rapid return to Iraqi sovereignty.
But, many protest, we can't just withdraw! Sure we can, and
better now than ten years from now, as in the case of Vietnam. If it
is true that we are not in Iraq to control the oil or to establish
military bases with which to dominate that strategic area, we can
certainly withdraw. As in Vietnam, the war is unwinnable... hear
that? Unwinnable!
If the U.S. withdraws, would there be civil war in Iraq? One
cannot dismiss this possibility lightly given the history of Iraq.
But it is at least as likely that a regional-federal model of
government that would include substantial autonomy for the Kurds in
the north, the Sunnis in the center, and the Shiites in the south
(something foreshadowed by the composition of the existing Council)
could begin to function in relatively short order with help from the
U.N. While some degree of inter-ethnic violence could be expected,
chances are good that this model would still allow a representative
national government to function.
We won't know if we don't try. Besides, there is no viable
alternative.
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Published: Nov 03 2003
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