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From
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}}>Begin
The
              Conspiracies of Empire
by
              H. Arthur Scott Trask
"Finally
              I say let demagogues and world-redeemers babble their emptiness
              to empty ears; twice duped is too much."
~ Robinson Jeffers
Day
              of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor
by
              Robert B. Stinnett
New
              York, NY: Free Press; 260pp., $26.00 The
              late Murray Rothbard often argued that far
 from being evidence of
              a "paranoid" strain in the American mind, belief in conspiracies
              as a factor in American history was usually not taken far enough.
              The truth behind most conspiracies, he alleged, was far more heinous
              and diabolical than even the most diehard conspiracy theorist suspected.
              While many have assumed Rothbard was only being half serious, a
              new book on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor by Robert B. Stinnett
              offers compelling evidence that Murray had it right. The truth that
              emerges as one makes his way through this exhaustively researched volume 
is of an American political and military establishment whose
              brilliance is exceeded only by its utter lack of moral scruple or
              genuine patriotism. Sixty years after the fateful attack, Stinnett
              has uncovered, presented, and substantiated the truth behind Pearl
              Harbor. It is now clear that FDR did know the Japanese attack was
              coming. He knew more than a year in advance of Japanese plans to
              bomb the United States’ Pacific fleet at Pearl, and he knew more
              than a week before that the attack would come early Sunday morning.
              He knew because American naval intelligence had cracked the Japanese
              naval codes in the early fall of 1940, 15 months before the
              fateful attack.
The
              smoke had barely cleared from Pearl Harbor before rightwing journalists, 
cranky poets, and some Republican politicians began suspecting that
              somehow Pearl Harbor was all a set-up. Since then, revisionist historians
              have contended that FDR both provoked and welcomed the war; and
              some even charged that he knew of the attack beforehand. Establishment
              historians and government officials countered these charges by insisting
              that the attack was indeed a surprise due to a failure of American
              intelligence and incompetence in the naval high command. Stinnett
              quotes historian Stephen E. Ambrose who claimed, as recently as
              a 1999 Wall Street Journal editorial, that "the real
              problem was that American intelligence was terrible." According
              to Ambrose (who echoes the official story), the navy had not yet
              broken the Japanese naval codes, and the Japanese task force maintained
              strict radio silence on its way to Hawaii. As a result, "in
              late November, intelligence ‘lost’ the Japanese aircraft carrier
              fleet." Other historians have contended that the Japanese caught
              us by surprise due to faulty analysis of pretty good intelligence,
              bureaucratic squabbling among high-level naval officers in Washington,
              underestimation of Japanese daring and capabilities, and expectations 
that the attack would come against Dutch or British possessions
              in East Asia, not against Hawaii. Stinnett exposes each one of these
              theories to be false. For instance, he amply demonstrates that the
              ships of the Japanese carrier fleet engaged in daily radio
              communication with the high command in Japan, military commands
              in the Central Pacific, and with each other. Stinnett found out
              the truth by reading American naval intelligence radio intercepts
              of the Japanese transmissions. American intelligence did not lose the 
carriers.
How
              did Stinnett manage to uncover the truth when congressional 
investigations (in both 1945-1946 and 1995) failed to do so? The answer lies in
              Stinnett’s intelligence, integrity, and unflagging research effort
              (lasting 17 years), qualities that we know from experience are all
              too lacking in congressional investigations. But it also lies in
              a crucial Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by the
              author in 1983. In that year, Stinnett learned of the existence
              of the Pacific War communications intelligence files of the United
              States Navy (a top secret file containing over one million documents
              relating to U.S. communication intelligence before and during the
              war). The author’s request was at first denied, but in 1994 the
              navy decided to declassify the records, or at least most of them.
              As the Stinnett soon discovered, key intercepts and documents were
  kept back, some were missing from the records, and other documents
              had been altered to conceal vital information. However, enough 
information
              was released, perhaps inadvertently, to enable Stinnett to piece
              together the truth.
American
              communication intelligence operations in the Pacific theater was 
primarily a naval operation. The intelligence network was composed
              of 21 radio intercept stations located along the North American
              coast from Panama to Alaska and on Pacific islands from Hawaii to
              the Philippines. As Stinnett demonstrates, well over 90 percent
              of all Japanese radio transmissions were intercepted by one or more
              of these stations. Once intercepted, these messages were sent to
              one of three regional control centers, two of which were also 
cryptographic
              centers, and from there they were sent on to Station US in Washington,
              the headquarters for naval communications intelligence. Of course,
              all official Japanese communications were in code. Diplomatic messages
              were sent in the Purple, Tsu, or Oite codes; naval
              communications in one of 29 codes called the Kaigun Ango, the most 
important of which were the 5-Num (naval operations), SM
              (naval movement), S (merchant marine), and Yobidashi Fugo (radio call 
sign) codes. Stinnett conclusively demonstrates that
              American cryptologists (codebreakers) had broken all four naval
              codes by October of 1940. (American intelligence had broken Japanese
              diplomatic codes even before: Tsu in the 1920s, Oite in 1939, and Purple 
in September 1940. As a result, cryptologists
              could intercept, decipher, and translate almost all Japanese diplomatic
              and military radio traffic within a matter of hours after receiving
              them. The decryption (decoding) and translating was done at three
              cryptographic centers: Station CAST on Corregidor in the Philippines;
              Station HYPO on Oahu; and Station US in Washington.
The
              resulting intelligence information was then sent to top U.S. military,
              naval, and cabinet officials, including the president (about 36
              individuals in all). However, as Stinnett meticulously and thoroughly
              demonstrates, crucial intelligence information indicating a Japanese
              strike at Pearl was deliberately withheld from both Lt. Gen. Walter
              Short, commander of army forces on Hawaii, and Admiral Husband E.
              Kimmell, commander of the Pacific fleet. Roosevelt and his advisers had 
set up these two distinguished officers to be the fall guys
              for the catastrophe at Pearl. The story of their betrayal by friends
              and colleagues in the naval high command, all of whom knew of the
              impending attack and Roosevelt’s strategy of provocation, is 
heartrending.

In
              addition to the interception and decryption of Japanese radio 
transmissions, most of the radio intercept stations were equipped with radio direction
              finders (RDF) which allowed trained operators to pinpoint the exact
              location of specific Japanese warships once their distinct radio
              call sign was identified. By means of RDF, naval intelligence experts
              were able to track the movement of the Japanese carrier force as
              it approached Pearl Harbor. Stinnett’s findings confirm the truthfulness
              of the claim made by the Dutch naval attaché to the
              United States, Captain Johan Ranneft, that while on visits to the
              Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington on December 2 and 6 he
              saw intelligence maps tracking the movement of Japanese carriers
              eastward toward Hawaii. Also, his findings support the testimony
              of Robert Ogg who claims that while on assignment to the 12th Naval 
District in San Francisco he located (by means of RDF intelligence)
              the Japanese fleet north of Hawaii three days before the attack.
Perhaps
              the single most important document discovered by Stinnett is a 7
              October 1940 memorandum written by Lt. Commander Arthur H. McCollum,
              head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence. McCollum’s
              memo outlines a strategic policy designed to goad the Japanese into
              committing "an overt act of war" against the United States.
              McCollum writes that such a strategy is necessary because "it
              is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the
              United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan
              without more ado." McCollum suggests eight specific "actions"
              that the United States should take to bring about this result. The
              key one is "Action F" which calls for keeping "the
              main strength" of the U.S. Pacific Fleet "in the vicinity
              of the Hawaiian Islands." McCollum concludes his memo by stating
              that "if by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt
              act of war, so much the better." Stinnett has little trouble 
demonstrating that the strategy outlined in this memo became the
              official policy of the Roosevelt administration. Not only was the
              memorandum endorsed by Capt. Dudley Knox, one of Roosevelt’s most
              trusted military advisers, but White House routing logs demonstrate
              that Roosevelt received the memorandum; and over the next year,
              Roosevelt put every one of the eight suggested actions into
              effect. He implemented the last one (Action H) on 26 July 1941 when
              he ordered a complete embargo of all U.S. trade with Japan.
Roosevelt’s
              summer embargo was the culmination of another very clever
administration
              policy, namely helping the Japanese to build up their military oil
reserves just enough to encourage them to attack the United States
              but enough to enable them to win a long war. In the summer of 1940,
              Roosevelt took two actions designed to implement this truly
Machiavellian
              plan. First, he signed a bill authorizing a massive American naval
              build up designed to create a two-ocean navy. Second, he required
              American companies to obtain a government license before selling
              any petroleum products or scrap metal to Japan. For the next 12
months, the administration readily granted export permits to American
              firms selling raw materials to Japan, and Japanese oil tankers and
              merchant vessels could be seen loading up on scrap iron and petroleum
              at America’s West Coast ports. Meanwhile, American naval intelligence,

              using radio direction finding (RDF), tracked the tankers to the
              Japanese naval oil depot at Tokuyama. Roosevelt’s strategists
calculated
              that helping the Japanese build up a two-year supply of reserves
              would be about right. That way, if war broke out in the second half
              of 1941, the Japanese would run out of oil in mid to late 1943,
              just as American wartime industrial production would be peaking
              and her massive carrier fleets (100 proposed carriers) would be
              ready to go on the offensive. In July 1941, Roosevelt took the final
              step and, together with the British and Dutch, imposed an embargo
              on the sale of petroleum, iron, and steel to Japan (McCollum’s Action
H). The trap had now been laid, and the Japanese were not slow to
              fall for it.
Stinnett
              does not ignore the moral dimensions of the Roosevelt strategy.
              How did those who knew the attack was coming justify the deliberate
              sacrifice of over three thousand American lives? A bone-chilling
              comment by Lt. Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, commander of Station
              HYPO at Pearl Harbor, provides the answer. In a postwar assessment
              of the attack made to a naval historian, he remarked of Pearl Harbor
              that "it was a pretty cheap price to pay for unifying the country."
              There you have it. Massive deception, lying, the sacrifice of military

              careers, the betrayal of friends and fellow officers, and the deaths
              of thousands of American servicemen – all is justified for the cause
              of inciting a peaceful people to go to war. Stinnett himself is
              far from being unsympathetic to Roosevelt’s strategy. He agrees
              with the pre-war interventionists that America needed to go to war
              against the Axis powers. According to Stinnett, Roosevelt and his
              advisers "faced a terrible dilemma." The public was overwhelmingly
              opposed to entering the war, and in a democracy the people are
supposed to rule. Yet, Roosevelt believed this war would be
              both necessary and just. What to do? In the end, they decided that
"something had to be endured in order to stop a greater evil."

Here
              we have yet another example of Americans making use of the doctrine
              that the end justifies the means. Americans are quick to deny the
              ethical legitimacy of this doctrine when it is presented to them
              as a naked proposition, yet there is no doctrine that they more
              readily turn to in order to justify morally questionable practices.
              Do not those who defend the nuclear holocaust of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki
              argue as their first line of defense that it was morally
              justified because it saved American lives? And can we not expect
              to hear in the near future from those who can no longer deny the
              truth, "Roosevelt’s duplicity was justified because it was
              necessary to stop Hitler." The Christian’s response to this
              question was articulated by Paul two thousand years ago: "And
              why not say, ‘Let us do evil that good may come’? – as we are
              slanderously reported and as some affirm that we say. Their
condemnation
              is just." (Romans 3:8 NKJV).
We
              owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Stinnett. Not only has he uncovered
              the truth behind Pearl Harbor, but in so doing he has exposed one
              of the greatest cover stories, or con jobs, of all time – American
              prewar naval intelligence and high command as keystone cop. After
              sixty years, America’s brave band of revisionist historians have
              been vindicated, while her servile crop of court historians have been
pretty much disgraced.
December
              9, 2000
Dr.
              Trask is an historian.

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The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking
new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The libertarian therefore considers one of his prime educational
tasks is to spread the demystification and desanctification of the
State among its hapless subjects.  His task is to demonstrate
repeatedly and in depth that not only the emperor but even the
"democratic" State has no clothes; that all governments subsist
by exploitive rule over the public; and that such rule is the reverse
of objective necessity.  He strives to show that the existence of
taxation and the State necessarily sets up a class division between
the exploiting rulers and the exploited ruled.  He seeks to show that
the task of the court intellectuals who have always supported the State
has ever been to weave mystification in order to induce the public to
accept State rule and that these intellectuals obtain, in return, a
share in the power and pelf extracted by the rulers from their deluded
subjects.
[[For a New Liberty:  The Libertarian Manifesto, Murray N. Rothbard,
Fox & Wilkes, 1973, 1978, p. 25]]

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