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<<Name change? Northern European/American Treaty Organisation {NEATO} ? >>
In Focus: NATO at 50
Volume 4, Number 11
March 1999
Written by Tomás Valásek, Center for Defense Information
Editors: Martha Honey (IPS) and Tom Barry (IRC)
Key Points
The end of the cold war invalidated NATO's original mandate and raised
questions about the need for a military alliance focusing on territorial
defense.
The alliance responded by embarking on peacekeeping missions in the Balkans
and enlarging to include former Warsaw Pact countries.
New U.S. proposals would expand the scope of NATO's operations, even while
relations with Russia founder.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-a military alliance of 17
European nations, the U.S., and Canada-will celebrate its 50th anniversary
in April 1999 by convening a summit in Washington, DC. The alliance was
created under U.S. leadership in 1949 to defend the West against the Soviet
military threat. Historically, the U.S. provided the largest share of funds,
troops, and weapons to NATO's activities and dominated the alliance's
decisionmaking.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact invalidated NATO's
original mandate and prompted a search for a new approach to European
security. Several new roles were proposed for NATO, including serving as a
forum for arms reduction and elimination, and becoming a political force for
consolidating democratic, capitalist systems throughout Europe, including
Russia. Another option was the complete abolition of NATO. On a continent
devoid of superpower rivalries, the new type of challenges-peacekeeping and
conflict prevention-could be handled by the 55-member Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the designated European
collective security organization. The OSCE, which includes all European
countries, the U.S., Canada, and the former Soviet republics, specializes in
conflict monitoring and prevention, arms reduction, and post-conflict
reconciliation.
Before completion of a comprehensive review of the need for NATO, the
alliance was thrust into a peacekeeping role in the Balkan wars. When the
activities of the UN and the European Union failed to prevent escalation of
the violence in Bosnia, NATO was called on to deliver punitive strikes
against the Bosnian Serb aggressor forces. NATO troops entered the country
in December 1995 to safeguard implementation of the Dayton peace agreement.
In June 1998 NATO countries extended the mandate of the Stabilization Force
(SFOR) in Bosnia indefinitely.
In July 1997, primarily at U.S. urging, NATO decided to invite three former
Warsaw Pact countries to join. This watershed event in NATO's post-cold war
history marked the end of the search for an alternative security
arrangement. Despite the absence of a clearly articulated purpose, the U.S.
and the European countries established NATO as the dominant security
organization in Europe. The expansion itself, coupled with peacekeeping
duties in the Balkans, became the alliance's raison d'ętre. But the decision
carried a political price: the expansion to former Warsaw Pact countries,
NATO's continued emphasis on territorial defense, and the persisting
dominant role of the U.S. in NATO damaged America's relations with Russia
and contributed to the radicalization of the Russian political scene. NATO's
attempts at damage control-such as the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding
Act, a largely unimplemented document on cooperation-failed to weaken Moscow
's opposition. The Yeltsin government accepted the first round of expansion
as a fait accompli while opposing the expansion in principle and protesting
the plans to include former Soviet republics in particular.
The financial costs of expansion-the costs of upgrading weapons in the new
member countries and buying communications systems compatible with NATO-will
be borne by new and longtime members. All three new NATO members have
increased their defense spending to cover the costs associated with
membership. But U.S. taxpayers will also pay their share. U.S. assistance
has already been required to help bring the invitees to NATO standards. For
example, the U.S. paid for installations of an air surveillance system in
Poland and will cover the costs of leasing surplus F-16 or F/A-18 fighter
aircraft to the Polish air force.
NATO continues to evolve, with the U.S. advocating new missions and a more
assertive approach to military operations. The new U.S. proposals raised in
early 1999 would authorize operations outside the territory of alliance
members. U.S. officials also argue that NATO should no longer be obligated
to secure UN Security Council approval for its military operations.
Washington hopes to formalize these and other proposals for NATO's future
missions in a number of documents slated for adoption at the alliance's 50th
anniversary summit. Far from settling the question of NATO's roles and
responsibilities, the proposals raise a number of questions regarding the
stability of European security.
As NATO's scope widens, the alliance's expansion to Central and Eastern
Europe appears to be slowing. At a July 1997 summit in Madrid, the alliance
voted to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join NATO and
decided to continue expanding to include all countries willing and able to
assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Even though the
three new members joined NATO in March 1999, the original expansion plans
are being revised and delayed. Both the German chancellor and the Canadian
foreign minister have suggested that further expansion be delayed by a
number of years.
Problems With Current U.S. Policy
Key Problems
Peacekeeping duties require expertise that NATO does not possess.
Expansion of NATO's responsibilities to peacekeeping intervention lacks a
solid foundation in international law.
NATO enlargement and new U.S. initiatives perpetuate the dominant role of
the United States in Europe.
At a December 1998 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NATO's governing
body), Secretary of State Madeleine Albright laid out U.S. proposals for new
missions for the alliance. NATO must maintain the ability to defend the
member states, Albright said, but it should also expand its scope to counter
the threat of weapons of mass destruction and to halt the spread of ethnic
and regional violence both inside and beyond the alliance's borders.
Secretary Albright's vision is one of NATO retaining its traditional duty to
protect its members' territory while adopting collective security tasks such
as conflict prevention and peacekeeping.
The proposals raise a number of problems. In explaining the proposal to
expand NATO's responsibilities beyond territorial defense, Secretary
Albright argued that "it makes sense to use the unified military structure
and the habits of cooperation we have built up over the past 50 years." But
NATO's operational procedures, devised and rehearsed during the cold war, do
not guarantee successful accomplishment of its new tasks. For example, as
the reconstruction process in Bosnia continues, the need for civilian
policing bodies has supplanted the reliance on armed soldiers for
deterrence. NATO simply does not have the police or paramilitary units
required for such tasks.
Similarly, conflict prevention, mediation, and monitoring require very
different kinds of expertise than what NATO offers. Unless NATO develops its
own civilian intervention units or delegates more responsibilities to the
OSCE, which is tasked with carrying out conflict prevention duties, the
international community may be unable to implement successful stabilization
measures.
Another thorny issue is NATO's authority to act without UN Security Council
approval. The question of UN authorizations for NATO missions arose from the
dichotomy in NATO's original duties and newly proposed responsibilities.
NATO has signaled its intention to carry out collective security duties,
such as peacekeeping operations, even outside of its members' territory.
Washington maintains that NATO will continue to act "in accordance with the
principles of the UN Charter." However, U.S. officials argue that the
alliance should be allowed to operate even when formal authorization from
the UN Security Council cannot be obtained.
Collective security organizations such as the OSCE are traditionally
all-inclusive. Membership in the organization implies the right of
collective intervention in the affairs of the member states to prevent
destabilization or conflicts. The collective security group's mandate to act
is derived jointly from the contract that each country forms with the
organization upon joining and from the decision of the member states. Unlike
NATO, which requires unanimous approval of all members for its missions, the
OSCE reserves the right to act over the objections of the member responsible
for gross violations of the OSCE's principles. NATO insists on limited
membership and unanimous decisions in order to preserve its effectiveness as
a defensive military alliance. Its intervention in the affairs of nonmembers
without either UN or OSCE authorization lacks the legal foundation of a
collective security organization.
NATO's subordination to the UN is also anchored in the alliance's documents.
Its founding text, the Washington Treaty of 1949, clearly obligates the
allied nations to "refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." Article 42, Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows military
intervention only "should the Security Council consider that [less forceful
measures] would be inadequate or have been proven inadequate." Finally, NATO
's 1991 Strategic Concept states that NATO's purpose is to "safeguard the
freedom and security of all its members...in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter." Part of the problem stems from the Security
Council's inability to act swiftly and effectively, such as during the
Bosnia and Kosovo crises. The trouble lies mainly with the UN's
decisionmaking mechanisms-the Security Council is often paralyzed and unable
to act for reasons that have little to do with the conflicts at hand.
In the case of Kosovo, the NATO nations did not even try to obtain an
explicit authorization from the Security Council, fearing that the deepening
rift between NATO and Russia rendered any agreement all but impossible. But
the Kosovo crisis signaled a compromise solution that NATO may use in the
future. The alliance sought and obtained an indirect endorsement of its
plans from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during his visit to NATO in
January 1999. In the future, NATO may also seek authorization from the OSCE
rather than the UN.
Finally, NATO enlargement and the proposals for the alliance's new missions
presuppose the strengthening of a U.S. leadership role in Europe. As
Secretary Albright states, "...NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of
American responsibilities in Europe." The vast majority of proposals put
before NATO in preparation for the Washington summit have come from the U.S.
delegation. By implication, if the proposals are adopted they would require
U.S. leadership in order to be implemented. These U.S. initiatives would
thus stifle the trend in NATO toward a greater role for its European
members; a trend that would allow Washington to reduce the costly presence
of almost 120,000 U.S. troops in Europe.
Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations
U.S. and European countries should delegate conflict prevention and
reconstruction duties to the OSCE and should build on its expertise.
NATO should seek mandates from either the UN or the OSCE for all missions
other than defense of its territory.
Washington should support French and British attempts to create a viable
European defense organization.
NATO will remain the dominant security organization in Europe. What is
needed is to clarify the alliance's relations with other European security
bodies and to divide responsibilities between these institutions. The OSCE's
mediation and security building measures need to be strengthened in order to
prevent existing tensions in Europe from turning into open conflicts. If all
other efforts failed and ensuing violence actually threatened European
security, the UN or the OSCE would request NATO military assistance to stop
the conflict.
The monitoring and implementation of peace agreements, such as the ones in
Bosnia and Kosovo, call for civilian intervention units trained in observing
and analyzing military activities, mediating, and diffusing potentially
dangerous situations. Currently, the OSCE's expertise in this realm is
confined to its skeleton permanent staff, while the actual implementation is
carried out by multinational forces recruited on an ad-hoc basis, such as
during the Kosovo Verification Mission. NATO countries have the manpower,
but the allied troops are not trained in prevention and monitoring duties.
One proposed
solution is to develop the expertise within NATO. This approach, however,
fails to build on the expertise developed over the years by the OSCE, and it
raises questions about military interference in civilian affairs. Another
option is to strengthen the role of the OSCE, expand its ranks of personnel
trained and experienced in conflict prevention and post-conflict
reconstruction, and establish clear links between this organization and
NATO. The alliance could provide security for OSCE personnel, as was the
case with the Kosovo Verification Mission, and could serve as a deterrent
against escalation or continuation of conflicts in Europe.
Any new arrangement needs to give European nations an opportunity to assume
responsibility over security on their continent. The need for a rigid
U.S.-European front to defeat a Soviet invasion no longer exists. A stronger
European defense identity would relieve U.S. taxpayers of the costs of
maintaining over 100,000 troops on bases and in peacekeeping operations in
Europe. Also, notably, French and British officials have signaled their
willingness to invest in a European military force. And greater European
defense autonomy would reduce the tensions between European nations and the
United States, which surfaced during the debate over NATO's future.
Even Tony Blair, Clinton's closest ally in Europe, dropped Britain's
longstanding opposition to a defense role for the European Union (EU). At a
French-British summit, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook proclaimed, "we
want to be able to see the European Union take sensible foreign and security
policy decisions and we need to match that up with the ability to call up a
military capacity where it is needed, for instance,
perhaps, in the former Yugoslavia." The December 1998 summit proclamation
calls for the European Union to acquire " the capacity for autonomous
action, backed up by credible military force...in order to respond to
international crises."
Previous attempts at creating a purely European defense identity, such as
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty signed by EU member states, remain largely paper
exercises. The latest initiative only involves France and Great Britain, and
it may also fall victim to European disagreements over payments to the EU
budget or agricultural subsidy issues, which tend to dominate the
organization's agenda. America has historically opposed a European defense
organization without U.S. participation. Washington's first reaction to the
new European defense initiatives was lukewarm, stressing that it must
"contribute to NATO's vitality and to preserving the Alliance's
prerogatives."
A stronger European role in Europe's military affairs would enable the U.S.
both to reduce its military presence and to decrease U.S. expenditures on
military operations in Europe. For example, the NATO mission to Bosnia,
alone, costs the U.S. taxpayers around $2 billion annually. Contrast this
with Macedonia, where the European nations took the lead in organizing the
NATO Extraction Force. The force is responsible for evacuating OSCE
observers from Kosovo, should it become necessary. Its combat units are
drawn entirely from European NATO members: France, Netherlands, Italy, and
Great Britain. In the future, European-led operations promise to relieve the
pressure on U.S.
military personnel-and U.S. taxpayers-and would likely relieve, as well,
some of Russia's concerns with the dominant role of the U.S. in an expanded
NATO.
Sources for more information
Organizations
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
1900 L Street NW, Suite 401-2
Washington, DC 20036
Voice: (202) 785-1266
Fax: (202) 387-6298
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Website: http://www.basicint.org
Center for Defense Information (CDI)
1779 Massachusetts Av. NW, Ste. 615
Washington DC 20036
Voice: (202) 332-0600, ext. 104
Fax: (202) 462-4559
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Website: http://www.cdi.org
Contact: Tomas Valasek
Publications
"NATO Expansion: Full Speed Ahead-But Where To?" CDI Defense Monitor,
February 1998 (available at: http://www.cdi.org/dm/1998/issue2/).
Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO, BASIC, January 1999 (available at:
http://www.basicint.org/natorr.htm).
Websites
Atlantic Council of the United States
http://www.acus.org/
CDI Weekly Defense Monitor articles on NATO:
http://www.cdi.org/issues/europe/nato.html#week
EU Common Security and Foreign Policy
http://europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm
European Union (EU)
http://europa.eu.int/index-en.htm
NATO
http://www.nato.int
NATO articles on Global Beat web site:
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato.html
NATO at Fifty (maintained by the USIA)
http://www.nato50.gov/
Center for Defense Information, NATO page
http://www.cdi.org/issues/europe/nato.html
New Atlantic Initiative
http://www.aei.org/nai/aboutnai.htm
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
http://www.osceprag.cz/
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission
http://www.osceprag.cz/e/kosovo.htm
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty NATO articles:
http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/madrid-nato/index.html
U.S. Mission to NATO
http://www.nato.int/usa/
Western European Union (WEU)
http://www.weu.int/eng/
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