-Caveat Lector- My husband is currently in Peru. The following couple of paragraphs are his comments, followed by a couple of pieces from "professionals", with some interesting websites at the end of the post. His English suffers after more than a month of speaking mostly Spanish or Quechua. FYI Patty > >Thanks for the note on Peru. Its amazing how half of Peru loves Fujimori >and half hates him. Its a funny split too. Camposinos love him except for >those in La Libertad and Iquitos as far as I can tell. In Lima its more >divided on class lines..those with good connections love him, taxi drivers >love him, intellectuals hate him, business people and most Americans here >think hes better than anyone else given the choices and prefer stability. > >Apparently today or yesterday Fujimori asked for foreign asylum for >Montesinos in Panama and Brazil who both turned him down. > >More of a problem just now here is the oil price problem and the general >truckers strike that has been going on in Lima and Chimbote among oterh >spots for the past 4 or 5 days. Lima is running out of gas supplies now >from the strike. In the sticks theres no issue. Huancayo where I am now is >tranquil. >http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n34peru.html > >In Focus: Peru: Democracy & Dictatorship > > Volume 5, Number 34 > October 2000 > >Written by Coletta A. Youngers, Washington Office on Latin America >Editors: Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS) > >Key Points > > Since taking office in 1990, President Fujimori has concentrated power >in his own hands, greatly strengthened the role of > the armed forces and SIN, and thwarted political opposition through >bribery and intimidation. > The recent Peruvian elections failed to meet even the most minimal >international standards for a free and fair process, and > Fujimori embarked upon an unconstitutional third term, which left the >country deeply polarized. > Fujimori’s decision to call for new elections and dismantle SIN is an >important step toward putting Peru back on the path > to democratization; however, the situation remains very tense and the >position of the military and intelligence services > uncertain. > >When President Alberto Fujimori assumed an unconstitutional third term in >July 2000 following fraudulent elections, some >Peruvian analysts predicted that growing popular unrest would thwart him >from staying in the presidential palace for his full >five-year term. Nobody, however, thought that Fujimori would decide to step >aside only a few months after the contested >elections. In mid-September, Fujimori announced that he would be holding new >elections (in which he would not parti-cipate) and >that he would dismantle the feared National Intelligence Service (SIN). >Fujimori’s startling announcement provoked joyous >celebrations, as Peruvians across the country took to the streets, honking >horns and chanting anti-Fujimori slogans. > >In the background, however, an ominous power play has intensified involving >the president, his national security adviser, >Vladimiro Montesinos, and the armed forces. A cloud of uncertainty hangs >over Peru, as calls for the detention of Montesinos go >unheeded and he appears to continue to orchestrate events from behind the >scenes at SIN headquarters. Some Peruvian analysts >are referring to a “white coup,” in which hard-line sectors have gained the >upper hand. > >Peru is now clearly on a different path—popular sentiment has turned sharply >against the Fujimori government, making it ever >more difficult for the president to continue in office. Popular protests >continue. Yet the path toward democratization is mined with >obstacles, unless firm action is taken quickly against Montesinos and other >top military leaders. > >What sparked Fujimori’s announcement was the release of a video that shows >Montesinos bribing an opposition member of >Congress, Alberto Kouri, to switch loyalties and join ranks with the >Fujimori coalition in return for a $15,000 monthly stipend and >payments to cover campaign costs. In addition to Kouri, at least 17 others >recently voted into Congress were bribed or >threatened into switching allegiances, thereby allowing the Fujimori >government to obtain a majority—in direct defiance of voters’ >wishes and largely delegitimating the present Congress. > >The source of the leaked video remains a cause for speculation. However, >what lies at the heart of Fujimori’s apparent demise is >an even more sinister action. Information has slowly emerged indicating that >high-level military and intelligence officials, including >Montesinos himself, have likely been involved in trafficking guns to the >Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), >possibly in exchange for drugs. According to press reports, thousands of >Russian manufactured automatic weapons were legally >purchased from Jordan by the Peruvian military and then secretly delivered >to the FARC. > >These recent events illustrate the extent to which governance in Peru has >deteriorated into an authoritarian regime where bribery, >intimidation, and repression are utilized to maintain political control. >Under Fujimori’s ten-year rule, the roles of the Peruvian >armed forces and SIN, which currently functions as Peru’s political police, >have expanded exponentially. Both the judiciary and >Congress are subservient to the executive branch, eliminating any effective >checks and balances. > >The 2000 electoral process was tainted from the start. Having already served >two terms in office, Fujimori should have been >prohibited from running for a third term by the 1993 constitution, which >allows for one consecutive reelection. Yet the >manipulation of the press, excessive use of state resources for Fujimori’s >campaign, control of official electoral agencies, and >SIN’s intimidation and harassment of opposition candidates ensured a playing >field steeply tilted in Fujimori’s favor. In the May >28 runoff vote, Fujimori was uncontested. Both the opposition candidate, >Alejandro Toledo, and international monitors pulled out >due to the lack of guarantees for a free and fair process. The head of the >Organization of American States (OAS) observer >mission left days before the final vote, after the Peruvian government >refused to agree to a postponement of the elections in order, >at minimum, to ensure that the OAS team could verify the final vote count. > >Having gone to such extremes to ensure reelection, Fujimori may not give up >power as easily as implied in his call for new >elections. Fujimori has already indicated that he plans to stay in office >until next July and will oversee the upcoming electoral >process. And he has hinted that he may just run again in 2006. > > > >Problems with Current U.S. Policy > >Key Problems > > Competing U.S. policy priorities in Peru have led to inconsistencies >and incoherence, as is evident in the U.S. response to > this year’s fraudulent elections. > Through its counternarcotics program, Washington is supporting the >Peruvian intelligence establishment, the very force > responsible for Fujimori’s illegitimate third term and a central player >in the present power struggle. > To date, the Clinton administration has undertaken no significant >bilateral action toward Peru, such as suspending aid or > trade benefits. It has yet to call publicly for Montesinos to be >investigated and prosecuted. > >Although the call for new elections appears to have caused unease in >Washington, the Clinton administration has publicly >supported both Fujimori’s announcement an ongoing dialogue with the OAS. >There are reports that as a result of the arms >scandal and the videotape disclosure, U.S. officials put significant >pressure on Fujimori to dismiss Montesinos. Some speculate >that the arms scandal could also be deeply damaging for the Clinton >administration, and Washington may in fact have pressed for >Montesinos’ departure to divert attention from the growing scandal. If >Peruvian journalists were able to uncover the arms deals, >U.S. intelligence agencies surely had some indication of what was going on, >yet they continued to provide support to SIN and the >Peruvian armed forces. A key question that remains unanswered is: what did >the CIA and other U.S. officials know, and when >did they know it? > >Washington’s interactions with Peru over the last decade provide a vivid >example of the contradictions and confusion that often >surround U.S. policy. The myriad U.S. interests in Peru often work at >cross-purposes, creating inconsistencies in U.S. policy >toward that country. The Clinton administration’s response to recent >developments is no exception. > >Washington led the international condemnation following the 1992 autogolpe, >or presidential coup. Although attention to Peru >largely waned following the 1995 elections, U.S. officials have spoken out >at some key moments when democratic setbacks took >place, and they have played a positive role in supporting civil society >organizations, particularly within the human rights community. >The U.S. government also played a critical role in negotiating an end to the >Peru-Ecuador border conflict. > >Yet these actions are directly undermined by the desire to maintain >continuity in both the antidrug and economic arenas. Most >disturbingly, the U.S. government has provided direct support to SIN—the >very agency responsible for setbacks to democracy >and for grave human rights abuses—for counternarcotics purposes. Ironically, >Fujimori’s shadowy adviser and de facto head of >SIN, Vladimiro Montesinos, has long been rumored to have maintained ties to >the drug trade after serving as a lawyer for various >notorious drug traffickers in the 1980s. > >Montesinos has also long been rumored to be on the CIA payroll. U.S. >officials have maintained a stony silence in response to >accusations that Montesinos takes protection money from drug traffickers, >refusing even to call for investigations. Hence, it should >come as no surprise that though U.S. officials have consistently spoken out >against electoral irregularities in Peru, they have not >once referred to the roles of SIN and Montesinos in undermining Peru’s >electoral process. Only when confronted with >overwhelming evidence of corruption have they apparently taken stronger >action. > >To its credit, the Clinton administration put significant pressure on the >Fujimori government to allow for a second round of voting >when it appeared that the Peruvian government was posed to proclaim a >first-round victory last April. Following the May 28 >runoff vote, the United States urged strong OAS action, although critics >point out that U.S. officials lacked a clear strategy and >frequently antagonized other governments. At the June OAS General Assembly >meeting, a resolution was adopted expressing >grave concern regarding the elections and mandating an OAS mission to Peru >to push for democratic reforms. The OAS mission >put forward a comprehensive list of recommendations and has set up a >permanent office in Lima to monitor the reform process. It >is facilitating a “dialogue” between the Fujimori government, the political >opposition, and civil society representatives to enhance >democratic reform. > >Nonetheless, the unwillingness of OAS member states to call for new >elections in Peru sent a dangerous signal to Fujimori that the >OAS is not serious about its commitment to ensure clean elections. Likewise, >the unwillingness of the U.S. and other governments >to follow up the OAS meeting with strong bilateral action demonstrates that >the OAS process has no teeth to it. > >Although Clinton administration officials continue to speak out in support >of the OAS process and of democratic reform, they >have not suspended any aid or trade program to Peru. Even small >military-to-military training programs have gone untouched. >Officials claim that their unhappiness with the present situation in Peru is >evident in what they are NOT doing—such as not >sending a diplomatic mission from Washington to attend the inauguration. > >The U.S. Congress, however, is taking a tougher stance toward Peru. An >unusual alliance of liberal Democrats and conservative >Republicans has ensured easy adoption of resolutions and amendments >condemning Peru’s authoritarian government. Several >Senate offices are reportedly investigating Montesinos and the arms scandal. >Yet when Congress eliminated $42 million slated for >Peru in the recent emergency aid package for Colombia, the U.S. Ambassador >to Peru quickly announced that he was seeking to >restore the aid. The administration is now allocating $32 million in a >line-item for helicopter support to the Peruvian police and is >taking additional money from a regional account. As one official notes, >“Congress did not prohibit aid to Peru.” But the >administration is certainly violating the congressional intent aimed at >ensuring that Peru will at least not get additional resources >over and above its normal allocation. > > > >Toward a New Foreign Policy > >Key Recommendations > > Washington’s top priority in Peru should be to ensure that new >presidential and congressional elections are held as quickly > as possible and that SIN is effectively dismantled. > The Clinton administration should immediately cease all assistance and >training for Peruvian security and intelligence > agencies, should publicly call for Montesinos to be held accountable >for corruption and human rights violations. > If the transition process does not move forward, the U.S. government >should cut off all nonhumanitarian aid to Peru, > suspend some trade benefits, and vote “no” on loans by international >financial institutions. > >Peru’s President Fujimori represents a dangerous model of authoritarian >populism that may become increasingly prevalent across >Latin America. Fed up with existing parties and politicians, rampant >corruption, and inefficiency in government, Latin Americans >are increasingly turning to populist independents who promise strong >leadership in order to bring order to society and discipline to >government. The subdued regional and U.S. response to Peru’s fraudulent >elections sends a dangerous message to the >hemisphere’s growing number of strongman wannabes. As a result of recent >developments, however, the international community >has been provided with a new opportunity to take strong action to ensure >that Peru returns to a democratic path. > >Such international pressure has had an impact in the past. Though rarely >achieving a total turnaround in Peruvian government >policy, outside pressure has forced important changes. It led both to the >reestablishment of the Peruvian Congress in 1993, >following the autogolpe, and to the drafting of a new constitution, although >both of these changes were ultimately crafted to >Fujimori’s advantage. Domestic and international pressure has obligated Peru >to retry before a civilian court American Lori >Berenson and to create an ad hoc commission to review the cases of Peruvians >in jail on terrorism charges. Ultimately, the >success of Fujimori’s neoliberal economic policies is dependent on staying >within the good graces of the international community. >Thus far he has managed to walk that fine line, but such poise may be >increasingly difficult if the political situation deteriorates. >International investors expressed relief at the announcement of new >elections; failure to move forward effectively could further >erode investor confidence and threaten Fujimori’s economic program. > >Moreover, Peru’s civil society groups are mobilized to see the reform >process through and are seeking stronger international >pressure. Although the political opposition is internally weak, it remains >united against Fujimori and is growing in strength. It now >appears to have popular sentiment on its side and is working toward >constructing a proposed government of national unity. > >First and foremost, the U.S. government should focus its efforts on ensuring >that President Fujimori follows through with his >promises to dismantle SIN and to move immediately toward new presidential >and congressional elections under close international >supervision. U.S. relations with Peru regarding aid, trade, and other >programs should be evaluated through that lens. U.S. >assistance to Peru’s security forces, including the notorious SIN, should be >discontinued immediately. Military-to-military training >programs should cease; no Peruvian soldiers should be brought to the School >of the Americas or any other U.S.-based training >facilities. Joint military-to-military operations should be canceled. > >The Clinton administration should publicly call for the detention of >Montesinos, for independent investigations into allegations of >corruption and human rights violations lodged against him, and for >subsequent prosecutions. His U.S. visa should be revoked, and >Washington should publicly repudiate the role of SIN in Peru today. There >should be full disclosure of information gathered by >U.S. officials regarding both the allegations against Montesinos and the >recent arms scandal. Then the U.S. Congress should hold >hearings on the scandal. > >All reforms—such as the dismantling of SIN—should be carried out within the >context of the OAS-sponsored dialogue. >Moreover, the OAS should have responsibility for preparing and monitoring >presidential and congressional elections. If prompt >movement in this direction does not occur, the U.S. government should cut >off all nonhumanitarian aid to Peru, suspend some >trade benefits, and vote “no” on loans by the international financial >institutions. > >Likewise, if substantial progress is not made, the OAS should suspend Peru >from its ranks until Peru returns to a democratic path. >A clear message must be sent both to President Fujimori and across the >hemisphere that in the 21st century, fraudulent elections >and authoritarian rule are simply not acceptable. > >Coletta A. Youngers <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, a senior associate at the >Washington Office on Latin America, is >presently taking a one-year leave to write a book on the history of the >human rights movement in Peru. > >Sources for More Information > >Organizations > >Amnesty International >600 Pennsylvania Ave. SE, Fifth floor >Washington, DC 20003 >Voice: (202) 544-0200 >Fax: (202) 546-7142 >Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Website: http://www.amnestyusa.org/ >Contact: Carlos Salinas > >Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos >Peru >Voice: (511) 441-1533 >Fax: (511) 422-4827 >Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Website: http://www.cnddhh.org.pe/ >Contact: Sofia Macher Batanero > >Human Rights Watch/Americas Division >1630 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 500 >Washington, DC 20009 >Voice: (202) 612-4321 >Fax: (202) 612-4333 >Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Website: http://www.hrw.org/ >Contact: Jose Miguel Vivanco > >Instituto de Defensa Legal >Peru >Voice: (511) 441-0192 >Fax: (511) 442-4037 >Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Website: http://www.idl.org.pe/ >Contact: Ernesto de la Jara or Carlos Basombrio > >Peru Peace Network >Box 1433 >Jefferson City, MO 65102 >Voice: (573) 635-8789 >Fax: (573) 635-3659 >Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Website: http://www.perupeace.net/ >Contact: Mark Saucier and Alice Wolters > >Washington Office on Latin America >1630 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 200 >Washington, DC 20009 >Voice: (202) 797-2171 >Fax: (202) 797-2172 >Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Website: http://www.wola.org/ >Contact: Gina Amatangelo > >Publications > >Sally Bowen, The Fujimori File: Peru and Its President 1990-2000 (Lima, >Peru: The Peru Monitor, 2000). > >Maxwell A. Cameron and Philip Mauceri, eds., The Peruvian Labyrinth: >Politics, Society and Economy (University Park, >PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). > >Coletta A. Youngers, Deconstructing Democracy: Peru Under President Alberto >Fujimori (Washington: The Washington >Office on Latin America, February 2000). > >Websites > >Asociacion Pro Derechos Humanos, APRODEH >http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/ > >Defensoria del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office) >http://www.ombudsman.gob.pe/ > >Peruvian News Organization >http://www.imediaperu.com/ > >International News on Peru >http://www.lima-news.com/ > >Peru Election 2000 Public Education Website >http://qsilver.queensu.ca/peru/ > >Peru Home Page (provides links to major media) >http://ekeko.rcp.net.pe/ > >Transparencia (civil society election monitoring organization) >http://www.transparencia.org.pe/ <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. 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