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TRAGEDY AND HOPE Chapters XII-XIII
by Dr. Carroll Quigley
ISBN 0913022-14-4
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION: WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN ITS WORLD SETTING
II. WESTERN CIVILIZATION TO 1914
III. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO 1917
IV. THE BUFFER FRINGE
V. THE FIRST WORLD WAR
VI. THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM AND RETURN TO NORMALCY 1919-1929
VII. FINANCE, COMMERCIAL POLICY AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY 1897-1947
VIII. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
IX. GERMANY FROM KAISER TO HITLER 1913-1945
X. BRITAIN: THE BACKGROUND TO APPEASEMENT 1900-1939
XI. CHANGING ECONOMIC PATTERNS
XII. THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT 1931-1936
XIII. THE DISRUPTION OF EUROPE
XIV. WORLD WAR II: THE TIDE OF AGGRESSION 1939-1941
XV. WORLD WAR II: THE EBB OF AGGRESSION 1941-1945
XVI. THE NEW AGE
XVII. NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND COLD WAR, AMERICAN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY
1950-1957
XVIII. NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND COLD WAR, RACE FOR THE H-BOMB 1950-1957
XIX. THE NEW ERA
XX. TRAGEDY AND HOPE: THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER XII: THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT 1931-1936
Page 559
The structure of collective security was destroyed completely
under the assaults of Japan, Italy and Germany who were attacking the
whole nineteenth century way of life and some of the most fundamental
attributes of Western Civilization itself. They were in revolt against
democracy, against the parliamentary system, against laissez-faire and
the liberal outlook, against nationalism (although in the name of
nationalism), against humanitarianism, against science and against all
respect for human dignity and human decency. It was recruited from the
dregs of society.
Page 560
During the nineteenth century, goals were completely lost or were
reduced to the most primitive level of obtaining more power and more
wealth. But the constant acquisition of power or wealth, like a
narcotic for which the need grows as its use increases without in any
way satisfying the user, left man's "higher" nature unsatisfied.
Page 561
Germany could have made no aggression without the acquiescence
and even in some cases the actual encouragement of the "satisfied"
Powers, especially Britain.
THE JAPANESE ASSAULT, 1931-1941
The similarity between Germany and Japan was striking: each had a
completely cartelized industry, a militaristic tradition, a hard-
working population which respected authority and loved order, a facade
of parliamentary constitutionalism which barely concealed the reality
of power wielded by an alliance of army, landlords, and industry.
Page 562
The steady rise in tariffs against Japanese manufactured goods
after 1897 led by America served to increase the difficulties of
Japan's position. The world depression and the financial crisis hit
Japan a terrible blow. Under this impact, the reactionary and
aggressive forces were able to solidify their control and embark on
that adventure of aggression and destruction that ultimately led to
the disasters of 1945.
Page 563
Separate from the armed forces were the forces of monopoly
capitalism, the eight great economic complexes controlled as family
units knows as "zaibatsu" which controlled 75% of the nation's wealth.
By 1930, the militarists and zaibatsu came together in their last
fateful alliance.
Page 569
Japan's unfavorable balance of trade was reflected in a heavy
outflow of gold in 1937-1938. It was clear that Japan was losing its
financial and commercial ability to buy necessary materials of foreign
origin. The steps taken by America, Australia, and others to restrict
export of strategic or military materials to Japan made this problem
even more acute. The attack on China had been intended to remedy this
situation by removing the Chinese boycott on Japanese goods.
Page 570
Under the pressure of the growing reluctance of neutral countries
to supply Japan with necessary strategic goods, the most vital being
petroleum products and rubber, it seemed that the occupation of the
Dutch Indies and Malaya could do much to alleviate these shortages but
which would lead to an American war on Japan. They decided to attack
the United States first.
THE ITALIAN ASSAULT, 1934-1936
Page 571
In 1922, the Fascists came to power in a parliamentary system; in
1925 it was replaced by a political dictatorship while the economic
system remained that of orthodox financial capitalism; in 1927 an
orthodox and restrictive stabilization of the lira on the
international gold standard led to such depressed economic conditions
that Mussolini adopted a much more active foreign policy; in 1934
Italy replaced orthodox economic measures by a totalitarian economy
functioning beneath a fraudulent corporate facade.
Italy was dissatisfied over its lack of colonial gains at
Versailles and the refusal of the League to accede to Tittoni's
request for a redistribution of the world's resources in accordance
with population needs made in 1920.
In a series of agreements with Austria and Hungary known as the
"Rome Protocols," the Austrian government under Engelbert Dollfuss
destroyed the democratic institutions of Austria, wiped out all
Socialist and working-class organizations, and established a one-party
dictatorial corporate state at Mussolini's behest in 1934. Hitler took
advantage of this to attempt a Nazi coup in Austria, murdering
Dollfuss in July 1934 but he was prevented by the quick mobilization
of Italian troops on the Brenner frontier and a stern warning from
Mussolini.
Page 572
Hitler's ascension to office in Germany in 1933 found French
foreign policy paralyzed by British opposition to any efforts to
support collective security or to enforce German observation of its
treaty obligations by force. As a result, a suggestion from Poland in
1933 for joint armed intervention in Germany to remove Hitler from
office was rejected by France. Poland at once made an non-aggression
pact with Germany and extended a previous one with the Soviet Union.
In 1934, France under Jean Louis Bathou, began to adopt a more
active policy against Hitler seeking to encircle Germany by bringing
the Soviet Union and Italy into a revived alignment of France, Poland,
the Little Entente, Greece and Turkey.
Page 573
France's Laval was convinced that Italy could be brought into the
anti-German front only if its long-standing grievances and unfulfilled
ambitions in Africa could be met. Accordingly, he gave Mussolini 7% of
the stock in the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, a stretch of desert
114,000 square miles in extent but containing only a few hundred
persons (sixty-two according to Mussolini) on the border of Libya, a
small wedge of territory between French Somaliland and Italian
Eritrea, and the right to ask for concessions throughout Ethiopia.
While Laval insisted that he had made no agreement which
jeopardized Ethiopia's independence or territorial integrity, he made
it equally clear that Italian support against Germany was more
important than the integrity of Ethiopia in his eyes. France had been
Ethiopia's only friend and had brought it into the League of Nations.
Italy had been prevented from conquering Ethiopia in 1896 only by a
decisive defeat of her invading forces at the hands of the Ethiopians
themselves, while in 1925, Britain and Italy had cut her up into
economic spheres by an agreement which was annulled by a French appeal
to the League. Laval's renunciation of France's traditional support of
Ethiopian independence brought Italy, Britain and France into
agreement on this issue.
Page 574
This point of view was not shared by public opinion in these
three countries. Stanley Baldwin (party leader and prime minister)
erected one of the most astonishing examples of British "dual" policy
in the appeasement period. While publicly supporting collective
security and sanctions against Italian aggression, the government
privately negotiated to destroy the League and to yield Ethiopia to
Italy. They were completely successful in this secret policy.
The Italian invaders had no real fear of British military
sanctions when they put a major part of their forces in the Red Sea
separated from home by the British-controlled Suez canal. The British
government's position was clearly stated in a secret report by Sir
John Maffey which declared that Italian control of Ethiopia would be a
"matter of indifference" to Britain. This opinion was shared by the
French government too.
Unfortunately, public opinion was insisting on collective
sanctions against the aggressor. To meet this demand, both governments
engaged in a public policy of unenforced or partially enforced
sanctions at wide variance with their real intentions.
Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare delivered a smashing speech to
support sanctions against Italy. The day previously he and Anthony
Eden had secretly agreed with Pierre Laval to impose only partial
economic sanctions avoiding all actions such as blockade of the Suez
canal.
Page 575
A number of governments including Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France
and Britain had stopped all exports of munitions to Ethiopia as early
as May 1935 although Ethiopia's appeal to the League for help had been
made on March 17th while the Italian attack did not come until
October. The net result was that Ethiopia was left defenceless and her
appeal to the US for support was at once rejected.
Hoare's speech evoked such applause from the British public that
Baldwin decided to hold a general election on that issue. Accordingly,
with ringing pledge to support collective security, the National
government won an amazing victory and stayed in power until the next
general election ten years later (1945).
Although Article 16 of the League Covenant bound the signers to
break off all trade with an aggressor, France and Britain combined to
keep their economic sanctions partial and ineffective. The imposition
of oil sanctions was put off again and again until the conquest of
Ethiopia was complete. The refusal to establish this sanction resulted
from a joint British-French refusal on the grounds that an oil
sanction would be so effective that Italy would be compelled to break
of its was with Ethiopia and would, in desperation, make war on
Britain and France. This, at least, was the amazing logic offered by
the British government later.
Page 576
Hoare and Laval worked out a secret deal which would have given
Italy outright about one-sixth of Ethiopia. When news of this deal was
broken to the public, there was a roar of protest on the grounds
that this violated the election pledge made but a month previously. To
save his government, Baldwin had to sacrifice Hoare who resigned on
December 19 but returned to Cabinet on June 5 as soon as Ethiopia was
decently buried. Laval fell from office and was succeeded by Pierre
Flandin who pursued the same policy.
Ethiopia was conquered on May 2 1936. Sanctions were removed in
the next two months just as they were beginning to take effect. The
consequences of the Ethiopian fiasco were of the greatest importance.
The Conservative Party in England was entrenched in office for a
decade during which it carried out its policy of appeasement and waged
the resulting war. The US passed a "Neutrality Act" which encouraged
aggression, at the outbreak of war, by cutting off supplies to both
sides, to the aggressor who had armed at his leisure and to the victim
as yet unarmed. Above all, it destroyed French efforts to encircle
Germany.
CIRCLES AND COUNTERCIRCLES, 1935-1939
Page 577
The remilitarization of the Rhineland in violation of the
Versailles Treaty was the most important result of the Ethiopian
crisis.
Page 578
In order to destroy the French and Soviet alliances with
Czechoslovakia, Britain and Germany sought to encircle France and the
Soviet Union in order to dissuade France from honoring its alliances
with either Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union and France, finding
itself encircled, dishonored its alliance with Czechoslovakia when it
came due in 1938.
Page 579
The British attitude towards eastern Europe was made perfectly
clear when Sir John Simon demanded arms equality for Germany. Adding
to the encirclement of France was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of
June 1935.
Page 580
Parallel with the encirclement of France went the encirclement of
the Soviet Union known as the anti-Comintern Pact, the union of
Germany and Japan against Communism.
The last encirclement was that against Czechoslovakia. Hungary
and Germany were both opposed to Czechoslovakia as an "artificial"
creation of the Versailles Conference. The Polish-German agreement of
1934 opened a campaign until the Polish invasion in 1938.
An analysis of the motivations of Britain in 1938-1939 is bound
to be difficult because the motives of government were clearly not the
same as the motives of the people and in no country has secrecy and
anonymity been carried so has been been so well preserved as in
Britain. In general, motives become vaguer and less secret as we move
our attention from the innermost circles of the government outward. As
if we were looking at the layers of an onion, we may discern four
points of view:
1) the anti-Bolsheviks at the center;
2) the "three-bloc-world" supporters close to the center;
3) the supporters of "appeasement" and
4) the "peace at any price" group in peripheral position.
Page 581
The chief figures in the anti-Bolshevik group were Lord
Curzon, Lord D'Abernon and General Smuts. They did what they could to
destroy reparations and permit German re-armament.
This point of view was supported by the second group, the Round
Table Group, and came later to be called the Clivenden Set which
included Lord Milner, Lord Brand (managing director of Lazard
Brothers, international bankers). This group wielded great influence
because it controlled the Rhodes Trust and dominated the Royal
Institute of International Affairs. They sought to contain the Soviet
Union rather than destroy it as the anti-Bolsheviks wanted. They
advocated a secret alliance of Britain with the German military
leaders against the Soviet.
Page 583
Abandoning Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Polish Corridor to
Germany was the aim of both the anti-Bolsheviks and the "three-bloc"
people.
Page 584
From August 1935 to March 1939, the government built upon the
fears of the "peace at any price" group by steadily exaggerating
Germany's armed might and belittling their own, by calculated
indiscretions like the statement that there were no real anti-aircraft
guns in London, by constant hammering at the danger of air attack
without warning, by building ostentatious and quite useless air-raid
trenches in the streets and parks of London, and by insisting through
daily warnings that everyone must be fitted with a gas mask
immediately (although the danger of a gas attack was nil). In this
way, the government put London into a panic in 1938 and by this panic,
Chamberlain was able to get the people to accept the destruction of
Czechoslovakia. Since he could not openly appeal on the anti-
Bolshevik basis, he had to adopt the expedient of pretending to
resist (in order to satisfy the British public) while really
continuing to make every possible concession to Hitler which would
bring Germany to a common frontier with the Soviet Union.
Page 585
Chamberlain's motives were not really bad ones; he wanted peace
so he could devote Britain's limited resources to social welfare; but
he was narrow and totally ignorant of the realities of power,
convinced that international politics could be conducted in terms of
secret deals, as business was, and he was quite ruthless in carrying
out his aims, especially in his readiness to sacrifice non-English
persons who, in his eyes, did not count.
THE SPANISH TRAGEDY, 1931-1939
Page 587
From the invasion of the Arabs in 711 to their final ejection in
1492, Spanish life has been dominated by the struggle against foreign
intruders. As a result of more than a thousand years of such
struggles, almost all elements of Spanish society have developed a
fanatical intolerance, an uncompromising individualism, and a fatal
belief that physical force is a solution to all problems, however
spiritual.
Page 588
The war of 1898, by depriving Spain of much of its empire, left
its over-sized army with little to do and with a reduced area on which
to batten. Like a vampire octopus, the Spanish Army settled down to
drain the life-blood of Spain and, above all, Morocco. This brought
the army officers into alignment with conservative forces consisting
of the Church (upper clergy), the landlords, and the monarchists. The
forces of the proletariat discontent consisted of the urban workers
and the much larger mass of exploited peasants.
Page 591
In 1923, while most of Spain was suffering from malnutrition,
most of the land was untilled and the owners refused to use irrigation
facilities which had built by government. As a result, agricultural
yields were the poorest in western Europe. While 15 men owned about a
million acres and 15,000 men owned about the of all taxed land, almost
2 million owned the other half, frequently in plots too small for
subsistence. About 2 million more, who were completely landless,
worked 10 to 14 hours a day for about 2.5 pesetas (35 cents) a day for
only six months in the year and paid exorbitant rents without any
security of tenure.
In the Church, while the ordinary priests share the poverty and
tribulations of the people, the upper clergy were closely allied with
government and supported by an annual grant. They had seats in the
upper chamber, control of education, censorship, marriage. In
consequence of this alliance of the upper clergy with government and
the forces of reaction, all animosities built against the latter came
to be directed against the former also. Although the people remained
universally and profoundly catholic, they also became incredibly
anticlerical reflected in the proclivity for burning churches.
All these groups, landlords, officers, upper clergy, and
monarchists, were interest groups seeking to utilize Spain for their
own power and profit.
Page 592
Alfonso XIII ordered municipal elections but in 46 out of 50
provincial capitals, the anti-monarchial forces were victorious.
Alfonso fled to France on April 14, 1931.
The republicans at once began to organize their victory, electing
a Constituent Assembly in June and establishing an ultramodern uni-
cameral, parliamentary government with universal suffrage, separation
of Church and State, secularization of education, local autonomy for
separatist areas and power to socialize the great estates or the
public utilities.
The republic lasted only five years before Civil War began in
1936 after being challenged constantly from the Right and the extreme
Left. Because of shifting governments, the liberal program which was
enacted into law in 1931 was annulled or unenforced.
Page 593
In an effort to reduce illiteracy (over 45% in 1930), the
republic created thousands of new schools and new teachers, raised
teachers' salaries, founded over a thousand libraries.
Army officers were reduced with the surplus being retired on full
pay. The republican officers tended to retire, the monarchists to stay
on.
To assist the peasants and workers, mixed juries were established
to hear rural rent disputes, importation of labor for wage-breaking
purposes was forbidden; and credit was provided for peasants to
obtain land, seed, or fertilizers on favorable terms. Customarily
uncultivated lands were expropriated with compensation to provide
farms for a new class of peasant proprietors.
Most of these reforms went into effect only partially. Few of the
abandoned estates could be expropriated because of the lack of money
for compensation.
Page 594
The conservative groups reacted violently. Three plots began to
be formed against the new republic, the one monarchist led by Sotelo
in parliament and by Goicoechea behind the scenes; the second a
parliamentary alliance of landlords and clericals under Robles; and
the last a conspiracy of officers under Generals Barrera and Sanjurjo.
In the meantime, the monarchist conspiracy was organized by
former King Alfonso from abroad. Goicoechea performed his task with
great skill under the eyes of a government which refused to take
preventative action because of its own liberal and legalistic
scruples. He organized an alliance of the officers, the Carlists, and
his own Alfonsist party. Four men from these three groups then signed
an agreement with Mussolini in 1934 who promised arms, money,
diplomatic support and 1.5 million pesetas, 10,000 rifles,10,000
grenades, and 200 machine guns. In return, the signers promised to
sign a joint export policy with Italy.
Page 595
The Robles coalition of Right parties with the clerical party and
agrarian party of landlords was able to replace the Left Republican
Azana by the Right Republican Lerroux as prime minister. It then
called new elections, won victory and revoked many of the 1931 reforms
while allowing most of the rest to go unenforced and restored
expropriated estates.
This led to a violent agitation which burst into open revolt in
the two separatist centers of the Basque country and Catalonia. The
uprising in Asturias spearheaded by anarchist miners hurling dynamite
from slings, lasted for nine days. The government used the Foreign
Legion and Moors, brought to Morocco by sea, and crushed the rebels
without mercy. The latter suffered at 5,000 casualties. After the
uprising, 25,000 suspects were thrown into prison.
The uprising of October 1934, although crushed, split the
oligarchy. The demands of the army, monarchists and the biggest
landlords for a ruthless dictatorship alarmed the leaders of the
Church and president of the republic Zamora. Robles as minister of war
encouraged reactionary control of the army and even put General Franco
in as his undersecretary of war.
Page 596
For the 1936 elections, the parties of the Left formed the
Popular Front with a published program promising a full restoration of
the constitution, amnesty for political crimes committed after 1933,
civil liberties, an independent judiciary, minimum wages, protection
for tenants, reform of taxation, credit, banking. It repudiated the
Socialist program for nationalization of the land, the banks, and
industry.
While all the Popular Front parties would support the government,
only the bourgeois parties would hold seats in the Cabinet while the
workers parties such as the Socialists would remain outside.
The Popular Front captured 266 of 473 seats while the Right had
153, the Center 54, CEDA 96, Socialists 87, Republic Left 81,
Communists 14.
The defeated forces of the Right refused to accept the election
results and tried to persuade Valladeres to hand over the government
to General Franco. That was rebuffed. On Feb. 20, the conspirators met
and decided the time was not yet ripe. The new government heard of
this meeting and transferred Franco to the Canary Islands. The day
before he left Madrid, Franco met with the chief conspirators and they
completed their plans for a military revolt but fixed no date.
In the meantime, provocation, assassination, and retaliation grew
steadily with the verbal encouragement of the Right. Property was
seized or destroyed and churches were burned on all sides. The mob
retaliated by assaults on monarchists and by burning churches.
Page 597
Italian Air Force planes were painted over and went into action
in support of the revolt which was a failure when the navy remained
loyal because the crews overthrew their officers; the Air Force
remained loyal; the army revolted with much of the police but were
overcome. At the first news of the revolt, the people, led by labor
unions, demanded arms. Because arms were lacking, orders were sent at
once to France. The recognized government in Madrid had the right to
buy arms abroad and was even bound to do so by treaty with France.
As a result of the failure of the revolt, the generals found
themselves isolated in several different parts of Spain with no mass
popular support.
Page 598
The rebels held the extreme northwest, the north and the south as
well as Morocco and the islands. They had the unlimited support of
Italy and Portugal and tentative support from Germany.
The French suggested an agreement not to intervene in Spain since
it was clear that if there was no intervention, the Spanish government
could suppress the rebels. Britain accept the French offer at once but
efforts to get Portugal, Italy, Germany and Russia into the agreement
were difficult because Portugal and Italy were both helping the
rebels. By August, all six Powers had agreed.
Efforts to establish some kind of supervision were rejected by
the rebels and by Portugal while Britain refused to permit any
restrictions to be placed on war material going to Portugal at the
very moment when it was putting all kinds of pressure on France to
restrict any flow of supplies to the recognized government of Spain.
Portugal had delayed joining the agreement until it would hurt the
Loyalist forces more than the rebels. Even then, there was no
intention of observing the agreements.
Page 599
France did little to help the Madrid government while Britain was
positively hostile to it. Both governments stopped all shipments of
war material to Spain. By its insistence on enforcing non-intervention
against the Loyalists, while ignoring the systematic and large-scale
evasions of the agreement in behalf of the rebels, Britain was neither
fair nor neutral, and had to engage in large-scale violations of
international law. Britain refuse to permit any restrictions to be
placed on war material going to Portugal (to the rebels). It refused
to allow the Loyalist Spanish Navy to blockade the seaports held by
the rebels, and took immediate action against efforts by the Madrid
government to interfere with any kind of shipments to rebel areas,
while wholesale assaults by the rebels on British and other neutral
ships going to Loyalist areas drew little more than feeble protests
from Britain.
Britain was clearly seeking a rebel victory and instead of trying
to enforce nonintervention, was actively supporting the rebel blockade
of Loyalist Spain when the British Navy began, in 1937, to intercept
British ships headed for Loyalist ports and on some pretext, or simply
by force, made them go elsewhere.
The rebel forces were fewer than the Loyalists but were
eventually successful because of their great superiority in artillery,
aviation, and tanks as a result of the one-sided enforcement of the
non-intervention agreement.
Page 600
The failure of Franco to capture Madrid led to a joint Italian-
German meeting where it was decided to recognize the Franco government
and withdraw their recognition from Madrid on Nov. 18, 1936. Japan
recognized the Franco regime in December.
As a result, Franco received the full support of the aggressor
states while the Loyalist government was obstructed in every way by
the "peace-loving" Powers. Italy sent 100,000 men and suffered 50,000
casualties, Germany sent 20,000 men. On the other side, the Loyalists
were cut off from foreign supplies almost at once because of the
embargoes of the Great Powers and obtained only limited amounts,
chiefly from Mexico, Russia and the US until the Non-intervention
agreement cut these off. On Jan. 18, 1937, the American Neutrality Act
was revised to apply to civil as well as international wars and was
invoked against Spain immediately but unofficial pressure from the
American government prevented such exports to Spain even earlier.
The Madrid government made violent protests against the Axis
intervention both before the Non-intervention Committee in London and
before the League of Nations. These were denied by the Axis Powers. An
investigation of these charges was made under Soviet pressure but the
Committee reported that these charges were unproved. Anthony Eden went
so far to say that so far as non-intervention was concerned, "there
were other governments more to blame tan either Germany or Italy."
Page 601
Soviet intervention began Oct 7,1936, three and a half years
after Italian intervention and almost three months after both Italian
and German units were fighting with the rebels. The Third
International recruited volunteers throughout the world to fight in
Spain. This Soviet intervention in support of the Madrid government at
a time when it could find support almost nowhere else served to
increase Communist influence in the government very greatly.
Page 602
The Italian submarine fleet was waiting for Russian shipping in
the Mediterranean and did not hesitate to sink it in the last few
months of 1936.
Although the evidence for Axis intervention in Spain was
overwhelming and was admitted by the Powers themselves early in 1937,
the British refused to admit it and refused to modify the non-
intervention policy. Britain's attitude was so devious that it can
hardly be untangled although the results were clear enough. The real
sympathy of the London government clearly favored the rebels although
it had to conceal the fact from public opinion since this opinion
favored the Loyalists over Franco by 57% to 7% according to a 1938
opinion poll.
Page 603
On December 18, 1936, Eden admitted that the government had
exaggerated the danger of war four months earlier to get the non-
intervention agreement accepted, and when Britain wanted to use force
to achieve its aims, as it did in the piracy of Italian submarines in
1937, it did so without risk of war. The non-intervention agreement,
as practiced, was neither an aid to peace nor an example of
neutrality, but was clearly enforced in such a way as to give aid to
the rebels and place all possible obstacles in the way of the Loyalist
government suppressing the rebellion.
The attitude of the British government could not be admitted
publicly and every effort was made to picture the actions of the Non-
intervention Committee as one of even-handed neutrality. In fact, it
was used to throw dust in the eyes of the world, especially the
British public. For months, the meaningless debates of this committee
were reported in detail to the world and charges, countercharges,
proposals, counterproposals, investigations and inconclusive
conclusions were offered to the a confused world, thus successfully
increasing its confusion. While debating and quibbling on about issues
like belligerence, patrols, volunteers, etc., before the Committee in
London, the Franco forces, with their foreign contingents, slowly
crushed the Loyalist forces.
Page 604
The Loyalist forces surrendered on March 28th 1939. England and
France had recognized the Franco government on February 17 and the
Axis troops were evacuated from Spain after a triumphal march through
Madrid in June.
When the war ended, much of Spain was wrecked, at least 450,000
Spaniards had been killed and an unpopular military dictatorship had
been imposed as a result of the actions of non-Spanish forces. At
least 400,000 Spaniards were in prison and large numbers were hungry
and destitute. Germany recognized this problem and tried to get France
to follow a path of conciliation, humanitarian reform, and social,
agricultural, and economic reform. This advice was rejected, with the
result that Spain has remained weak, apathetic, war-weary, and
discontented ever since.
CHAPTER XIII: THE DISRUPTION OF EUROPE, 1937-1939
AUSTRIA INFELIX, 1933-1938
Page 607
The Austria which was left after the Treaty of St. Germain
consisted of little more than the great city of Vienna surrounded by a
huge but inadequate suburb whose population had been reduced from 52
to 6.6 million.
Page 608
The Social Democrats were unable to reconcile their desire for
union with Germany (called Anschluss) with the need for financial aid
from the Entente Powers who opposed this.
The Social Democrats embarked on an amazing program of social
welfare by a system of direct taxes which bore heavily on the well-to-
do.
Page 609
Before 1914, the living conditions of the poor had been
maintained by a very undemocratic political system under which only
83,000 persons, on a property basis, were allowed to vote and 5,500 of
the richest were allowed to choose one-third of all seats on city
council. By 1933, the Social Democrats had built almost 60,000
dwellings so efficiently that the average cost per apartment was only
about $1,650 each with average rent of $2 per month. Thus the poor of
Vienna had all kinds of free or cheap medical care, dental care,
education, libraries, amusements, sports, school lunches and maternity
care provided by the city.
While this was going on in Vienna, the Christian Socialist-Pan-
German federal government of Catholic priest Monsignor Ignaz Seipel
was sinking deeper into corruption, The diversion of public funds to
banks and industries controlled by Seipel's supporters was revealed by
parliamentary investigations in spite of the government's efforts to
conceal the facts.
Seipel formed a "Unity List" of all the anti-Socialist parties he
could muster but the election gave his party only 73 seats compared to
71 for the Social Democrats, 12 for the pan-Germans, 9 for the
Agrarian League. He sought to change the Austrian constitution into a
presidential dictatorship which required a two-thirds vote. It became
necessary to use illegal methods.
Page 610
The secret documents published since 1945 make it quite clear
that Germany had no carefully laid plans to annex Austria and was not
encouraging violence by the Nazis in Austria. Instead, every effort
was made to restrict the Austrian Nazis to propaganda in order to win
a gradual peaceful extension of Nazi influence.
Page 611
The invasion of Austria in 1938 was a pleasant surprise even for
the Nazi leaders and arose from several unexpected favorable
circumstances. Secret documents now make it clear that in 1937 the
German and British governments made secret decisions which sealed the
fate of Austria and Czechoslovakia. It is evident from some of
Hitler's statements that he had already received certain information
about the secret decisions being made by Chamberlain on the British
side.
Page 612
The British government group controlling foreign policy had
reached a seven point decision regarding Germany:
1. Hitler's Germany was the front-line bulwark against the spread of
Communism in Europe.
2. The aim was a four power pact including Britain, France, Italy and
Germany to exclude all Russian influence from Europe.
3. Britain had no objection to German acquisition of Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.
4. Germany must not use force to achieve its aims as this would
precipitate a war in which Britain would have to intervene.
Page 622
For years before June 1938, the government insisted that British
rearming was progressing in a satisfactory fashion. Churchill
questioned this and produced figures on German rearmament to prove
that Britain's own progress in this field was inadequate. These
figures (which were not correct) were denied by the government. As
late as March 1938, Chamberlain said that British rearmament were such
as to make Britain an "almost terrifying power." But as the year went
on, the government adopted a quite different attitude. In order to
persuade public opinion that it was necessary to yield to Germany, the
government pretended that its armaments were quite inadequate.
Page 623
We now know that this was a gross exaggeration. Britain produced
almost 3000 "military" planes in 1938 and about 8,000 in 1939 compared
to 3350 "combat" planes produced in Germany in 1938 and 4,733 in 1939.
It is quite clear that Britain did not yield to superior force in
1938, as was stated at the time and has been stated since by many
writers including Churchill. We have evidence that Chamberlain knew
these facts but consistently gave a contrary impression and that Lord
Halifax went so far as to call forth protests from the British
military attaches in Prague and Paris.
The British government made it clear to Germany both publicly and
privately that they would not oppose Germany's projects. Dirksen wrote
to Ribbentrop on June 3 1928 "Anything which could be got without
firing a shot can count upon the agreement of the British."
THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS, 1937-1938
Page 626
The economic discontent became stronger after the onset of the
world depression in 1929 and especially after Hitler demonstrated that
his policies could bring prosperity to Germany.
Page 627
Within two weeks of Hitler's annexation of Austria, Britain put
pressure on the Czechs to make concessions to the Germans; to
encourage France and Germany to do the same. All this was justified by
the argument that Germany would be satisfied if it obtained the
Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor. All these assumptions were
dubious.
Page 628
Czechoslovakia was eliminated with the help of German aggression,
French indecision and war-weariness, and British public appeasement
and merciless secret pressure.
Page 629
Five days after Anschluss, the Soviet government call for
collective actions to stop aggression and to eliminate the increased
danger of a new world slaughter was rejected by Lord Halifax.
Page 633
It was necessary to impose the plan for Czechoslovakia on public
opinion of the world by means of the slowly mounting war scare which
reached the level of absolute panic on September 28th. The mounting
horror of the relentless German mobilization was built up day by day
while Britain and France ordered the Czechs not to mobilize in order
"not to provoke Germany."
We now know that all these statements and rumors were not true
and that the British government knew that they were not true at the
time.
Page 634
The Chamberlain government knew these facts but consistently gave
a contrary impression. Lord Halifax particularly distorted the facts.
Just as the crisis was reaching the boiling point in September
1938, the British ambassador in Paris reported to London that Colonel
Lindbergh had just emerged from Germany with a report that Germany had
8,000 military planes and could manufacture 1,500 a month. We now know
that Germany had about 1,500 planes, manufactured 280 a month.
Page 635
Lindbergh repeated his tale of woe daily both in Paris and in
London during the crisis. The British government began to fit the
people of London with gas masks, the prime minister and the king
called on the people to dig trenches in the parks, schoolchildren
began to be evacuated. In general, every report or rumor which could
add to the panic and defeatism was played up, and everything that
might contribute to a strong or a united resistance to Germany was
played down.
Page 636
The Anglo-French decision was presented to the Czechoslovak
government at 2a.m. on September 19 to be accepted at once. The
Czechoslovak government accepted at 5p.m. on September 21st. Lord
Halifax at once ordered the Czech police to be withdrawn from the
Sudeten districts, and expressed the wish that the German troops move
in at once.
Page 638
At Munich, Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini and Daladier carved up
Czechoslovakia without consulting anyone, least of all the Czechs.
Germany was supreme in Europe. Since this was exactly what Chamberlain
and his friends had wanted, they should have been satisfied.
THE YEAR OF DUPES, 1939
Page 642
Concessions to Germany continued but now parallel with
concessions went a real effort to build up a strong front against
Hitler.
Page 643
The anti-Bolshevik and "three-bloc-world" groups had expected
Hitler would get the Sudetenland, Danzig, and perhaps the Polish
Corridor and that he would then be stabilized between the "oceanic
bloc" and the Soviet Union.
As a result of these hidden and conflicting forces, the history
of international relations from September 1938 and September 1939 or
even later is neither simple nor consistent. In general, the key to
everything was the position of Britain. As a result of Lord Halifax's
"dyarchic" policy, there were not only two policies but two groups
carrying them out. Lord Halifax tried to satisfy the public demand for
an end to appeasement while Chamberlain, Wilson, Simon and Hoare
sought to make secret concessions to Hitler in order to achieve a
general Anglo-German settlement. The one policy was public; the other
was secret. Since the Foreign Office knew of both, it tried to build
up the "peace front" against Germany so that it would look
sufficiently imposing to satisfy public opinion and to drive Hitler to
seek his desires by negotiation rather than by force so that public
opinion in England would not force the government to declare a war
that they did not want in order to remain in office. This complex plan
broke down because Hitler was determined to have a war merely for the
personal emotional thrill of wielding great power, while the effort to
make a "peace front" sufficiently collapsible so that it could be case
aside if Hitler either obtained his goals by negotiation or made a
general settlement with Chamberlain merely resulted in making a "peace
front" which was so weak it could neither maintain peace by threat of
force nor win a war when peace was lost.
Page 644
On March 15th, Chamberlain told the Commons that he accepted the
seizure of Czechoslovakia and refused to accuse Hitler of bad faith.
But two days later, when the howls of rage from the British public
showed that he had misjudged the electorate, he denounced the seizure.
However, nothing was done other than to recall Henderson from Berlin
for consultations and cancel a visit to Berlin by the president of the
Board of Trade. The seizure was declared illegal but was recognized in
fact at once. Moreover, #6 million in Czech gold reserves in London
were turned over to Germany with the puny and untrue excuse that the
British government could not give orders to the Bank of England.
Page 647
Germany opened its negotiations with Poland in a fairly friendly
way on October 24, 1938. It asked for Danzig and a strip a kilometer
wide across the Polish Corridor to provide a highway and four-track
railroad under German sovereignty. Poland's economic and harbor rights
in Danzig were to be guaranteed and the "corridor across the Corridor"
was to be isolated from Polish communications facilities by bridging
or tunneling. Germany also wanted Poland to join an anti-Russian bloc.
Germany was prepared to guarantee the country's existing frontiers, to
extend the Non-aggression Pact of 1934 for 25 years, to guarantee the
independence of Slovakia and to dispose of Ruthenia as Poland wished.
These suggestions were rejected by Poland. About the same time, the
Germans were using pressure on Romania to obtain an economic agreement
which was signed on March 23rd.
On March 17, London received a false report of a German ultimatum
to Romania. Lord Halifax lost his head and, without checking his
information, sent telegrams to Greece, Turkey, Poland, Bulgaria,
Soviet Union asking what each country was prepared to do in the event
of a German aggression against Romania. Four replied by asking London
what it was prepared to do but Moscow suggested and immediate
conference which Halifax rebuffed, wanting nothing more than an
agreement to consult in a crisis. Poland was reluctant to sign any
agreement involving Russia. However, when news reached London of
Hitler's demands on Poland, Britain suddenly issued a unilateral
guarantee of the latter state (March 31st).
Page 648
"In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish
independence and which the Polish government accordingly considered it
vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government
would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all
support in their power."
This was an extraordinary assurance. The British government
since 1918 had resolutely refused any bilateral agreement guaranteeing
any state in western Europe. Now they were making a "unilateral"
declaration in "eastern" Europe and they were giving that state the
responsibility of deciding when that guarantee would take effect,
something quite unprecedented. If Germany used force in Poland, public
opinion in Britain would force Britain to declare war whether there
was a guarantee or not.
If the chief purpose of the unilateral guarantee to Poland was to
frighten Germany, it had precisely the opposite effect.
Page 649
Hitler announced that the terms he had offered Poland had been
rejected, negotiations broken off. The crisis was intensified by
provocative acts on both sides.
Page 650
In 1939, there was talk of a British loan to Poland of #100
million in May; On August 1 Poland finally got a credit for $8 million
at a time when all London was buzzing about a secret loan of #1
billion from Britain to Germany.
In 1936, Poland was given 2 billion francs as a rearmament long
and on May 19, 1939, an agreement was signed by which France promised
full air support to Poland on the first day of war, local skirmishing
by the third day, and a full-scale offensive on the sixteenth day. On
Aug. 23, General Gamelin informed his government that no military
support could be given to Poland until the spring of 1940 and that a
full-scale offensive could not be made before 1941-1942. Poland was
never informed of this change and seems to have entered the war on
September 1st in the belief that a full-scale offensive would be made
against Germany during September.
The failure to support Poland was probably deliberate in the
hope that this would force Poland to negotiate with Hitler. If so, it
was a complete failure. Poland was so encouraged by the British
guarantee that it not only refused to make concessions but also
prevented the reopening of negotiations by one excuse after another
until the last day of peace.
Page 651
In light of these facts, the British efforts to reach a
settlement with Hitler and their reluctance to make an alliance with
Russia, were very unrealistic. Nevertheless, they continued to exhort
the Poles to reopen negotiations with Hitler, and continued to inform
the German government that the justice of their claims to Danzig and
the Corridor were recognized but that these claims must be fulfilled
by peaceful means and that force would inevitably be met with force.
The British continued to emphasize that the controversy was over
Danzig when everyone else knew that Danzig was merely a detail, and an
almost indefensible detail. Danzig was no issue on which to fight a
world war, but it was an issue on which negotiation was almost
mandatory. This may have been why Britain insisted that it was the
chief issue. But because it was not the chief issue, Poland refused to
negotiate because it feared it would lead to partition of Poland.
Danzig was a free city under supervision of the League of Nations
and while it was within the Polish customs and under Polish economic
control, it was already controlled politically under a German
Gauleiter and would at any moment vote to join Germany if Hitler
consented.
Page 654
Lord Halifax's report reads: "Herr Hitler asked whether England
would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said I did not
exclude such a possibility provided the development of events
justified it."
The theory that Russia learned of these British approaches to
Germany in July 1939 is supported by the fact that the obstacles and
delays in the path of a British-Russian agreement were made by Britain
from the middle of April to the second week of July but were made by
Russia from the second week in July to the end on August 21st.
The Russians probably regarded the first British suggestion
that the Soviet Union should give unilateral guarantees to Poland
similar to those of Britain as a trap to get them into a war with
Germany in which Britain would do little or nothing or even give aid
to Germany. That this last possibility was not completely beyond
reality is clear from the fact that Britain did prepare an
expeditionary force to attack Russia in March 1940 when Britain was
technically at war with Germany but was doing nothing to fight her.
Russia offered the guarantee if it were extended to all states on
their western frontier including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Romania. This offer meant that Russia was guaranteeing its
renunciation of all the territory in these six states which it had
lost to them since 1917.
Instead of accepting the offer, the British began to quibble.
They refused to guarantee the Baltic States on the ground that these
states did not want to be guaranteed although they had guaranteed
Poland on March 31st when Jozef Beck did not want it and had just
asked the Soviet Union to guarantee Poland and Romania, neither of
whom wanted a Soviet guarantee. When the Russians insisted, the
British countered by insisting that Greece, Turkey, Holland, Belgium,
and Switzerland must also be guaranteed.
Page 655
France and Russia were both pushing Britain to form a Triple
Alliance but Britain was reluctant and delayed the discussions to the
great irritation of the Soviet leaders. To show its displeasure, the
Soviet Union on May 3rd replaced Litvinov with Molotov as foreign
minister. This would have been a warning, Litvinov knew the West and
was favorable to democracy and to the Western Powers. As a Jew, he was
anti-Hitler. Molotov was a contrast from every point of view.
On May 19th, Chamberlain refused an alliance and pointed with
satisfaction to "that great virile nation on the borders of Germany
which under this agreement (of April 6th) is bound to give us all the
aid and assistance it can." He was talking about Poland!
Page 656
The members of the military mission took a slow ship (speed
thirteen knots) and did not reach Moscow until August 11th. They were
again negotiators of second rank. In London, according to
rumor, neither side wanted an agreement. Considering Chamberlain's
secret efforts to make a settlement with Germany, there is no reason
to believe that he wanted an agreement with Russia.
The Russians demanded an exact military commitment as to what
forces would be used against Germany; they wanted guarantees whether
the states concerned accepted or not; they wanted specific permission
to fight across a territory such as Poland. These demands were flatly
rejected by Poland on August 19th. On the same day, Russia signed a
commercial treaty with Germany. Two days later, France ordered its
negotiators to sign the right to cross Poland but Russia refused to
accept this until Poland consented as well.
Page 657
On Aug. 23, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed an agreement which
provided that neither signer would take any aggressive action against
the other signer or give any support to a third Power in such action.
The secret protocol delimited spheres of interest in eastern Europe.
The line followed the northern boundary of Lithuania and the Narew,
Vistula, and San rivers in Poland and Germany gave Russia a free hand
in Bessarabia. This agreement was greeted as a stunning surprise in
the Entente countries. There was no reason why it should have been.
The British begged the Poles and the Germans to negotiate; the
Italians tried to arrange another four-Power conference; various
outsiders issued public and private appeals for peace; secret
emissaries flew back and forth between London and Germany.
All this was in vain because Hitler was determined on war and
his attention was devoted to manufacturing incidents to justify his
approaching attack. Political prisoners were taken from concentration
camps, dressed in German uniforms, and killed on the Polish frontier
as "evidence" of Polish aggression. A fraudulent ultimatum with
sixteen superficially reasonable demands on Poland was presented to
the British ambassador when the time limit had elapsed. It was not
presented to the Poles because the Polish ambassador in Berlin had
been ordered by Beck not to accept any document from the Germans.
Page 658
The German invasion of Poland at 4:45a.m. on September 1, 1939,
did not end the negotiations to make peace, nor did the complete
collapse of Polish resistance on September 16. Since these efforts
were futile, little need be said of them except that France and
Britain did not declare war on Germany until more than two days had
elapsed. During this time, no ultimatums were sent to Germany. On
September 3 at 9a.m., Britain presented an ultimatum which expired at
11a.m. In a similar fashion, France entered the war at 6p.m. on
September 3.
--
John C. "The Engineer" Turmel, Founder, Abolitionist Party of Canada
915-2045 Carling Ave., Ottawa, K2A 1G5, Tel/Fax: 613-728-2196
LETS Abolish Interest Rates http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel
For TURMEL topic http://www.onelist.com/subscribe.cgi/lets
-----
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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