-Caveat Lector- > > The black market in weapons components > http://www.phillynews.com/programs/aprint > Profiteers try to sell to anyone willing to pay -- terrorists or > roguestates.> First of four parts. > http://www.phillynews.com/inquirer/99/Jan/10/front_page/NUKE10.htm > By Steve Goldstein PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER STAFF WRITER > MOSCOW -- On Sept. 7, the Finance and Customs Department in > Istanbul,Turkey, > made an arrest that should have been reason for rejoicing. > Turkish agents arrested eight men on charges of smuggling nuclear > material > from the former Soviet Union. Posing as buyers, the agents seized > about12 > pounds of uranium 235 and one-quarter ounce of plutonium powder. > Thematerial > was being peddled for $1 million by three men from Kazakstan, one from > Azerbaijan, and four from Turkey. One suspect was a colonel in the > Kazakarmy. > While the seizure kept nuclear material out of the hands of rogue > statesor > terrorists, the incident was hardly reassuring news to the > worldwidefraternity > of nuclear-proliferation specialists. To them, the case suggested > thatthe > world's "loose nukes" nightmare scenario of the early 1990s hadreturned. > The fact that thieves were able to smuggle uranium and plutonium out > ofthe > former Soviet Union and offer it for sale to the highest bidder > onceagain > raised the specter of terrorists -- or an outlaw nation -- detonating a > primitive nuclear device. Those fears had subsided in recent years asthe > United States spent more than $2.5 billion to contain the nuclear threat > unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. > Now, after an apparent hiatus in confirmed diversions of nuclearmaterial > from> the former Soviet Union, disturbing new incidents have surfaced. From > small-time hustlers to organized-crime figures, there are > sustainedattempts by > profiteers to obtain and sell nuclear material to anyone willing to > payfor it. > Many nuclear experts say the proliferation threat is greater now than > inrecent > years. They say deepening economic and political upheaval in Russia has > increased the likelihood that financially desperate specialists > withaccess to > nuclear material will be tempted to sell it, or that security at > nuclearsites> will continue to corrode as fast as the beleaguered economy. > In fact, Russia is perhaps more politically volatile now than in > theearly > 1990s, with troubling implications for nuclear security: > At least 3,000 unpaid and disillusioned Russian scientists withexpertise > in> weapons of mass destruction have left the country in the last > sevenyears, > according to U.S. intelligence estimates. Some have gone to roguenations > trying to build nuclear-weapons programs, such as North Korea, > Libya,Iran and> Iraq. The continuing exodus prompted Graham T. Allison, a > Harvardproliferation > expert, to conclude two years ago that the likelihood of a nucleardevice > exploding in the United States has actually increased since the end > ofthe Cold> War.Security at many Russian nuclear facilities is porous, > despiteU.S.-supplied > equipment and expertise, according to some proliferation experts. U.S. > officials estimate that only a quarter of the uranium and plutonium > atsuch > facilities is adequately secured. Eighty percent of the > facilitiescovered by a > U.S. security program do not even have portal monitors to detect nuclear > material carried through their gates. > There is evidence that Iraqi and Iranian purchase agents are > activelyseeking > nuclear technology and material inside Russia, according to MatthewBunn, > a > proliferation expert at Harvard. > Some Russian nuclear-research institutes do not have heat or properly > functioning computers. > Russia's top customs official acknowledges that only about a quarter > ofthe > country's 300 border crossings have adequate equipment to thwart nuclear > smuggling. > Moscow's central authority is dissipating, salaries are not being > paid,and > official corruption is endemic -- creating conditions conducive > tosmuggling> nuclear materials. > "The economic crisis in Russia is the world's No. 1 > proliferationproblem," > said William C. Potter, a leading expert on nuclear smuggling. "I > don'tbelieve > the United States fully appreciates the implications of this crisis > forcontrol> of nuclear materials and technical know-how." > Potter, who heads the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, a > privateresearch > institute in Monterey, Calif., recently returned from an inspection > tripof > five Russian nuclear sites. He said he found security equipment that > hadnever> been installed, highly enriched uranium transported on a > canvas-toppedtruck, > and guards who disconnected security sensors after a series of > falsealarms.> "The situation is desperate," Potter said. > In a report written Dec. 2, he added: "Not only are the guards > typicallyvery > young, poorly paid, and often without adequate food and heat, but . . > .they> are unlikely to have a good appreciation of why the material they > areguarding> is so important. > "They are . . . exceptionally vulnerable to recruitment by > organizedcrime." > Thomas Graham, a former arms-control official now working for > theRockefeller > Foundation, deplores what he regards as a patchwork, underfunded > seriesof > programs that are not doing enough to reward Russians for > protectingnuclear > material."We're facing catastrophic failure of keeping the loose-nukes > phenomena > undercontrol," Graham said, adding that international expenditures are > not > proportional to the scale of the threat. "We have a problem that's a > 10-- and> we're throwing a one at it." > The September seizure in Turkey is one of several disturbing > recentattempts to> acquire, smuggle or sell nuclear material. > In February, Italian police arrested 14 members of the Italian Mafia > oncharges > of attempting to sell a 190-gram bar of enriched uranium and what > themafioso > claimed were eight Russian missiles. It was the first documented case > ofan > organized-crime group attempting to sell nuclear material. > On Nov. 4, a federal indictment charged that Saudi exile Osama bin > Ladenand> members of his terrorist organization, al Qaeda, "made efforts to > obtainthe > components of nuclear weapons," presumably for terrorist purposes. > In December, despite the bombings of Iraq by U.S. and British > forces,there was > evidence that Saddam Hussein lacked only fissile material -- > materialable to> fuel an atomic reaction -- to build nuclear weapons. > The week the bombings ended, David Albright of the private Institute for > Science and International Security in Washington and Khidir Hamza, > aformer > Iraqi nuclear-weapons scientist, reported that Iraq could rapidly make a > nuclear weapon once it acquired fissile material. Former U.N. > weaponsinspector > Scott Ritter earlier had reported to the CIA that Iraq had completed > theshells> of four 20-kiloton nuclear devices. > "If Iraq acquires plutonium or HEU [ highly enriched uranium ] > fromRussia, > Saddam Hussein could have nuclear weapons within a matter of > months,"Albright> said. Uranium enriched to more than 90 percent is > consideredweapons-grade. > For years, U.S. officials took solace in the belief that there were > noactive > buyers in the black market, even as prospective sellers stole uraniumand > plutonium from sites in Russia. The emergence of aggressive > terroristgroups > such as bin Laden's al Qaeda and Japan's doomsday cult Aum Shinri > Kyo(Aum > Supreme Truth), coupled with the recent diversion cases, has piercedthat > sense> of security. > Also troubling are attempts to smuggle and sell material that even > seemsto be > fissile. Experts report several cases in which smugglers tried to > sellmaterial > that is not weapons-usable, such as beryllium and cesium, but is > stillharmful> and thus suitable for terrorism. > In late 1995, Chechen separatists locked in a war with Russia > threatenedto > blow up radioactive materials they had buried in a park in Moscow.Police > found > a vial of cesium buried near a footpath in popular Izmailovsky Parkafter > a > Russian TV crew was directed to the site by Chechen leader > ShamilBasayev. > Cesium causes radiation poisoning if not handled properly. > "The weak central government and the risk of economic collapse are also > increasing the risk of nuclear theft or blackmail for domestic political > purposes -- inside Russia," said Jessica E. Stern, a former > NationalSecurity > Council staffer who ran a U.S. antismuggling group and is author of the > forthcoming The Ultimate Terrorists. > Corruption -- as integral to the Russian economy as vodka sales -- > isalso on > the rise. In November, Russian Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin > said5,500 > officials were being investigated for bribe-taking. Stepashin said the > officials, like other middle-class Russians, had been devastated by the > economic crisis. > "A poverty-stricken official is always prone to crime," Stepashin > toldreporters. > In December, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright told NATO foreign > ministers that "a ballistic-missile attack using a weapon of > massdestruction > from a rogue state" is as real a threat now as Warsaw Pact tanks > wereduring> the Cold War. > Russia's nuclear inventory includes about 30,000 nuclear warheads, > 1,050metric> tons of weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium, and up to 200 > metrictons of > separated plutonium contained within weapons or available for weapons.At > a > minimum, the material is enough to build 120,000 nuclear > weapons,assuming 4 > kilograms of plutonium and 12 kilograms of highly enriched uranium > foreach > weapon.Much of this material may still lack adequate security and > control and > accounting procedures, despite U.S. efforts to secure facilities whereit > is> stored. The material is located at between 80 and 100 civilian > research,naval> nuclear-propulsion, or civilian-controlled > nuclear-weapons-relatedfacilities, > according to the General Accounting Office and other sources. It > isspread over> 11 time zones. > The amount of nuclear material needed to build a crude bomb is so > smallthat> smugglers have hidden it in their trousers. Retired Russian > Gen.Alexander I. > Lebed has described Russian nuclear "suitcase bombs" small enough to > fitinside> a briefcase. > Authorities do not know how much nuclear material has been stolen > butnever > reported. > "What has surfaced," said Rens Lee, author of Smuggling Armageddon, > "mayjust> be a small amount of what has been stolen." > In some cases, material is reported stolen but never recovered. > In 1996, two pounds of enriched uranium 235 vanished from > TomskPolytechnic > University in western Siberia. Because of poor accounting and control > procedures, Russian officials do not know whether the material wasstolen > or> accidentally mixed with other nuclear fuel. > What analysts call confirmed "proliferation significant" cases > werereported > and documented until late 1994. After that, confirmed reportsdiminished, > although there continued to be seizures of small amounts of uranium and > plutonium, or of dangerous radiological materials with no weapons value. > This apparent lull prompted officials to credit the introduction > ofsecurity > systems in Russia and a realization by thieves that there was no > readyblack> market for nuclear materials. > The less-optimistic view holds that nuclear thieves became more > cunning,that > professionals and organized groups have taken over and have made > contactwith> scientists or administrators with access to nuclear materials. > Someexperts> suggest that the Russians are not sharing intelligence about > smugglingattempts> they have intercepted, out of embarrassment or fear of > acknowledgingsecurity > lapses -- a charge Russian officials denied in interviews. > Perhaps most persuasive is the theory that smugglers no longer attemptto > pierce relatively tightly controlled European borders, but instead > probethe > poorly protected southern border of the former Soviet Union. In fact,the > southern tiers of newly independent, ex-Soviet nations share a4,400-mile > border with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and China. > The September sting in Turkey is considered Exhibit A among > expertsconcerned > that nuclear material is leaking across these southern borders. It > wasthe > third reported seizure of uranium by Turkish officials since 1994. > "The Turks don't want to see their country become a conduit for these > materials," said David Kyd of the International Atomic Energy Agency. > Turkey acknowledges its concern but maintains that no highly > enricheduranium > has ever been found in Turkey. All cases of illicit trafficking inTurkey > are> reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Cengiz Yalcin, > president of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority. > William Potter, the expert on nuclear smuggling, has argued that a > greatwindow> of opportunity opened for theft and diversion after the Soviet > breakup.He said > it is conceivable that material was stolen and not marketed > immediatelybut set> aside in hope of better conditions. > For example, in June 1997, authorities in Vilnius, Lithuania, weretipped > off> that material had been stolen from the Ignalina nuclear-power > station.They> were directed to material buried in a nearby forest. > Authorities later learned that the theft actually had taken place > in1992, when > four men stole a 20-kilogram uranium fuel rod and buried it. In > November1997,> three of the thieves, all former soldiers in the security > battalionguarding > Ignalina, were sentenced to prison terms. A fourth suspect is stillbeing > sought. No buyer was ever identified; the thieves apparently werewaiting > for> an opportune time to sell the material. > Anatoly Bulochnikov, director of the private Center for Export > Controlsin > Moscow, cautioned that reports of thefts of nuclear material may > beexaggerated. > "First, it is difficult to steal from an enterprise," he said. > "Thesecond > problem is to transport it. The third problem is to find a buyer. Thisis > not> potatoes, not something you can keep anywhere." > But Bulochnikov acknowledged that there now is more evidence of amarket. > And> the "potatoes" can be handled, even if they are hot. Most > fissilematerial > emits low levels of radiation that can be shielded by special gloves. > Avisitor > to Moscow's Kurchatov Institute, for instance, held in his bare hand a > baseball-sized sphere of uranium 235 covered in protective graphite. > Moreover, the lull in reported cases has not calmed experts andanalysts. > "The> longer we go without a [ diversion ] case," said John J. Nettles > Jr.,head of > emergency management for weapons of mass destruction issues for > theDepartment> of Energy, "the more I worry about it." > One serious case that has been reported is the disappearance of > 2kilograms of > highly enriched uranium -- enriched to more than 90 percent -- in > thebreakaway > Abkhaz Republic in Georgia. The material had been stored at the > I.N.Vekua > Physics and Technology Institute in Sukhumi and had been lastinventoried > in> 1992. Because Sukhumi is in Abkhazia, the institute is no longer > underthe> direct control of Georgia's authorities. > At the request of Georgia's government, the International Atomic > EnergyAgency > and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy attempted to conduct > aninventory of > the institute but were prevented by continuing strife. In December > 1997,a > Russian team finally gained access to the facility. The storage site > hadbeen > broken into and all available uranium had been stolen, although other > radioactive material was still present. Russia has no idea how long the > material has been missing or where it has gone. > The earliest cases of diversion were supply-side driven, with > would-besellers> desperate for money and thus willing to steal the material > onspeculation. > U.S.-provided security measures have since helped deter thefts. So has > publicity about sting operations that trapped profiteers trying to > sellnuclear> materials. > Now investigators increasingly are finding anecdotal evidence of > demandfor > nuclear materials. > After the 1995 poison-gas attack in the Tokyo subway by the doomsdaycult > Aum> Shinri Kyo, press accounts disclosed that Russian followers of the > sectwere > looking for nuclear material or weapons in Russia. The accounts said > thegroup > was cooperating with North Korean and Russian crime gangs and dealing > indirectly with Iran to smuggle nuclear material out of Russia > throughUkraine. > Vladimir A. Orlov, Russia's leading authority on nuclear smuggling, > saidin an > interview that terrorist groups constitute the greatest threat to > thesecurity > of nuclear materials. Orlov said Russian foreign intelligence officials > estimate that 200 to 400 groups "could be interested in acquiringweapons > of> mass destruction, including nuclear weapons." > Citing the case of nuclear smuggling involving the Italian Mafia, > GlennE. > Schweitzer, a proliferation expert at the National Research Council in > Washington, said that organized crime has become more, well, organized. > "Organized crime has really gotten its act together," he said. "We > usedto > worry about 100 grams. Now we worry about quantities approaching > 10kilograms > or more." Retired Air Force Gen. Lee Butler, former commander of the > U.S. > StrategicCommand, has now become a nuclear abolitionist. He said any > advances in > avoiding criminal proliferation over the last several years must now be > reevaluated. > Butler said his successor at the strategic command, Gen. Eugene Habiger, > visited five Russian nuclear weapons sites in June -- two months > beforeRussia > plunged into economic crisis. Habiger "was optimistic about what he > sawabout > security of nukes" then, Butler said. "But he added that he would haveto > condition his optimism on the chance that Russia might one day > slideintochaos. > "Well, guess what?" Butler said. "Clearly, that's the scenario that > weare > seeing unfolding." DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. 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