-Caveat Lector- Dave Hartley http://www.Asheville-Computer.com/dave World Development Movement, http://www.wdm.org Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Battle for International Rules on GMOs: The biotech industry versus the worlds poor December 1999 The Biosafety Protocol set out to establish international rules on GMOs, enshrining in international law two very simple basic rights; a countrys right to know what it is importing, and a governments right to refuse an import if its population is threatened. On the 20 January 1999 negotiators from around the world will meet in a desperate attempt to hammer out agreement on international rules covering the trade in GMOs. They will seek to cut through the clashes of interests that paralysed the last set of negotiations on the Biosafety Protocol in Cartagena, Colombia in February 1999. The stakes at these negotiations have been considerably raised with the collapse of World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks in Seattle. Following the WTO meeting, negotiations on international agreements will never be the same. Developing countries made it clear that they are fed up with having their interests sidelined in trade deals that are forced on them. Meanwhile citizens want more accountability from negotiations that have an ever-increasing impact on their lives. As Biosafety Protocol talks resume for the final time, negotiators are aware that the issues that paralysed trade negotiations in Seattle are right behind them. In the words of one European delegate: "before the end of November, we knew where we were, now its clear that there is everything to play for." WDM, along with NGOs throughout the developing world, has been campaigning for a strong Biosafety Protocol. In the run up to the WTO meeting in Seattle we fiercely opposed attempts by the US, Canada and Japan to discuss GM regulation at the WTO. The battleground now shifts to Montreal. Whatever happens, negotiators will be under huge pressure to portray the outcome as a success. The collapse of the Biosafety Protocol negotiations in Cartegena in February 1999 was unfortunate; the collapse of trade negotiations in Seattle was deeply embarrassing. A third failure would be a disaster, not only for the credibility of governments, but also for the prospects of sound regulation on GMOs. SEVEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATION In 1992, 175 governments signed up to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) at the Earth Summit in Rio. Article 19 of this UN Convention commits these countries to developing an international legal regime, or Protocol on the transfer, handling and use of GMOs. This process has been plagued with difficulties. >From the adoption of the UN Convention in 1992, it took concerned countries more than three years to overcome US and industry criticism that a Protocol was unnecessary. The US was included as a negotiating partner in 1995, in spite of its efforts to scupper the process of initiating negotiations and its non-ratification of the CBD. In December 1996, a formal working group began drafting the Biosafety Protocol. The meeting of governments in February 1999 represented the culmination of almost seven years of international effort to formulate an agreement to safeguard the public against a technology whose long-term effects are uncertain and deeply mistrusted. The aim was to sign a Biosafety Protocol, but an illusion of common interests was shattered. Different negotiating agendas crystallised into three blocks. THE THREE MAIN PLAYERS The Miami group of grain exporting countries (led by the US, but also including Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) is pushing for a weak agreement which elevates the WTO form of unregulated free trade over considerations of environmental safety or the fears of small farmers. They do not want any regulation of GMOs. It was clear from the outset that the US was going to fight those who wanted safety because it regarded this as a stumbling block to the promotion of its commercial interests. The US has challenged the basis for a GMO Protocol since they have claimed on numerous occasions that GM products are no different to their non-GM counterparts. They use the term substantially equivalent to claim that all genetic engineering does is mix genes from different individuals, in a similar process to sexual reproduction, and is therefore as old and well tested as life itself. They have used this argument throughout the Protocols formation. Yet ironically, GMOs are sufficiently transformed to be patented by US companies as original creations. The Like-Minded Group (LMG), which consists of over 100 developing countries and China (excluding members of the Miami group) wants the rigorous regulation of GMOs. This group believes that safety is paramount since most unsafe experimentation is tried out in developing countries. Natural environments in developing countries are generally hotter and more biodiversity-rich, and therefore very different from those of the North. A biosafety agreement that focuses on narrow trade interests will not adequately consider safety in the marginalised South. Nor will it deal with the risks that GMOs pose to the livelihood of local and indigenous communities in developing countries, whose society and economic systems are inextricably linked to the maintenance of biodiversity. The European group, which includes the UK delegation has often sounded like the Like-Minded Group, but has often supported the position of the Miami Group. Since 1992, Europe has tended to take a more realistic view of the risks involved in genetic engineering than the US. Europe has definitely had second thoughts about the use of the WTO for fully dictating the terms of trade in GMOs. They do not want to see the Biosafety Protocol subjugated to current WTO rules, but at the same time have sought to introduce the essentials of trade into the Protocol and have ignored many developing countries safety concerns. Government negotiators in Montreal are facing a task greater than agreeing the Protocols text. GM exporters like the US must overcome entrenched positions that prioritise commercial profits over the environment and the welfare of millions of consumers and farmers. SAFETY VERSUS TRADE: WHAT KIND OF PROTOCOL IS THIS? The Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure The AIA procedure should be the heart of this Protocol. This means that countries importing GMOs can demand that exporters give them prior notification about the GM product. This will allow the importing country to make a risk assessment of the GMO, before approving the trade. Throughout the negotiations, the US has sought to undermine the scope of this aspect of the Protocol. They have chipped away at the AIA procedure claiming that it should only apply to GMOs intended for direct release into the environment (GMOs planted in the field, applied to the soil, in mines or in open waters). This would exclude products of GMOs (those destined for food, animal feed and processing). This in practice means excluding over 90 percent of GMOs. Tewolde Egziabher, a negotiator from Ethiopia. described this AIA exclusion tactic as "perhaps the most blatant disregard by the Miaimi Group of the interests of the [developing countries]." It shows a lack of understanding by the US and later the EU for the situation in many developing countries. Excluding, for example grain, from the Protocol could spell disaster for livelihoods and biodiversity in some of the worlds poorest regions. Grain travels within developing countries unprocessed. It is cleaned at home and often processed at home or in a small village mill. All this makes it certain that grain will be planted and pollute the genetic make-up of the same or related species. Worst still, there is nothing to stop farmers from planting this grain in their fields. For developing countries, commodities as well as seed have to be regulated by the AIA procedure. If this is not done, the AIA will have little value for developing countries. What ends up in the field as seed often comes into the country originally intended as food. The position of developing countries is that all GMOs and products made from GMOs must be within the scope of the Protocol and be subject to a prior notification procedure. The Miami Group, later followed by the EU have suggested that governments use their domestic legislation to regulate GMO products excluded from the Protocol. Yet applying AIA through national legislation, without the provisions and procedures of the Protocol is problematic. Any such national action would be very easy to challenge using WTO rules. Burden of proof Underpinning recent international trading agreements is the procedure that in order to reject a product, the importing country must prove that it is unsafe. Without clear evidence, it can be very difficult for a country to refuse a product, even if they feel that it poses potential risks to people or the environment. The Like-Minded Groups negotiating position on the Biosafety Protocol challenges this procedure. It lays the burden of proving a GMOs safety with the company or country wishing to export a product. The Biosafety Protocol is not a trade agreement. It aims to protect people and the environment from a technology whose risks and impacts are poorly understood. Subordinating the Protocol to current free trade procedures will not only result in a weak agreement, but could seriously undermine food security and have a potentially devastating effect on biodiversity. WDMS DEMANDS IN MONTREAL WDMs campaign highlights Developing Country demands for a strong Biosafety Protocol. At the centre of this campaign are two concerns. Firstly, the interests of the worlds poor are consistently marginalised at international negotiations. Developing countries find themselves unable to defend their people in international deals that offer more rights to the rich at the expense of the poor and the environment. This was central to the breakdown at Seattles WTO meeting and has been a recurring theme at Biosafety Protocol meetings. Secondly, the clashes that have arisen throughout the Biosafety Protocol demonstrate current problems about the kind of international rules that we want - those promoting free trade or those designed to protect people and the environment. There are at least four areas within the Protocol where developing country demands must be taken seriously if we are to ensure that international rules on GMOs are not hijacked by the US on behalf of its biotechnology industry. Scope of the Protocol WDM demand: The AIA, which is at the centre of this Protocol must cover all GMOs and their parts, including commodities being shipped for food use (e.g. soyabeans) and products of GMOs (e.g. flour and other processed items). Currently on the table is a Miami Group and EU proposal that will confine the Protocol to the narrowest range of GMOs possible. If they wish, countries could require these other commodities to be subject to AIA on a national basis. However, this would make any national action very easy to challenge in the WTO. Precautionary Principle WDM demand: It must be clear that it is legitimate for states to refuse a GMO import on the basis of risks to human health, socio-economic and cultural factors (not just scientific evidence). GM crops seriously threaten the ability of small farmers in some of the worlds poorest countries to make informed choices about their farming practices. Therefore, governments should be permitted to take full account of socio-economic impacts within their country and its environment when deciding whether or not to allow the import of GMOs. Currently on the table: The Precautionary Principle has been continually eroded in the text as the Miami group totally opposes the precautionary approach. The parts of the Protocol which focus on a countrys decision making procedures on imports, have retained a reference to human health, but not to socio economics (which includes the impact on small farmer and rural livelihoods). Socio-economics have been included in a separate article which does not relate directly to a countrys decision making procedure. This would mean that a countrys decision to reject GMOs based on socio-economic concerns could be challenged through the WTO. Relationship with the World Trade Organisation WDM Demand: The Biosafety Protocol should take precedence over the provisions of international trade rules should there be conflicts between the two agreements. Liability WDM Demand: Companies exporting GMOs should be strictly liable in the event of problems that arise and should provide adequate compensation for any damages to health, the environment or livelihoods. The Protocol must include provisions on strict liability to recognise that genetic engineering is a new technology. Making companies liable is one way to ensure that they undertake adequate testing and minimise potential risks. Currently on the table is no clear commitment in the Protocol concerning liability and compensation. A time target of four years for developing a stricter liability regime is mentioned, but there is plenty of scope for delaying and avoiding action. For more information contact: The Campaigns Team, World Development Movement, http://www.wdm.org DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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