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US Military Non-Lethal Weapons
Submitted by [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Source: http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apj/mcgowan.html
11-10-97


ACOUSTIC ENERGY PROPERTIES

Infrasonic:

Target effects
-- Mild to severe discomfort
-- Organ functional disturbance
-- Organ disruption

Propagation characteristics
-- Ground or structure penetration
-- Long-range propagation
-- Nondirectional


Sonic: 20 Hz to 20 kHz

Target effects
-- Hearing interference
-- Performance degradation
-- Pain
-- Hearing loss
-- Tissue damage

Propagation characteristics
-- Moderate propagation
-- Moderately directional


Ultrasonic: 20 kHz

Target effects
-- Possible diffuse psychological effects
-- Pain
-- Surface tissue damage
-- Tissue destruction

Propagation characteristics
-- Limited propagation
-- Highly directional


ACOUSTIC WEAPONS GRADUATED EFFECT

Effect on personnel inherently graduated by range and power level Detection
(infrasonic/sonic) at medium to long range Hear/feel presence of energy
Annoyance, irritation, interference with performance Infrasonic/sonic at
medium power Ultrasonic at medium to high power Pain (a) Auditory
(sonic/infrasonic) at medium to high power (b) Other organs
(infrasonic/sonic/ultrasonic) at high power Incapacitation (very high power)
Death Potential as area exclusion devices

Vortex Ring Generator Objective

Integrate concussion, flash, chemical, and impact methods of crowd control
into a single vortex ring delivery system, with the intent of improving
nonlethal effectiveness as well as reducing weight, cost, and logistics
associated with stockpiling different cartridges.


Vortex Ring Generator Description

o Concept of operation
-- Attach muzzle adapter to barrel
-- Add a chemical tank
-- Fire blank flash-bang rounds to generate vortex rings
-- Impact targets by integrated chemical-flash-concussion impulses

o Desired performance
-- Knock down human target with single shot
-- Incapacitate via resonance effects
-- Incapacitate by single shot employing entrained chemical agent


Nonlethal Testing Conclusions/Observations

o Determining target effects on personnel is greatest challenge to testing
community
o Wide variety of potential effects requires evaluation
o Potential for injury or death severely limits human testing
o Animal testing is limited
o Extrapolation of surrogate target test data not consistently reliable
o Antimaterial systems present difficult challenges
o Details of temporary upset mechanisms not readily measurable
o Human presence (integral and collateral) limits testing scenarios


____________________________________________________________________________
_


NONLETHAL WEAPONS
Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies
Maj Joseph W. Cook, III,
Maj David P. Fiely, Maj Maura T. McGowan


>From A.D. 1200 to 1500 a group of mercenaries on the Italian peninsula
called the condottieri waged what has often been regarded as a form of
nonlethal warfare. They were hired by the various mercantile city-states to
protect vital interests. Many of the major engagements between these
city-states' condottieri were almost comical for their lack of casualties.

According to Niccolo Machiavelli, the battle of Zagonara in 1424 was a
"defeat, famous throughout all Italy, [in which] no death occurred except
those of Lodovico degli Obizi and two of his people, who, having fallen from
their horses, were drowned in the mire."1 Several reasons have been extended
for this low lethality. One of the more plausible reasons was the simple
fact that the armor of the day was much superior to most offensive weaponry.
A more personal reason is the fact that the surest way for a mercenary to
lose his source of livelihood was for the condottieri to obliterate his
enemies. As a result, mercenaries rarely sought setpiece battles, choosing
instead to fight relatively minor and extended campaigns. Engagements
between mounted warriors often resembled jousts and those between infantry
often turned into shoving matches.

In the past, nonlethal warfare did not rely on the use of nonlethal weapons;
rather, it was the fortuitous result of the superiority of body armor over
offensive weaponry or the mutual lackadaisical approach of opposing soldiers
and leaders. Today, nonlethal weapons might offer the ability to wage
nonlethal warfare without relying on such fortuitous circumstances. The use
of nonlethal weapons would serve as a means of keeping the level of conflict
low and of dissuading belligerents from resorting to more forceful weapons.
Also, the prospect of resolving conflict with low levels of lethality is
especially exciting to a country that has a warfighting doctrine of
minimizing friendly as well as enemy casualties. Sun Tzu espoused a similar
doctrine when he said:


o Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is
inferior to this.

o To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a
battalion, a company or a fiveman squad is better than to destroy them.

o For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of
skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.2


Nonlethal weapons are defined as "weapons that are designed to disable
personnel, weapons, supplies, or equipment in such a way that death or
severe permanent disability to personnel are unlikely." However, some
proposed "nonlethal" weapons are not authorized under the international law
governing weapons. Additionally, some nonlethal weapons are not truly
nonlethal in all employment scenarios. Some government organizations such as
the National Institute of Justice prefer the term less than lethal3 to
emphasize the point that "enough marshmallows will kill you if properly
placed."4 Others have coined the phrase "nonlethal weapons of mass
destruction" to emphasize the fact that nonlethal weapons span the spectrum
of warfare from lowintensity conflict through theater conventional warfare
and all the way to strategic global war. Biological or chemical agents that
destroy crops without directly affecting people would still be considered
lethal if starvation is the likely result. A microwave weapon that disables
a truck that subsequently drives off a cliff, killing the driver, would be
nonlethal. The same weapon used against a helicopter in flight would have to
be considered lethal.

Some nonlethal technologies may offer new options to our armed forces;
others may prove to be more useful to our enemies because of our advanced
society's many vulnerabilities. For example, a terrorist group with
rudimentary knowledge of our information switches could shut down our stock
market with several wellplaced electromagnetic pulse generators. Regardless
of a weapon's potential worth or our relative vulnerability, however, there
is some value in pursuing these technologies if only to develop appropriate
countermeasures and policies. In this article, we will examine the various
nonlethal weapons in three contexts-potential technologies, legalities, and
potential policies.


Proposed Nonlethal Weapons and Their Legality

In 1868, the Russian government issued an invitation to the International
Military Commission "to examine the expediency of forbidding the use of
certain projectiles in time of war between civilized nations." At issue was
the use of certain light explosives or inflammable projectiles. When used
against human beings, the new projectile was no more effective than an
ordinary rifle bullet; however, it caused greater wounds and thus greatly
aggravated the sufferings of the victim. The resulting document, the
Declaration of St. Petersburg, prohibited the use of explosive projectiles
under 400 grams of weight. It was the first international treaty imposing
restrictions on the conduct of war.


Legal Framework

The Declaration of St. Petersburg is a significant document because it
develops a line of reasoning governing the legality of weapons. This
reasoning is found in the preamble to the declaration:

"Considering the progress of civilization should have the effect of
alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war. The only legitimate
object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken
the military forces of the enemy. It is sufficient to disable the greatest
possible number of men, and this object would be exceeded by the employment
of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render
their death inevitable. The use of such weapons would therefore, be contrary
to the laws of humanity."

Although it may appear to be an incongruous concept, the nations of the
world have recognized the need to impose restrictions on the waging of war.
War will necessarily result in death and injury to humans and the
destruction of property; however, in the eyes of the international
community, it need not be an unlimited exercise in cruelty and
ruthlessness.5 The necessities of war must be conciliated with the laws of
humanity. The resulting restrictions are regarded as the international law
of armed conflict (LOAC), or the law of war.

These concepts did not originate in Russia. They can be found throughout
man's history. The ancient Hindu laws of Manu prohibited the use of barbed
arrows because they exacerbated the injury upon their removal. The Romans
considered the use of poisoned weapons to be unlawful. During the Middle
Ages, the Pope condemned the crossbow, noting the appalling injuries it
caused.

While most cultures saw a need to restrain the horrors of war, it was not
until the nineteenth century that these concepts were codified. The
Declaration of St. Petersburg was followed by the Hague conventions, which
codified the "laws and customs of war on land."6 The Geneva conventions of
1929 and 1949 focused on ameliorating the conditions of civilians, prisoners
of war, and the sick and wounded.7 The latest amendments to the law of armed
conflict are contained in the 1977 Protocol.8 Additionally, a number of
treaties address the legitimacy of specific weapons.9

The legality of a weapon and the legality of the specific use of a weapon
are determined by international law. The sources of international law are
international conventions, international customs, general principles of law,
as well as the writings of publicists.10 International law is part of the
domestic law of the United States. Treaties are regarded as the supreme law
of the land in the Constitution.11 Those practices of states that are
regarded as custom are binding on all nationstates. A large part of the law
of armed conflict is recognized as custom and must be observed by all
nations.12

To examine the legality of nonlethal weapons, it is necessary to understand
the wide array of legal principles and restrictions governing their use.

[I]n considering the use of any weapon, new or old, two questions must be
answered. First, can this weapon legally be use? Second, if the first
question is answered in the affirmative, is the proposed use of this weapon
legal?13

We will review the general principles governing the law of armed conflict,
restraints imposed by custom and treaty, and specific bans on weapons in
order to review the legality of some proposed nonlethal weapons.

General Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict

International law does not enumerate those acts that may be committed in the
name of military necessity. Guidance is found in United States v. List, when
the international military tribunal at Nuremberg determined that ...

"Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to
apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the
enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. . . .
There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property
and the overcoming of the enemy."14


Military Necessity

The rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the
loss of an advantage. Kriegsraison, the German doctrine of military
necessity, was the belief that the ends justified the means. A matter of
urgent necessity could override the LOAC. This principle was rejected in
United States v. Krupp, when the Nuremberg tribunal held that ...

"to claim that the law of war can be wantonly and at the sole discretion of
any one belligerent be disregarded when he considered his own situation to
be critical means nothing more than to abrogate the laws and customs of war
entirely."15


Humanity

The principle of humanity calls for the mitigation of human suffering.16 As
an example, an enemy soldier should not be subjected to unnecessary
suffering. A wound should be inflicted to heal as painlessly as possible.17
Humanity's position in the law of armed conflict was also preserved by the
"Martens' Clause," which specified that ...

"the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protections and the
principles of the laws of nations as they result from the usage's
established among civilized persons, from the laws of humanity, and from the
dictates of the public conscience."18


The Rule of Proportionality

The concept of proportionality calls for a reasonable relationship between
the amount of destruction caused and the military significance of the
attack.19 The principles of humanity and military necessity are applied
together. Proportionality requires that the loss of life and the damage not
be disproportionate to the expected military advantage. "Proportionality
represents a movable fulcrum on which necessity humanity scale may be
balanced."20 The law recognizes that a military activity will result in some
loss of life and property, but the action is illegal if the loss exceeds the
military advantage.


Principles Governing Weapons

International law establishes certain principles governing the prohibition
of weapons. Two such principles are unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate
effects caused by certain weapons.

Unnecessary Suffering

Article 23(e) of the 1907 Hague Convention prohibits the use of "arms,
projectiles or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."21 This
concept has been the subject of much concern as there is no precise
definition of unnecessary suffering. As stated in Air Force Pamphlet (AFP)
11031, International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict, all weapons cause
suffering.22 The St. Petersburg Declaration speaks in terms of arms that
uselessly aggravate "the sufferings of disabled men or render their death
inevitable."

Indiscriminate Effects

A primary concern of the law of armed conflict is the protection of
noncombatants. A belligerent may not attack a noncombatant and must cancel
an attack on a legitimate military target if the injury to the noncombatant
population would be disproportionate. Belligerents cannot employ a "blind"
weapon, one that cannot discriminate between noncombatants and combatants.


Restraints Imposed by Custom or Treaty

A weapon that complies with the general principles of the law may not be
used in a manner that is restricted by custom or treaty. The Hague
conventions underline that there are restrictions on the conduct of war in
Article 22, which provides that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited."

Weapons may be used only against military objectives. An object is
considered to be a military object if its use, nature, location, or purpose
make effective contribution to the military action.23 Some objects are
considered dual use objects. They meet the needs of the civilian population
but also effectively contribute to the enemys military action. These objects
may be attacked if there is a military advantage to be gained by their
attack. During Desert Storm, the coalition forces bombed bridges across the
Euphrates River, not only to restrict the movement of enemy forces but to
sever the communications systems. The bridges contained fiberoptic links
that provided Saddam Hussein with a communications system to his forces.24
The attack produced a military advantage for the coalition forces.

The attack may only be against lawful combatants. The LOAC prohibits attack
against noncombatants or civilian property. Again, attacks against military
targets may result in injury to protected persons and property. It is the
attackers' responsibility to minimize collateral damage against protected
persons and property. Places such as buildings dedicated to religion, art,
science, charitable purposes, historic monuments, and hospitals are
protected from attack.25 The Hague Convention also prohibits the use of
poison,26 treachery, and perfidy.27 Emblems of protection such as the Red
Cross must be respected.28 There are rules governing the use of uniforms and
certain signals.29 Assassination is prohibited.30


Technologies

Man is constantly using technology to devise new weapons that international
law must address. These weapons range from the very deadly to the nonlethal.


Biological Weapons

Biological warfare is defined as "the technique of destruction by
disease."31 Biological agents are living organisms (bacteria, viruses,
fungi, protozoa, and rickettsiae) or the toxins derived from such organisms.
These organisms or toxins can be targeted against animals, plants, or
material.

The idea of using bacteria and toxins to harm an enemy is not a new one.
During the fourteenth century, the Tatars catapulted bodies of plague
victims into a Crusader fortress to spread contagion. The Crusaders,
weakened by disease, lost their stronghold.32 Historically, biological
weapons have been regarded as so horrible that they should be prohibited.
The objections are based on a number of grounds.

Bacteriological agents owe their effects to the multiplication of their
organisms within the victim. Their multiplication after dissemination is
hard to control. They are unpredictable in scale and duration.33 They
increase the possibility of epidemics that would indiscriminately strike
noncombatants. They may also indiscriminately attack the disseminator's own
troops. The medical profession, entitled to protection, would suffer at the
same rate as the combatants, decreasing chances of survival for the whole
population.34 Bacteriological warfare may be impossible to defend against.
This type of warfare does not destroy property but strikes against
personnel, animals, and crops. Suffering may be prolonged due to the
destruction of crops.35 An important consideration was that toxins are
technically poisons, and poisons have historically been prohibited.

Although it is conceivable that under limited circumstances biological
weapons could be employed in accordance with the generally accepted
principles of the LOAC, they have been banned by international treaties. In
1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of bacteriological methods of
warfare. In 1975 the United States ratified the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction. Under
the terms of the convention, the parties undertake not to develop, produce,
stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic protection and other
peaceful purposes."

The impact of these two conventions is the clear prohibition of the use and
development of biological weapons. Attempts to employ biological warfare,
even in a nonlethal capacity, would be prohibited under international law.
The drafters of the Biological Convention focused on the development of
biological weapons for hostile purposes.

One of the methods of nonlethal warfare under consideration is the use of
recombinant DNA technology to attack an ethnic population. This would be a
prohibited hostile use of biological agents. In addition, such an action
could be a violation of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide.36 The use of biological agents even to cause mild
sickness or destroy a food crop would be unlawful. The criteria for the use
of the biological agent is whether or not it is a hostile use, not whether
or not the use will result in death.

Some bacteriological agents have genuine medical uses, and stockpiling for
these purposes is not objectionable. Accordingly, it would follow that the
use of bioremedians, biological agents that break down material, to clean up
oil spills would be legal under these treaties, but the use of these same
agents to destroy an enemy's fuel supply would be considered hostile intent
and therefore illegal.37

Although the original impetus for the prohibition against biological warfare
was the damage or injury to man, the conventions have been written to
prohibit any hostile use of biological agents, even those which are
nonlethal.


Chemical Weapons

The end of the nineteenth century saw the development of chemical weapons on
a significant scale.38 Chemical weapons were frequently used during World
War I in the form of toxic chemicals such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard
gases. Phosgene has a slow effect on the victim. "The person will have
increasing difficulty in breathing as the lung tissue is slowly destroyed
and fills up with bodily fluids. Death, which is slow in coming, is by
asphyxiation."39 Since death was slow in coming, the victims damaged lungs
would suffer bacterial infection that would be the actual cause of death.40
Sulfur mustard gas also destroys tissue. If the gas contacts skin, the skin
is destroyed. If the gas is inhaled, the lung lining is destroyed.41

The military and the general population were horrified by these weapons,
which had the same treacherous characteristics of poison that had been
prohibited by custom and international treaties. The weapon could not be
seen, and defenses were limited. Its effectiveness was subject to the whims
of the wind. Gas was released to cover an area, and would indiscriminately
strike all in the area, be they combatants or noncombatants. And last, the
weapon caused unnecessary suffering.

The 1925 Gas Protocol was drafted in response to the horrors seen during
World War I. A number of nations reserved the right to retaliate against the
use of chemical weapons with chemical weapons. The United States had several
objections to the Gas Protocol. It believed chemical weapons did not include
chemical riot control agents. The United States has historically argued the
dichotomy of allowing riot control gases by a nations police force against
its own citizens while prohibiting their use against enemy combatants in
battle.42 Again, it argued that the use of herbicides and defoliants may be
more humane in some cases than the use of conventional weapons.43 Fifty
years later, in 1975, the Senate abandoned these arguments and unanimously
ratified the treaty. In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford issued an executive
order renouncing first use of riot control gases and herbicides except in
limited noncombatant situations.44

The Gas Protocol has been subject to a number of criticisms.45 Following the
United States's lead, the United Nations took efforts to develop
comprehensive arms control of chemical weapons. The Draft Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction46 prohibited the use, development,
production, acquiring, or stockpiling of chemical weapons. It also
prohibited the use of riot controls as a method of warfare.

The Convention defines chemical weapons to include "Toxic chemicals and
their precursors, except when intended for purposes not prohibited under
this convention" (emphasis added). Toxic chemical is defined to mean "any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals."
Prohibited toxic chemicals have been listed in schedules contained in the
"Annex of Chemicals":

"Riot Control Agent" means any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can
produce rapidly in human sensory irritation or disabling physical effects
which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure."

Article II, Section 9, goes on to define "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this
Convention" to mean:

c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not
dependent on the use of toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare

d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.

Following are some of the chemical antipersonnel nonlethal weapons under
consideration.

Tear/Riot Gases. The domestic law enforcement community possesses and uses
riot gases. However, in a warfare situation, the use of tear gas is
currently strictly limited by an executive order. When the chemical
convention is entered into force, the use of tear gas and other riot
controls will be completely forbidden.

Calmative Agents. These agents, sometimes called sleep agents, can be made
more effective by combining them with dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO), a chemical
that promotes transmission of the calmative through the skin and into the
bloodstream. Calmative agents were allegedly used by the Soviets in
Afghanistan. The reports indicated that the mujahideen would lie down and
sleep until they awoke later in Soviet custody. The reports are discounted
because such a chemical has not proven effective.47 If the chemical that
comprises the calmative agent is not listed on the prohibited chemical
schedule, then a further determination of whether the agent constitutes a
prohibited riotcontrol agent must be made. Under the definition of "riot
control agent," calmative agents would be prohibited because they cause
disabling physical effects.

Sticky Foam. These polymer agents will hopelessly stick a person to
anything. It can be argued that these weapons amount to prohibited riot
control agents under the convention since they are "chemicals... which can
produce rapidly disabling physical effects."

Markers. These chemical agents come in numerous forms and are currently used
in law enforcement. A covert variety can surreptitiously expose a criminal
to an invisible dye that shows up under special lighting. An overt dye that
is impossible to wash off can be sprayed on a fleeing felon.

Nonlethal chemical agents that attack material are promising and diverse. If
the chemical that comprises the weapon is limited on the schedule of
prohibited chemicals, it may be possible to claim that the weapon is exempt.
These chemicals are "not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of
chemicals as a method of warfare." "Toxic Properties" means using chemical
action on life processes that cause death, temporary incapacitation, or
permanent harm to humans or animals. This category of weapons would include
the following agents.

Combustion Alteration Technology (CAT). CAT agents change the viscosity or
combustion characteristics of fuel to degrade engine performance.
Nearinstantaneous engine failure is possible if the agent is applied in
appropriate quantities.

Smart Metals. These special metals, formed with chemical additives or
blended in a particular form, could be introduced to control certain
activities while allowing legitimate ones. For example, a notional metal
designed to perform satisfactorily in a legitimate chemical plant might be
designed to fail or give off telltale signs to inspectors if the plant is
used for more insidious purposes.

Super Caustics. These super acids can be used against weapons, tires, roads,
roofs, optical systems, or even shoes. They could also be used to deny human
contact and can be stored in a harmless binary form.48

Metal Embrittlement. These agents severely weaken metals by chemically
changing their molecular structure. They are clear, leave imperceptible
residue, can attack almost any metal, and can be applied with a felt tip
pen.49

Antitraction Technology. These super lubricants severely reduce traction.
They are specially blended to attack specific targets such as roads,
runways, rails, and the like.50

Polymer Agents. These agents are similar to sticky foams but are designed to
target material instead of personnel. They can foul engines or ventilation
systems and can also deny the use of weapons and facilities.51

Electromagnetic Weapons

Nonlethal electromagnetic weapons span the spectrum from simple to exotic.
Many can be employed (or can have collateral effects) against both personnel
and equipment. Blinding and shocking effects are the most common nonlethal
results of the use of this class of weapons. We will now look at potential
nonlethal applications of certain technologies for which there are presently
no specific prohibitions but which could certainly have LOAC implications.

Electrified Baton, Stun Gun, Taser. These weapons deliver immobilizing,
lowenergy pulsed shocks either at close range (baton and stun gun) or at
long range (taser). They are used by police in criminal enforcement. The
taser has electric currents of high voltage and low amperage that cause the
muscles of the body to contract forcefully.52 The individual experiences
spasms.53 The contractions may fracture bones. If the individual collapses,
he may suffer further injury.54 If an individual is repeatedly shocked, he
may be rendered unconscious. The individual may suffer electrical burns that
may be difficult to treat.55

Highintensity Light. These omnidirectional bombs or flares can flashblind
personnel even in existing intense lighting situations. They can also
degrade sensors and night vision devices.

Lasers. Lowenergy lasers can be directed or aimed at specific targets to
blind personnel or sensors either temporarily or permanently. They can also
be used to make a gun or other weapon too hot to hold. The most advanced
blinding lasers oscillate between numerous colors to make goggles and other
countermeasures ineffective.

One factor in the assessment of the legality of a weapon is discrimination.
A weapon that injures the civilian population or civilian property along
with military personnel and objects, without distinction, is considered
indiscriminate and thus illegal. Electromagnetic weapons, and most
specifically the laser, can "almost always be directed very precisely
against specific targets."56

A second factor of assessment is "unnecessary suffering." Several
electromagnetic weapons, such as the highintensity light and laser, may
produce temporary or permanent blindness. These weapons have been the
subject of much discussion. Sweden has been actively condemning the use of
lasers as antipersonnel weapons on the grounds that they cause unnecessary
suffering.

Several sophisticated types of military equipment, such as sensors and
optics, are rendered useless when subjected to laser weapons. These pieces
of military equipment are legitimate targets. Their destruction, however,
may result in injury to personnel. Such injury would be incidental to the
primary target of the weapon.57

The controversy surrounding lasers focuses on the legitimacy of deliberately
blinding human beings. Exposing a pilot's eyes to a laser may result in the
destruction of the entire plane.58 Intentionally blinding an attacking
infantry unit would render them unable to fight. Some scholars, in
particular experts from Switzerland and Sweden, argue that intentionally
using a laser to permanently blind a combatant is a disproportionate injury
to the gained military advantage.59 The essence of their argument is that
the Declaration of St. Petersburg authorized the incapacitation of an
opponent only for the duration of the conflict. "Although it is permitted to
kill combatants under the law of war, and thus to put them permanently out
of action, it is not permitted to use methods or means of warfare
exclusively designed to injure soldiers with injuries lasting not only the
duration of the conflict but for the rest of their lives."60 It is their
position that intentional irreversible permanent blindness by a laser
constitutes "unnecessary suffering."

The United States rejects this position. In a memorandum of law, it noted
that there was no legal obligation to limit wounding so that the opponent
would be temporarily disabled for the period of the hostilities and no
longer.61 Additionally, it noted, "Blinding is no stranger to the battle
field." The use of a number of conventional weapons could result in
blindness.62 However, these conventional weapons are more likely to cause
death. It is the United States' position that lasers do not cause
unnecessary suffering but are more humane because the victim is likely to
suffer less injury than that caused by conventional weapons.63

The injuries suffered as a result of electromagnetic weapons are typically
less severe than those injuries resulting from conventional weapons.
Although it is possible that a belligerent may be permanently injured or
killed as a result of the use of these weapons, there is no evidence that
the suffering experienced is greater then that experienced from conventional
weapons.


Acoustical Weapons

Nonlethal acoustical weapons also range from the mundane to the
extraordinary as described below.

High-intensity Sound. High-intensity sound sets the ear drum in motion.
These vibrations cause the inner ear to initiate nerve impulses that the
brain registers as sound.64 The inner ear regulates the spatial orientation
of the body. If the ear is subjected to high-intensity sound, the individual
may experience imbalance.65 Low-frequency, high-intensity sound may cause
other organs to resonate, causing a number of physiological results,
including death.66

The British use high-intensity sound as a means of riot control in Northern
Ireland. The Curdler is a device that emits a high "shrieking noise at
irregular intervals."67 The sound is emitted at levels lower than the pain
threshold.

The assessment of high-intensity sound as a legal weapon must be reviewed in
terms of "unnecessary suffering." If the acoustical weapon emits sounds
below the pain threshold, then unnecessary suffering is not an issue. If the
sound does inflict pain, the suffering must be balanced against military
necessity. It may be lawful to use high-intensity sound against an attacking
force, although some of the attackers may experience dis-orientation, pain,
or even death. As noted earlier when discussing the legality of blinding
soldiers, it is permissible to injure a combatant even with a wound that may
incapacitate the soldier for a period exceeding the term of the hostilities.
Combatants have been rendered deaf from conventional warfare, or have even
been disoriented from the confusion of the battle. The use of high-intensity
sound as a weapon to disorient, or to cause pain or death, does not
constitute unnecessary suffering.

However, acoustical weapons run the risk of being an indiscriminate weapon.
The release of highintensity sound would impose the same degree of damage on
the noncombatant as the combatant. It may be used only in circumstances in
which the damage to noncombatants is merely incidental in proportion to the
necessity of the military objective.

Infrasound. This is a powerful ultralow frequency (ULF) sonic weapon that
can penetrate buildings and vehicles and can be directional and tunable. As
a weapon infrasound, lowfrequency sound entails the same concerns as
highintensity sound. After being exposed to highintensity infrasound, a
subject suffers from disorientation and reduced ability to perform simple
sensorymotor tasks.68 At elevated levels, experimental animals cease
breathing temporarily.69 The principles and findings regarding highintensity
sound would apply to infrasound. The suffering would be no greater than that
experienced by conventional weapons. The suffering must be proportionate to
the military objectives. The sound must be applied so that damage to
noncombatants is incidental in light of the military objective.

Unfortunately, large banks of speakers are required to provide
directionality, and the power demands are enormous.70 Area denial is a very
plausible mission for such a device as the level of pain or damage increases
predictably as range decreases.

Sonic Bullets. These are packets of sonic energy that are propelled toward
the target. The Russians apparently have a portable device that can propel a
10-Hertz (Hz) sonic packet the size of a baseball hundreds of yards. When
employed against humans, the energy can be selected to result in nonlethal
or lethal damage.71 The sonic bullet uses direct sonic energy. If the energy
can be controlled so that it is used only against lawful combatants, the
concerns surrounding acoustical weapons may be reduced or eliminated.

Deference Tones. These are sophisticated arrays that can project a voice or
other sound to a particular location. The resulting sound can only be heard
at that particular location.72 Deference tones, a means of projecting sound,
would not directly cause injury upon the enemy. Its use must be in
accordance with the constraints of the law of armed conflict. For example,
if the tone is generating a sound such as an SOS signal, the enemy has an
obligation to respond to that sound. If the SOS sound is used to lure the
enemy to a place where they will be ambushed, such a use of the tone would
be perfidious and therefore illegal.


Informational Weapons

Recently, a new class of nonlethal weapons has drawn considerable interest
in defense circles as well as in international law. Two types of such
weapons are discussed below.

Voice Synthesis. This is the ability to clone a person's voice and broadcast
a synthesized message to a selected audience. The propaganda value of this
technique in our highly mediadependent world would be enormous. We currently
have the ability to control the broadcasts of foreign radio and television
stations by using orbiting platforms packed with electronic gear.

In considering whether it is legal to clone a persons voice in order to gain
a military advantage, it is important to determine whose voice is being
cloned. In most cases, it would be realistic to expect that the voice cloned
would be that of a political leader or a military officer. The cloned voice
might give orders to the enemy combatant that might prove detrimental to the
combatant. The combatant would most likely be under an obligation to follow
these orders. That obligation, however, is owed to his own chain of command
and is not under the law of armed conflict. Treacherous acts, those which
abuse an obligation to be truthful under the law of armed conflict, are
illegal. But if there is no obligation to be truthful under the law of armed
conflict, then the misinformation amounts to a lawful ruse. Morris
Greenspan, a prominent writer in the field of international law, notes that
examples of legitimate ruses are "making use of the enemy's signals, bugle
and trumpet calls, watchwords, and words of command."73 Giving orders by
voice is analogous to giving orders by bugle calls or signals. Cloning a
voice would not violate the law of armed conflict.

Computer Viruses. The ability to severely disrupt computer operations with
viruses has already been demonstrated by amateur American hackers. A more
sophisticated and professional effort might be that of being able to produce
viruses that can be injected into enemy hardware at long range.

When planning to disrupt computer operations, it is necessary to distinguish
whether the computers are military objectives. If they are civilian property
or their loss would impact only the civilian population, then they are not
legitimate targets. However, if the computers serve a dual use (for both the
civilian population and the military population), they may be considered
valid targets. The next step in the analysis calls for applying the rule of
proportionality to determine if the military advantage outweighs the impact
upon the civilian population.


Potential Policies

In this section we will discuss several possible scenarios for the
employment of nonlethal weapons. These include special operations missions
such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and peacemaking,
as well as more conventional forms of warfare. We will also examine the
potential for nonlethal weapons to lower or raise the threshold of war and
the issue of escalation.


Special Operations

Special operations forces typically operate in a highly volatile political
environment. They must often minimize the use of force if they intend to
complete the mission without alienating international as well as domestic
political players. Such alienation would make future missions much more
difficult.

Hostage Barricade Situation. One counterterrorism scenario that must be
resolved with a maximum degree of control is the hostage barricade
situation. The ideal nonlethal weapon for a hostage barricade situation
would be one that instantaneously and selectively disables the hostage
takers. Unfortunately, any feasible weapon would probably disable the
hostages as well. Therefore, any disabling effect should be controllable so
that the hostages could cooperate in their rescue. At the very least, if the
weapon is indiscriminate, the effect must not permanently injure the
hostages. The use of lasers to temporarily blind personnel could cause
permanent blind spots depending on range and weapon intensity. In the final
analysis, however, any nonlethal weapon must be judged against the normally
lethal alternatives. A typical hostage rescue operation involves a violent
plan that results in the death of the hostage takers and the rescue of the
hostages. The weapons employed are concussion grenades, flashbang devices,
and conventional small arms. The tactics involve the so-called "double
tap" - one bullet to the chest and one to the head. Even a well-executed
mission can result in the deaths of one or more hostages. The primary
potential usefulness of nonlethal weapons is the decreased chance of
lethality for the hostages and the possibility of increased safety for the
rescuers.

The worst-case hostage situation would involve an in extremis assault. This
would occur if the terrorists start executing hostages. In most situations,
the result would be an immediate and violent raid by special operations
forces to resolve the situation. The level of violence and lethality
acceptable in this circumstance would increase drastically. Ironically, this
might also be the situation most conducive to the use of nonlethal
technologies. If hostages are already dying, then the advantages of
instantaneously incapacitating everyone are obvious. Some unwanted permanent
injuries to hostages who would otherwise have surely died are probably
acceptable. In contrast, injuries to hostages that occur when rescuers
preempt the in extremis situation are inevitably attributed to the rescuers
and may not be acceptable.

Each hostage situation is so unique that one universal course of action
cannot be recommended. Variables include the condition of the hostages,
potential access by rescuers, the capabilities and proven intentions of the
terrorists, the use of deadman triggers, and other factors. The solution
seems to be the development and testing of a repertoire of possible
nonlethal technologies that gives the mission planner more options.
Cooperation with domestic law enforcement in the development of nonlethal
weapons could yield synergistic benefits for the resolution of hostage
situations.

Counterinsurgencies. The key to winning a counterinsurgency is winning the
hearts and minds of the affected population. In this scenario, any weapon
that reduces collateral damage to innocent people or property is
advantageous. Insurgents who are interspersed with innocent civilians are
especially hard to target. However, it is not even necessary or even
desirable to kill the insurgent in order to defeat him. Certain nonlethal
weapons might offer solutions to these tactically difficult situations. In
Vietnam, for example, the only options available to a patrol under fire from
a "friendly" village were (1) return fire and risk generating friendly
casualties, or (2) withdraw. Both options have the potential of further
alienating a largely friendly population. The ability to incapacitate the
insurgents would enable troops to sort out the good from the bad without
killing anyone. A secondary advantage of capturing an insurgent rather than
killing him is the intelligence that can be garnered from the prisoner, a
critical element in defeating an insurgency.

Some nonlethal technologies that offer promise in counterinsurgencies
include chemical defoliants and tear gasses, calmative agents, blinding
weapons, and acoustical weapons. Of course, as discussed earlier, the weapon
chosen must be a legal one. Additionally, such practical issues as
portability, training, and effectiveness must also be addressed before
relying on such weapons in the hands of troops facing a mortal enemy.
Insurgents might be emboldened and able to attract more (though less
dedicated) followers if they know that death is a very unlikely prospect.
The insurgency could deteriorate into a game in which the insurgents are
incapacitated and captured while counterinsurgents are killed.

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking. Peacekeeping and peacemaking are rapidly
expanding roles for special operations as well as conventional forces. The
use of minimal lethal force may be desirable in both situations. Nonlethal
technologies may offer some solutions. In Somalia, soldiers confronted with
a hostile crowd often had no options other than to fire upon the crowd.
Effective nonlethal crowd control techniques might have been used.

One potential role for nonlethal weapons in a peacemaking scenario would be
the ability to defeat the "iron sight." For example, in spite of all our
technological successes in countering infrared and electronic threats, we
have not developed a technique to defeat a lone sniper with a rifle, or a
radar precision guided (RPG) or other optically guided weapon. Small numbers
of snipers can wreak havoc on an entire city as they did in Sarajevo. They
can also bring down helicopters as they did in Mogadishu, and they can also
destroy the morale of a normally effective combat force. Lasers might offer
an effective means of point defense and could even be used to counter
snipers. For example, a relatively simple laser device strapped on a
helicopter could be scanned to blind anyone looking in the direction of the
aircraft. Likewise, a laser scanned around a compound or guard shack could
blind anyone attempting to target the site. Indeed, by using the unique
optical reflection signature from the back of the eye, a low power laser
could be used to locate anyone persistently looking at a specific target.74
A human operator (or an automated system) could then decide whether to
target the detected signature with a higherpowered laser weapon or even a
lethal weapon. Disadvantages of this sophisticated antisniper device include
possible indiscriminate targeting, adjustment of power levels to account for
environmental conditions, and the possibility that the laser itself may
provide a more sophisticated enemy with an emission source that could be
targeted.

The role of peacekeeping (as opposed to peacemaking) troops does not
generally involve combat. Many UN observers are required to be unarmed.
Perhaps nonlethal weapons could be used to aid in separating warring
factions or as antisniper devices to protect the peacekeepers.


Conventional Warfare

Nonlethal weapons can also be used in conventional conflicts.
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons can be used to disable grounded aircraft
or vehicles rendering them useless on a temporary or even permanent basis.
These weapons can also be used to down airborne aircraft although this would
hardly be considered nonlethal. One key to effective warfighting doctrine is
to attack an enemy's critical nodes of command and communications as well as
other infrastructures. While smart weapons can attack specific complexes and
bunkers, nonlethal weapons offer the opportunity to disable entire nodes on
a much grander scale. For example, the remote injection of a computer virus
into an enemy's command and control system could be devastating. Likewise,
certain biological agents that are designed to attack silicon or other
computer components could effectively destroy computerized warfighting
equipment. Super caustics can be sprayed on roads to deteriorate tank tracks
and truck tires. Antitraction compounds can render mountain roads
impassable, and embrittlement compounds could be sprayed on virtually any
mechanical device -- rendering them ineffective over a period of time.
Combustion alteration technology agents could be used to shut down an entire
harbor or airfield. Of course, practical matters such as method of delivery,
persistence, concentration, and efficiency of these agents versus more
lethal weapons must be considered.

One advantage for using nonlethal technologies in combat is the possibility
of reducing fratricide. Nonlethal weaponry that disables a tank rather than
killing it enables friendly forces the option of "shooting first and asking
questions later." Additionally, nonlethal weapons such as acoustical and
laser devices might offer good point defense options for high security
areas, further reducing the chances of fratricide.


Threshold of War

Raising the threshold of war is a consistent overarching goal of most arms
control negotiations. In light of the fact that many hostile countries
possess weapons of mass destruction, quick escalation from rhetoric to
shooting could prove disastrous. Indeed, conventional weapons in the hands
of fairly skilled armed forces often result in significant casualties.
Therefore, a primary concern in the employment of nonlethal weapons is the
possibility that they might lower the threshold of war. What one country
might consider a "normal" economic sanction, another country might consider
an act of war. Even if such a sanction was not considered an act of war, it
could, nonetheless, provide a path for escalation. National sensitivities
and vulnerabilities are too variable to accurately predict a response to the
employment of a particular nonlethal weapon. For example, if a third world
country brought down our stock exchange and electronic funds transfer system
with a computer virus, we may consider this an act of war. The world
community, however, would probably condemn us if we retaliated with lethal
weapons-perhaps our only option against a less-developed society.

The most tempting use of some nonlethal weapons would be in the area of
clandestine operations. With computer viruses, for example, an attacking
country would almost certainly enjoy plausible (if not total) deniability.
In some cases, the targeted country might never realize they were attacked
at all. For example, a liquid metal embrittlement agent introduced
clandestinely in an industrial plant could cause a catastrophic failure that
might be attributed to normal wear and fatigue. Clandestine operations of
this type might muddy the international waters to the point that nobody
knows when or by whom they are being attacked.


Conclusion

Nonlethal weapons offer new possibilities in warfare, especially in the
arena of special operations. However, it is not an unlimited exercise. Each
newly developed weapon must be designed and used in compliance with
international law. We must then consider the practicalities of the weapon's
use. Nonlethal weapons show promise, but they are not bringing us to a new
golden age of warfare. Carl von Clausewitz lambasted the idea of nonlethal
warfare outright when he remarked,

"Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody
slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect
to War, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees
from feelings of humanity, until some one steps in with one that is sharp
and lops off the arm from our body."75

Likewise, Robert E. Lee remarked during the Battle of Fredericksburg, "It is
well war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it."76 The
condottieri largely avoided terrible battles and thus apparently grew fond
enough of war to elevate it to a game. Modern nations might also be tempted
to engage in a game of nonlethal warfare only to see it escalate to
something much more terrible.

Notes

1. Joseph Jay Deiss, Captains of Fortune: Profiles of Six Italian
Condottiere (New York: Crowell, 1967), 28. Contemporary scholars almost
universally agree that Machiavelli's contempt for the mercenaries caused him
to exaggerate the nonlethality of their encounters. Nevertheless, many
engagements were indeed devoid of significant casualties. See also Geoffrey
Trease, The Condotteri: Soldiers of Fortune (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1971), 18-22.

2 .Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 77.

3. "NIJ Initiative on LessThanLethal Weapons," National Institute of Justice
Research in Brief, March 1993.

4. "NonLethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility." Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 7 December 1992, 50.

5. Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer
Publications, 1991), 12.

6. The Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29
July 1899 (hereinafter cited as Hague 1899), in Treaty Series (TS) 403
(Washington, D.C.: US Department of State), and the Regulations Annexed to
Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18
October 1907 (hereinafter cited as Hague 1907).

7. Following are these conventions, which can be found as noted in Treaties
and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) (Washington, D.C.: US Department
of State, 1956): Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, TIAS
3362. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick and Shipwrecked Members, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3363. Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949,
TIAS 3363. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3365.

8. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 8 June 1977
(hereinafter Protocol I), in Dietrich Schindler, The Laws of Armed Conflict:
A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents (Rockville,
Md.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981), The United States has not ratified
Protocol I.

9. These include the following agreements: The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925 (hereinafter Gas Protocol),
in United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 26
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 571 (26 UST 571),
TIAS 8061. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, 10 April 1972, 26 UST 583, TIAS 8062. Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, 10 December 1976 (hereinafter ENMOD), 31 UST 333,
TIAS 9614. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179. Protocol on
Non Detectable Fragments, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179. Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps, and Other
Devices, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179. Protocol on the Use of
Incendiary Weapons, in Schindler, 179.

10. Gerhard von Glahn, Law among Nations: An Introduction to Public
International Law (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 17-22.

11. Article VI, Section 2.

12. Von Glahn, 12-23.

13. Maj William J. Neinast, "United States Use of Biological Warfare,"
Military Law Review 24 (1964): 17.

14. United States v. List et al., in Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. XI, The High Command Case; The Hostage
Case (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1950), 1253.

15. United States v. Krupp, Ibid., vol. IX, The Krupp Case, 1433-48.

16. Jean Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims
(Rockville, Md.: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1985), 28-29.

17. Ibid.

18. Hague 1907, Preamble.

19. Judith Gail Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in International Law,"
American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 391; and Brown, "The
Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare," Cornell
International Law Journal 10 (1976): 134.

20. G. J. Adler, "Targets in War: Legal Considerations," University of
Houston Law Review 8 (1970): 1, 17-18.

21. Hague 1907.

22. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 11031, International Law: The Conduct of Armed
Conflict and Air Operations, November 1976, par. 63(b)(2).

23. Ibid., par. 53(b).

24. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, vol. 1
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992), 9.

25. Hague 1907, art. 27. See also Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954.

26. Hague 1907, art. 23 (a).

27. Ibid., art. 23 (b).

28. Ibid., art. 23 (f).

29. Ibid.

30. Assassination is considered a treacherous act. See Patricia Zengel,
"Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict," Military Law Review 134
(1991): 123.

31. W. F. Biddle, Weapons Technology and Arms Control (New York: Praeger,
1972), 281.

32. Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Law and Armed
Conflict (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992), 245.

33. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of
Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Study of the Historical, Technical,
Military, Legal, and Political Aspects of CBW, and Possible Disarmament
Measures, vol. 4, CB Disarmament Negotiations (New York: Humanities Press,
1971-1975), 268. Hereinafter cited as CBW Negotiations.

34. Neinast, 9.

35. CBW Negotiations, 270.

36. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, defines genocide to mean any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethical, racial, or religious group such as: a. killing members of
the group; b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; or e. forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group See United Nations
Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 78 (New York: Secretariat of the United Nations,
1951), 280.

37. Harald Mhuller and Richard Kokoski, The NonProliferation Treaty:
Political and Technical Prospects and Dangers in 1990 (Stockholm: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, c. 1990).

38. CBW Negotiations, 270.

39. Hugh D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons: The Scientific Background (New
York: Cambridge University Press), 18.

40. Ibid.

41.Ibid.

42.CBW Negotiations, 23; and W. Hays Parks, "Classification of Chemical
Biological Warfare," University of Toledo Law Review 13 (1982): 1168.

43.Ibid., 285. The use of herbicides must be in accordance with the 1977
Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD). The convention requires that
parties not engage in modifications being widespread (an area of several
hundred square kilometers), be long lasting (a period of months or
approximately a season or more, or have severe effects (serious or
significant disruption or harm to life, nature, or economy).

44. Executive Order 11,850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical
Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 8 April 1976.

45. The Gas Protocol lacked any verification or enforcement means. Chemical
weapons have been used a number of times, including by the Italians against
the Ethiopians, by the Japanese against the Chinese, and by the Soviets
against the Afghans. Phillip Louis Reizenstein, "Chemical Biological
Weapons: Recent Legal Developments," Brooklyn Journal of International Law
95 (1986): 105.

46. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 156 UN Doc.
CD/500, 8 April 1974.

47.Crone, 80-81.

48.Paul R. Evancoe, "NonLethal Technology Enhances Warriors Punch," National
Defense, December 1993, 28.

49.Ibid.

50.Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Antipersonnel Weapons
(London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), 203.

53.Ibid.

54.Ibid.

55.Ibid.

56.Bengt Anderberg and Myron L. Wolbarsht, Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New
Military Age (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 207.

57.Ibid., 209-12.

58.Ibid.

59.Ibid.

60.Ibid., 211.

61. "Memorandum of Law: The Use of Lasers as Antipersonnel Weapons," The
Army Lawyer, November 1988, 3.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Antipersonnel Weapons, 203.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 204.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Evancoe, 28.

71. "NonLethal Weapons Offer New SO/LIC Capabilities," Tactical
Technologies, 3 February 1993, 5; and "Russians Continue Work on
Sophisticated Acoustic Weaponry, " Defense Electronics 26 (March 1995): 12.

72. Ibid.

73. Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1959), 317-22.

74. This phenomenon can be observed using visible light. Anyone who has
spotlighted a deer or a cat in their headlights has witnessed this
retroreflection in the form of glowing eyes.

75. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Baltimore, Md.:
Penguin Books, 1968), 345.

76. Quoted in Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography, In vol. 2
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), 462.


______


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air
University. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government,
Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.




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