-Caveat Lector- Investigators Now Focusing on Lee's Ties to Taiwan By Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, December 24, 2000 ; Page A03 Former Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee has told the FBI that he was a paid consultant in the late 1980s and early 1990s to a Taiwanese businessman who later helped arrange for him to spend four weeks at Taiwan's leading military research center, according to sources close to the investigation. That same businessman also paid for Lee's air travel to Taiwan in December 1998, when Lee made a second, shorter visit to the military research center, the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), the sources said. The disclosure of the consulting arrangement with and travel assistance from the unnamed businessman – a resident alien who has since returned to Taiwan – has prompted the FBI to review Lee's links to his country of birth and, in particular, his ties to Chung Shan. The institute 25 miles southwest of Taipei, Taiwan's capital, allegedly was involved in past efforts by Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons. Lee has told investigators that while at Chung Shan for four weeks in April and May 1998, he gave talks and "consulted on matters related to unclassified computer codes" for which he received "a modest fee of less than $5,000," according to a person familiar with the case. Lee did not report the payment from Chung Shan to officials at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1998, as lab rules required, according to government sources. Lee made the disclosures during 10 days of closed-door questioning under oath by the FBI. He cooperated in the questioning, which ended on Dec. 12, as part of a plea bargain reached in September. In return for pleading guilty to a single felony count of mishandling classified information, he was released from jail after nine months in solitary confinement. He was also given immunity from further prosecution, as long as he tells the truth. Lee initially had been targeted in 1996 by FBI agents and Energy Department investigators looking into alleged espionage by the People's Republic of China. The focus then was on two trips he took to Beijing and meetings he held with Chinese nuclear scientists. Now, however, the government is exploring the possibility that Lee may have accumulated a virtual library of nuclear weapons secrets from computers at Los Alamos with the intention of assisting Taiwan, which has long feared an invasion or missile attack from the communist mainland. Lee, a naturalized U.S. citizen who worked at Los Alamos from 1979 through 1999, has never been charged with espionage and adamantly denies passing classified information to any foreign government. His attorney, Mark Holscher, said there was nothing improper about Lee's trips to Taiwan, where Lee's two sisters live and which he has visited roughly a dozen times over the past 25 years, according to recently compiled government records. Before his visits to Chung Shan, Holscher said, "Dr. Lee received laboratory approval and clearance to go to Taiwan for unclassified speech and consulting." Holscher also expressed frustration with what he views as unscrupulous leaks aimed at tarring his client. He noted that the FBI questioning is supposed to be confidential. "It is perplexing and deeply concerning to us that anonymous government sources are inaccurately describing approved, unclassified visits," he said. Senior Clinton administration officials, including FBI Director Louis J. Freeh and Attorney General Janet Reno, have said the goal of the questioning is to determine why Lee downloaded the equivalent of 400,000 pages of nuclear data from computers at Los Alamos to pocket-sized tapes and to find out exactly what became of those tapes. Sources previously disclosed that Lee told the FBI he threw the tapes into a trash bin at the national laboratory in New Mexico in January 1999. FBI agents then dug through tons of garbage in the Los Alamos County landfill. They failed to turn up any of the Lee tapes, although they did find others from the lab. Officials said last week that they may renew the search of the landfill. Up to now, they said, the government has no physical evidence to prove or disprove Lee's account. Lee celebrated his 61st birthday, and his freedom, at a party this weekend paid for by 500 friends and supporters in California's Silicon Valley. His supporters contend that he was unfairly singled out for investigation by the FBI and the Energy Department because of his ethnicity. Although nuclear secrets allegedly obtained by China could have come from any of hundreds of defense plants or government offices, they say, overzealous investigators focused exclusively on Los Alamos and Lee. While acknowledging serious mistakes in the investigation and prosecution of Lee, government officials and FBI counterintelligence agents still do not believe they have gotten to the bottom of the matter. As information continues to emerge, both sides in this long and bitter struggle tend to see each new bit of evidence as confirming their prior view of Lee as either a victim of government persecution or a national security threat. One significant change, however, is the FBI's interest in Taiwan. Although for four years the FBI concentrated on Lee's possible connections with mainland Chinese scientists, he has had much tighter familial and professional bonds with Taiwan. In 1984, after he was recorded by the FBI talking on the phone with a fellow Taiwanese American scientist under investigation for espionage, Lee admitted to the bureau he had delivered to Taiwanese representatives in Washington documents about U.S. nuclear reactors that were unclassified but not for distribution to foreign officials. He also told the FBI that in the early 1980s, Taiwanese government representatives called him asking questions about nuclear problems. The FBI never passed that information to Los Alamos security officials, although "it would have raised flags about him and perhaps cost him his [security] clearance," said Edward J. Curran, the recently retired head of counterintelligence at the Energy Department. The Taiwanese government, which is friendly to the United States and works hard to maintain supporters in Congress, denies that it is trying to develop nuclear weapons or that it engages in espionage in America. James Lilley, a former U.S. representative in Taiwan as well as CIA station chief and ambassador in China, said he did not believe that the Taiwanese government "as a policy" would try to steal U.S. nuclear secrets. "But I don't rule out some guy on their side doing it," he said. In 1969, about five years after mainland China's first nuclear test, Taiwan made its first known attempt to acquire the ability to reprocess nuclear fuel into weapons material. The United States intervened to foil that effort. But the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing under President Richard M. Nixon in the early 1970s spurred Taiwan to try again to acquire plutonium, according to Andrew Mack, an Australian expert on Taiwan's nuclear program. In 1976, under U.S. pressure, Taiwan agreed to stop reprocessing spent fuel from a Canadian-supplied research reactor. Then, in 1982, Taiwan sought to acquire reprocessing technology from France; the United States intervened again. Six years later, Col. Chang Hsien-Yi, who had been deputy director of the nuclear energy laboratory at the Chung Shan Institute and an asset for the CIA, was secreted out of Taiwan. Once in the United States, he disclosed that Taiwan had secretly been building a plutonium separation facility. U.S. officials pressed Taiwan to close it down. Mack has said it would be difficult for Taiwan to build a nuclear weapon in secret today because its facilities are inspected by the International Atomic Energy Administration. But some U.S. experts believe Taiwan might use the ability to build nuclear weapons as leverage to obtain other weapons from the United States, such as early-warning systems, submarines or destroyers. In July 1995, right after China test-fired missiles into nearby waters, Taiwan's then-President Lee Teng-hui told the country's national assembly: "We should restudy the question [of nuclear weapons] from a long-term point of view. . . . Everyone knows we had the plan before." A few days later, Lee responded to pressure from the United States and said that although his country "has the ability to develop nuclear weapons," it would not do so. Chung Shan, which has 11,000 employees, is Taiwan's equivalent of Los Alamos, a laboratory that works on many types of weapons. "With its ultimate goals of achieving self-reliance on national defense, CSIST is committed to the pursuit of the state-of-the-art technologies and to the development of next-generation weapon systems in close cooperation with industry, government, academic and research communities," says Lt. Gen. Chen Yu-wu, Chung Shan's president, in the institute's brochure. In his recent questioning by the FBI, Lee said Los Alamos officials approved his month-long stay at Chung Shan in April and May 1998. The lab, however, did not inform the Energy Department's counterintelligence office. "We never had a chance to cover what he may have done," one investigator said. On his return from the Taiwanese institute, Lee mentioned at a security debriefing that the trip was paid for by a friend who owned a company that had connections with Chung Shan. But he did not disclose that he had received a consulting fee from Chung Shan itself, the sources said. In December 1998, Lee again traveled to Taiwan, mostly on personal business: He was taking back a nephew who had developed a drug problem in Los Angeles, according to sources close to the case. The Taiwanese businessman again paid for the tickets, and Lee made a quick stop at Chung Shan, where he spoke at a luncheon, the sources said. Not long after his return, he was given a polygraph exam as part of the FBI's espionage investigation. Because the FBI was focused on China, he was never asked questions about Taiwan during this "lie detector" test. Although the name of the businessman has not been made public, part of the connection is known. Lee filed reports at Los Alamos in 1989 and 1990 saying he was consulting for a company called Intelligent Systems Integration Inc., which had an office in Albuquerque. Intelligent Systems listed itself as a "foreign corporation" when it registered in the late 1980s in New Mexico and California. Records indicate it surrendered its U.S. registration in January 1990. Investigators are still puzzling over an incident in May 1998, when Lee used a computer at Chung Shan to try to gain remote access to the classified computer system at Los Alamos. When that access was denied, Lee used his password to get into his personal, unsecured computer files, according to court testimony earlier this year. In his recent questioning, Lee told the FBI that there were some classified files in the directory he accessed from Chung Shan. But he said he extracted only unclassified data. At Lee's bail hearing earlier this year, an FBI agent testified that Lee's entry into his computer directory from Chung Shan left an electronic trail that could have allowed a computer expert to steal his password and gain access to all his files. The final step in the government's inquiry, under the terms of Lee's plea agreement, is for him to take another polygraph exam "sometime after Christmas," according to a government source. Unless the government can prove to a judge's satisfaction that Lee has broken the agreement by lying, he cannot be prosecuted again. 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