-Caveat Lector- From: Carol Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Peace list from <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Nuclear War Op-Ed Washington Post Date: Thursday, May 27, 1999 3:36 PM Invitation to Nuclear Disaster By Michael Krepon Tuesday, May 25, 1999; Page A15 Unless concerted action is taken soon to reduce nuclear dangers, conditions will be coming into place for a dreadful accident, incident or even a nuclear detonation of Russian origin. The problems posed by Chinese nuclear espionage pale in comparison with the dangers inherent in Russia's domestic plight, its aging arsenal, stressed-out command and control and lax export controls. Moreover, the current U.S. nuclear posture exacerbates current dangers by requiring the deployment of 6,000 nuclear weapons, approximately half of which are on hair-trigger alert. Russia, whose GNP is now the size of Belgium's (and falling), cannot match U.S. nuclear force levels. Over the next decade, deployed Russian nuclear weapons on strategic forces may well dip below 1,000 -- six times below the number allowed by the START II treaty, which has been held hostage by the Russian Duma since January 1993. At present the Kremlin retains as many of its nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert as possible. This is done to compensate for weaknesses in Russia's conventional forces, for gaping holes in the old Soviet early warning network and for the vast launch readiness of U.S. nuclear forces. Independent estimates suggest that Russia maintains in excess of 3,000 nuclear warheads in very high states of launch readiness. This is a recipe for disaster. The CIA's unclassified assessment of the "fail-safeness" of Russian command and control is not reassuring. Although the CIA says nuclear safety is not a concern as long as current security procedures and systems are in place, stresses in the Russian command and control system are growing, and are aggravated by the high launch readiness of U.S. nuclear forces. In January 1995 Russian forces mistook a scientific rocket launched from Norway for a U.S. attack, thus activating President Boris Yeltsin's nuclear "suitcase." In September 1998 a deranged Russian sailor killed seven of his shipmates and barricaded himself inside the torpedo bay of his nuclear attack submarine. Security forces recaptured the boat, which may or may not have had nuclear weapons on board. In September 1998, a guard at a facility holding 30 tons of plutonium shot other guards and then escaped, heavily armed. The list of incidents of this kind in Russia that we know about is chilling. How does the U.S. maintenance of 6,000 deployed nuclear weapons, half on hair-trigger alert, help this country deal with such dangers? With Russian forces projected to decline dramatically over the next decade, what useful purpose is served by maintaining bloated nuclear arsenals at such high states of launch readiness? While U.S. nuclear forces have been downsized with the end of the Cold War, U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting requirements have changed relatively little. We still maintain massive attack options, with the potential for many hundreds of nuclear detonations. We still place Russia's crumbling industrial capacity "at risk," even though these factories have become liabilities rather than assets for the Kremlin. We still maintain forces at very high launch readiness, even though there is no longer a doctrinal requirement to launch quickly in the event of a Russian nuclear attack. Capitol Hill has barely addressed the dangers inherent in interlocking U.S. and Russian nuclear postures. Extensive targeting lists and high Russian alert rates reinforce high U.S. alert rates. This vicious circle will be extremely dangerous as strains on Russian command and control continue to grow. As long as the U.S. strategic posture involves keeping our nuclear guns out of their holsters with the triggers cocked, there is no chance whatever of persuading Russia to take its dangerous and aging nuclear missiles off hair-trigger alert. These nuclear dangers are badly compounded by congressional insistence that the United States maintain a force level of 6,000 deployed warheads -- the maximum allowed under START I -- until the 1993 START II accord finally enters into force. In this way, national decisions on the proper size of U.S. strategic forces are determined by the most retrograde delegates of the Russian Duma, who have blocked ratification of START II. What could the United States conceivably do with 6,000 deployed nuclear warheads in the post-Cold War era? Why is it in the national security interest of the United States to wait for action by Russia's unpredictable and erratic legislature before taking new initiatives to reduce nuclear dangers? Doesn't it make more sense to accelerate the process of deep reductions now? Sen. Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.) has a better idea than waiting for the Duma. He would strike the legislative requirement to remain at 6,000 deployed weapons and proceed instead with parallel, reciprocal, verifiable reductions. Without accelerated reductions and new initiatives, such as a stand-down of alert nuclear forces, we invite tragedies on a massive scale. The writer is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center. © Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company Distributed under fair use--or sue me quick before the inevitable nuke war.... DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! 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