From: "Alex Hamilton", [EMAIL PROTECTED] Steve, In connection with last Sunday's article about the Gulf Syndrome, I attended a dinner in London on Tuesday the purpose of which was to promote Ann Prentice's (Journalist - The Times) book "One woman's war" in which she writes about her work and experiences in Serbia and Kosovo during and after the bombing. In her speech after dinner, she described all the classic symptoms of exposure to Depleted Uranium:_ 1) High death rate amongst the people employed on clearing the bomb sites - mostly the young. 2) Incidence of respiratory diseases 3) 25% increase in Cancers and 20% increase in child Leukaemia 4) Crops not growing "right" You might be interested in an extract from a long report on toxic weapons reproduced below. You will find a map in the attachment - unfortunately my OCR software cannot deal with graphics. It is clear that the US government does not care about their troops, but the point is that ours are there too!!! Regards, Alex APPENDIX A - DU USE IN Kosovo AND SERBIA During the 1999 war between NATO air forces and Yugoslav ground troops, American A-10 aircraft fired 37,550 rounds of all typed 30mm ammunition. (USAF, 2000). Assuming each A- 10 carried a standard combat mix of 5 DU rounds with 1 high explosive incendiary (HEI) round, approximately 31,300 depleted uranium rounds were shot. Each 30mm round contains a depleted uranium penetrator weighing 0.302 kg or 0.66 lb. (Fahey, 1998: 198). Therefore, US forces released approximately 9,453 kg (9.5 metric tons) or 20,658 lb. (10.3 tons) of depleted uranium during the war. Following the end of NATO's bombing campaign, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) (UNCHS) formed the Balkans Task Force (BTF) to assess the impacts of the war. (UNEP/UNCHS, 1999). Within the Balkans Task Force, an inter-agency 'Desk Assessment Group' was assembled to investigate the use of depleted uranium munitions. The Desk Assessment Group's investigation was hindered by NATO's refusal to confirm the quantities and locations of depleted uranium expenditure. (UNEP/UNCHS, 1999: 61). Consequently, the group was reduced to conducting a review of published literature and making assessments based on hypothetical exposure scenarios. The Desk Assessment Group noted that people in the immediate vicinity of a DU attack could be heavily exposed to DU by inhalation. This is confirmed by US Air Force testing showing that "findings of past air sampling efforts revealed contamination was localized to within 300 to 400 feet (90 to 120 m) of the [A-10] target area." (Nellis, 1998: 3-9). Claims that the release of depleted uranium in Kosovo resulted in vastly increased rates of radioactivity in the air in Bulgaria or Greece are highly improbable. Following the release of the Balkans Task Force report in October 1999, Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan wrote to NATO requesting details about the use of depleted uranium during Operation Allied Force. Five months later, NATO responded that A-l0's shot depleted uranium during approximately 100 missions. "At this moment it is impossible to state accurately every location where DU ammunition was used," states Lord George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, in the letter to Kofi Annan. (NATO, 2000). A NATO map released with the letter to Kofi Annan identifies 28 locations in Kosovo where A-10's are believed to have released depleted uranium (see attachment). (NATO, 2000). However, it is likely that A-l0' s also shot depleted uranium at Yugoslav forces in Serbia, though no locations outside the borders of Kosovo are identified on the NATO map. The Balkans Task Force apparently did not make much of an effort to look for or find depleted uranium, but Christian Science Monitor journalist Scott Peterson found depleted uranium in Djakovica, Kosovo and reported its discovery in Vranje and Bujanovac, Serbia. (Peterson, 1999). The Balkans Task Force convened a meeting of experts on March 20, 2000 in Geneva, Switzerland to discuss the NATO letter and map. Those gathered at the meeting agreed to give the following recommendations: 1. Inform any organizations concerned about the recommendations of the BTF Desk Study on DU. With the given information, the earlier recommendations, based on precautionary principles are still valid. 2. The expert group concluded that for several reasons it would be useful to continue the investigations on the health and environmental impacts of DU in Kosovo. However, the information obtained so far will not allow appropriate preparations into a necessary field study. 3. A follow-up of the BTF Desk Study should be organized with good inter-agency co-operation and should be conducted in a way as to safeguard independent and reliable results. Success in the study requires smooth collaboration with military organizations and UN organizations in Kosovo. 4. A field mission should be carefully prepared and would require considerable resources and commitment from several UN agencies. 5. Based on the nature of the potential DU-contamination, the field mission should be organized as soon as possible in order to achieve reliable results. 6. A field mission should start from measuring the places indicated as targeted areas during the NATO operation. Consequently, the need for further assessment of health and other investigations would then be assessed. 7. Though the urgency of the issue and organizations' willingness was made clear, a political decision from UN headquarters on the future steps would be necessary. (UNEP, 2000). In accordance with the recommendations made in the Balkans Task Force's 1999 report, measures should be taken to prevent access and clean up contaminated material at places where contamination is confirmed. (UNEP/UNCHS, 1999: 76). Local authorities and civilian populations should be informed of the possible risks and appropriate precautionary measures. (UNEP, 2000(a)). Finally, "appropriately designed health examination programmes should be established" in areas where civilians may have encountered DU contamination. (UNEP/UNCHS, 1999: 77). Since NATO declared that it fought the war in Kosovo to protect civilian populations from internal and external harm, it is reasonable to expect NATO, and specifically the United States, to accept responsibility for cleaning up depleted uranium contamination. The steps for such an effort have already been established at Nellis Air Force Range in Nevada, where A-10 pilots practice their skills. Contaminated tanks in the storage area at the Nellis range "are properly labeled with clearly visible warning signs indicating 'Caution: Radioactive Material."' (Nellis, 1998: 3-9). Some tanks are decontaminated and returned to target service, but the tanks that cannot be decontaminated "will ultimately be disposed of either as low-level waste in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20... or shipped to a licensed facility for treatment, smelting, and recycling. These tanks and debris would be loaded into sealed shipping containers on site and transported to the landfill or recycling facility by truck or rail, as appropriate, by a licensed contractor" (Ibid.). Out on the firing range, "trained technicians will manually remove visible DU rounds and fragments from the target area." (Nellis, 1998: 3-8). "Every five years, surface and subsurface DU rounds and fragments will be removed... Tilled soil and upturned materials will be inspected by EOD personnel and fed into a hopper for sorting... These operations will remove the DU source material on the surface, as well as those expected to be in the upper subsurface." (Ibid.: 3-9). Approximately 25% of the rounds shot by an A-10 bit their target. The physical form of the DU on the Nellis range varies from oxidized particulates mixed with sand, to fragments and intact penetrators within an approximately 300 to 400 foot (90-120 m) radius of the tank targets. (Nellis, 1998: 2-4). In general, the amount of contamination decreases as the distance from the target increases. "DU penetrators have been seen for many feet beyond the 300 to 400 foot radius and, due to overshot, are expected to be present and isolated in the soil for possibly over 1,000 feet (300 m) past the targets." (Ibid.). At Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, where depleted uranium ammunition is also tested, areas with the potential for increased soil contamination "are not accessible to the general public." (FR, 1999: 64(240)). "Depleted uranium fragments are collected after tests and additional measures are taken to remove any contamination from the soil." (Ibid.). The end of the air war over NATO brought the return of tens of thousands of ethnic Albanian people to Kosovo. Relief agencies and military forces from the United States, Russia, England, France, Holland, Germany, Italy, Canada and other nations accompanied the refugees back into Kosovo. When the movement of people back into Kosovo began, the British National Radiological Board issued a depleted uranium advisory to British citizens which warned them to avoid entering areas where DU was suspected of having been used. (NRPB, 1999). In contrast to the action of the British government, the United States did not even warn or train the soldiers and Marines sent into Kosovo on peacekeeping operations. The General Accounting Office recently stated that "Army and Marine Corps officials in Washington, DC and Europe were unable to tell us whether Army and Marine Corps troops who recently deployed to Kosovo had received DU training prior to or during the deployment." (GAO, 2000: 19). This is emblematic of the Pentagon's approach to DU training: public affairs keeps saying training is taking place, but they can seldom provide any supporting evidence. It is unclear whether any soldiers or Marines in Kosovo have been medically tested following known or suspected exposures to depleted uranium. The Army's Office of the Surgeon General refused to comment when asked whether any soldiers have been tested for a depleted uranium exposure since 1991 .~ Unlike their American counterparts, Dutch soldiers in Kosovo have not only been trained about DU, but also tested following a known exposure incident. In a letter to the Dutch Soldiers Trade Union, the Dutch Ministry of Defence confirmed that six soldiers from the Explosive Device Removal Service were tested after finding and keeping one 30mm DU penetrator. (DMD, 2000). No elevated uranium concentration was found in the urine of any of the six soldiers. The Dutch Ministry of Defence should be commended for caring enough about its soldiers to medically test them following an exposure to DU. Someday, perhaps, the U.S. Department of Defense will show as much concern for the health and well being of its fighting forces as its counterpart in the Netherlands. The United States Department of Defense has clearly demonstrated the impossibility of using depleted uranium munitions in a responsible manner. The Pentagon fails to warn civilian populations in Iraq, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia about the release of depleted uranium. Relief agencies and United Nations inquiries receive vague information long after DU is released. The Pentagon oversees cleanup of depleted uranium at selected locations in the United States, but refuses to accept responsibility for DU shot on many domestic and foreign lands. American fighting forces receive scant training about DU's hazards, and no testing of active duty forces is apparently taking place. Marine Corps pilots "accidentally" fire DU rounds in Japan and Vieques, Puerto Rico. If the Pentagon can not take responsibility for health and environmental consequences associated with the use of depleted uranium munitions, then perhaps they should not be allowed to use it. Unfortunately, elected U.S. representatives with the courage and fortitude to confront the Pentagon about its reckless use of DU munitions are as rare as a snowstorm in July. Depleted uranium penetrators are now in the arsenals of many nations who purchase weapons from the United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan, though some nations including Canada and Germany have foresworn the use of depleted uranium. In the Middle East, virtually every nation except Iraq has depleted uranium ammunition in its arsenal. In the future, large numbers of soldiers and civilians may be exposed to depleted uranium, and nations already impoverished by war may face the additional burden of long-term health care for exposed populations living on contaminated lands. Depleted uranium is a weapon whose time has come, and gone. * Virginia Stefanokis, Public Affairs officer for the Army's Office of the Surgeon General (703.681.8022), did not respond to this request. -- This is pretty biased, it is hardly surprising that soldiers aren't tested for DU exposure when the effects of DU exposure are still being argued about. Steve. Cybershooters website: http://www.cybershooters.org List admin: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ T O P I C A The Email You Want. http://www.topica.com/t/16 Newsletters, Tips and Discussions on Your Favorite Topics
