----- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ----- From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2005 18:19:18 -0400 To: Ip Ip <ip@v2.listbox.com> Subject: [IP] more on USG RFI for "metrics" on the 'terror war' X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Begin forwarded message: From: Lee Tien <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: October 4, 2005 5:47:42 PM EDT To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [IP] more on USG RFI for "metrics" on the 'terror war' I'm sure the military folks on the list can suggest better sources. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Warfare." International Security, vol. 26, no. 1, Summer 2001, pp. 93-128. Paul, T. V. Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Miles, Franklin B. Asymmetrical Warfare: An Historical Perspective. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1999. See generally http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/asymmetric.html Lee At 5:25 PM -0400 10/4/05, David Farber wrote: >Begin forwarded message: > >From: "Robert C. Atkinson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Date: October 4, 2005 4:32:01 PM EDT >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: [IP] USG RFI for "metrics" on the 'terror war' > > >Regarding the statement that: > > > >> the continuing belief that a conventional high- tech army >> can defeat a low-tech insurgency (something that has not happened >>in Western >> history to my knowledge)... >> >> > >Things aren't quite that bad: there have been "successes" such as > >- the British and then US "pacification" of North America >(the United States and Canada) and the whole western hemisphere for >that matter) >- the British "pacification" of South Africa, Australia and >New Zealand >- the United States in the Philippine Insurrection at turn >of the 20th century >- British suppression of insurgents in Malaya after WWII? >- British suppression of the Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s >- British suppression of the IRA in Northern Ireland > >And in "Western history" Rome's high tech army (for its time) >defeated insurgencies throughout the centuries of the Roman Empire. >There are probably plenty of other examples that historians can >offer. In this day and age, the important thing is to understand >why high tech armies sometimes lose to low-tech insurgencies? My >guess is that the willingness of the high-tech army's "homefront" >to sustain the cost and horror of a long, drawn-out counter- >insurgency (including periodic tactical defeats such as Tet in the >Vietnam) is a very important factor in the longterm success or >failure of the high-tech army. >Thanks > >Bob > > > >David Farber wrote: > > > >> >> >> Begin forwarded message: >> >> From: Richard Forno <rforno@infowarrior.org> >> Date: October 4, 2005 2:45:23 PM EDT >> To: Infowarrior List <infowarrior@g2-forward.org> >> Cc: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> Subject: USG RFI for "metrics" on the 'terror war' >> >> >> >> While I'm all for knowing how to measure one's effectiveness, I >>fear that >> such "metrics" will be nothing more than a rehash of Vietnam-era >>body count >> tallies as the "measure of success" in the 'war' to make juicy and >> positive-sounding quotes for the current iteration of the Five >>O'Clock >> Follies. >> >> This, coupled with the continuing belief that a conventional >>high- tech army >> can defeat a low-tech insurgency (something that has not happened >>in Western >> history to my knowledge) only reinforces my sense that the USG is >>not >> learning from history but rather repeating it. >> >> The fact that a contractor is being asked to develop these >>"metrics" speaks >> volumes, IMHO. You'd think this would be something they'd have >>come up with >> BEFORE launching into the 'war' on terror, right? >> >> -rick >> >> <snip> >> >> >> >> >>> The Contractor shall develop, in conjunction with the Joint >>>Staff, OSD, >>> Combatant and Unified Commands, Services and designated Agencies >>> (stakeholders) a system of metrics to accurately assess US >>>progress in the War >>> on Terrorism, identify critical issues hindering progress and >>> develop and >>> track action plans to resolve the issues identified. In this >>> effort, the >>> contractor shall work as an independent contractor not subject >>>to the >>> supervision and control of the Government. All deliverables >>>become the >>> property of the US Government. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> Source document: >> http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/files/ >>WarOnTerrorismMetrics.doc >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------- >> You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> To manage your subscription, go to >> http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip >> >> Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/ >>interesting-people/ >> >> > > > > >------------------------------------- >You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] >To manage your subscription, go to > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip > >Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- >people/ > ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
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