On Tue, 11 Feb 2003, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
> The TPM is a mandatory part of the TCPA specifications.
> There will be no TCPA without TPM.
That makes sense, TPM is just key storage.
> And there will be no TCPA-enabled system with complete user control.
> Just look at the main specification:
On Sun, Feb 09, 2003 at 02:32:13PM -0800, Mike Rosing wrote:
> TPM != TCPA. TCPA with *user* control is good.
The TPM is a mandatory part of the TCPA specifications.
There will be no TCPA without TPM.
And there will be no TCPA-enabled system with complete user control.
Just look at the main spe
On Sun, 9 Feb 2003, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:
> However note: you can't defend TCPA as being "good" vs Palladium "bad"
> (as you did by in an earlier post) by saying that TCPA only provides
> key storage.
TPM != TCPA. TCPA with *user* control is good.
> As Michel noted
On Sat, 8 Feb 2003, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
> AFAIK, IBM's "embedded security subsystem 1.0" is only a key
> storage device (Atmel AT90SP0801 chip).
> But the TPM we're talking about is part of the TCPA compliant
> "embedded security subsystem 2.0" which supports all specified
> TPM functions,
On Thu, 6 Feb 2003, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:
> I think you may have been mislead by the slant of paper.
>
> Quoting from the paper:
>
> http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf
>
> you will see:
>
> | The TCPA chip is not particularly suited to DRM. While it do
Mike Rosing wrote:
> > - secure boot
> > - sealing
> > - remote attestation
>
> It does *not* do these parts.
I think you may have been mislead by the slant of paper.
Quoting from the paper:
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf
you will see:
| The TCPA chip is not particularly su
On Tue, 4 Feb 2003, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> The main features of TCPA are:
>
> - key storage
The IBM TPM does this part.
> - secure boot
> - sealing
> - remote attestation
It does *not* do these parts. That's why IBM wants the TPM != TCPA
to be loud and clear. That's why the RIAA can't expec
Mike Rosing wrote:
> Thanks Eugen, It looks like the IBM TPM chip is only a key
> store read/write device. It has no code space for the kind of
> security discussed in the TCPA. The user still controls the machine
> and can still monitor who reads/writes the chip (using a pci bus
> logger for ex
On Fri, 24 Jan 2003, David Howe wrote:
> Bearing in mind though that DRM/Paladium won't work at all if it can't
> trust its hardware - so TPM != Paladium, but TPM (or an improved TPM) is
> a prerequisite.
Certainly! But this TPM is really nothing more than a dongle
attached to the pci bus. It w
at Friday, January 24, 2003 4:53 PM, Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
was seen to say:
> Thanks Eugen, It looks like the IBM TPM chip is only a key
> store read/write device. It has no code space for the kind of
> security discussed in the TCPA. The user still controls the machine
> and can still
On Fri, 24 Jan 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> -- Forwarded message --
> Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2003 02:29:27 -0500
> From: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: ip <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [IP] Open Source TCPA driver and white papers
>
>
> -- Forwarded Message
> From: David Saffo
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2003 02:29:27 -0500
From: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: ip <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [IP] Open Source TCPA driver and white papers
-- Forwarded Message
From: David Safford <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2003 12:05:39 -0
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