Analysis: The failed helicopter attack By Thomas Houlahan From the International Desk Published 3/27/2003 10:36 AM View printer-friendly version
WASHINGTON, March 27 (UPI) -- On Monday, Apache attack helicopters launched an assault on Baghdad's outer ring of defenses. The attack failed and sparked a certain amount of puzzlement regarding why it was conducted the way it was.
Baghdad's outer defenses have been dubbed the "Red Zone" by Centcom planners, after the last 20 yards before the end zone of a football field. The Red Zone contains between eight and 10 Iraqi divisions. Based around Amarah, between the southeastern city of Basra and Baghdad is the Regular Army's IV Corps. The IV Corps consists of two weak light infantry divisions and the 10th Armored Division, one of the best in the Iraqi army.
Behind the IV Corps is the Republican Guard's Baghdad Motorized Division, a not particularly good truck-mounted unit. Closer to Baghdad are four Republican Guard Divisions and at least two commando brigades. To the north of the city are the Hammurabi and al-Nida Armored divisions and the 26th Commando Brigade. To the south are the Medina Armored and Nebuchadnezzar Motorized divisions. Guarding the southern edge of the city is the 3rd Commando Brigade. Two more solid regular army tank divisions may also be in the ring.
The 6th Armored Division is unaccounted for. It was supposed to be stationed in the south. However, there have been reports that the division was moved north to defend Baghdad. Aside from a few contacts with rear-guard units, there has been no serious contact between coalition forces and the 6th Armored. There have also been reports that the 3rd Armored Division, usually stationed in the north, across from the Kurdish Autonomous Region, has been moved to Ramadi, on the western approaches to Baghdad.
The attack on the Red Zone began with heavy aerial bombardment of the Baghdad, al-Nida, Medina and 10th Armored divisions. Then, some 30 army tactical missile system surface-to-surface missiles were fired at Republican Guard command posts and artillery units. ATACMS rockets carry 950 half-pound bomblets, which are scattered over an area a quarter-mile in diameter. Finally, the Medina Division was attacked by 32 Apaches from the 11th Aviation Regiment, a Germany-based unit. Coalition planners hoped that the attack would deal the Republican Guard a decisive defeat and help persuade other Republican Guard units not to resist. It did neither.
Many pilots said they were forced to abandon most of their targets and return to base with Hellfire anti-tank missiles still on their launch racks because of an intense curtain of anti-aircraft fire. That fire included heat-seeking missiles. Nearly all of the returning gun ships (31 of 32) sustained damage. One had an engine blown off by a rocket-propelled anti-armor grenade. The damage to the Iraqis was minimal. Reportedly, four or five Iraqi tanks and several light vehicles were destroyed or crippled. To add insult to injury, one Apache was forced by mechanical trouble to land in a farmer's field without firing any of its missiles. Both crewmen were captured.
The use of Apaches in this fashion is baffling. Apaches are not designed to be employed against viable, dug-in heavy units with fully operational anti-aircraft defenses. In the first Gulf War, attack helicopters were a potent complement to the coalition's heavy armor, accounting for about 14 percent of all Iraqi armored vehicles destroyed in combat. However, in that war, they were used mostly to attack units that were reeling from an artillery strike or units that were moving. Attacks on dug-in heavy units were usually aided by heavy artillery barrages, usually involving anti-armor bomblets.
These barrages knocked the defenders off balance and wiped away most of their anti-aircraft weapons, making life much easier for the Apaches. Apaches were also effective when attacking units on the road. When a unit is traveling, its air defenses are usually down and it can be a sitting duck for an Apache strike. On the other hand, when employed against viable units with potent anti-aircraft defenses, an Apache, flying low and slow, can find itself a sitting duck.
Centcom is no doubt reassessing some of its assumptions with regard to the use of the Apache. Hopefully, this bad experience will not prompt planners to be overly cautious in its future employment. The Apache is a powerful weapon. It remains quite possibly the best weapon in our inventory for turning an enemy's defeat into a rout. Monday's setback simply underscored the fact that all combat systems have strengths and weaknesses. It also served as a warning about the dangers of employing any system beyond what it was designed to do. Finally, and probably most important, it was a reminder that military planners must do their utmost to ensure that their reach does not exceed their grasp.
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(Thomas Houlahan is the director of the Military Assessment Program of the William R. Nelson Institute at James Madison University. A veteran of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps staff, he is the author of "Gulf War: The Complete History," Schrenker Military Publishing, 1999).
source:http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030326-104422-8200r
