oops, finger slip that should be
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61 security proportional to risk
aka 2001h.html not 2002h.html
[EMAIL PROTECTED] on 8/10/2002 11:25 pm wrote:
small discussion of security proportional to risk:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#61 security propor
small discussion of security proportional to risk:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#61 security proportional to risk
slightly related
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#5 E-commerce security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#54 Does "Strong Security" Mean
Anything?
also slight
AARG!Anonymous writes:
> I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal
> for achieving the following technical goal:
>
> Allow computers separated on the internet to cooperate and share data
> and computations such that no one can get access to the data outside
>
- Original Message -
From: "Eugen Leitl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Can anyone shed some light on this?
Because of the sophistication of modern processors there are too many
variables too be optimized easily, and doing so can be extremely costly.
Because of this diversity, many compilers use s
On Sat, 10 Aug 2002, R. Hirschfeld wrote:
> A trivial observation: this cannot be true across hardware platforms.
Untrue, just use a VM. Open Boot Forth would do nicely.
> TCPA claims to be "platform and OS agnostic", but Palladium does not.
Have fun in that there tarpit.
> Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2002 19:30:09 -0700
> From: AARG!Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Re the debate over whether compilers reliably produce identical object
> (executable) files:
>
> The measurement and hashing in TCPA/Palladium will probably not be done
> on the file itself, but on the executable
Re the debate over whether compilers reliably produce identical object
(executable) files:
The measurement and hashing in TCPA/Palladium will probably not be done
on the file itself, but on the executable content that is loaded into
memory. For Palladium it is just the part of the program called
"James A. Donald" wrote:
>
> --
> On Wed, 7 Aug 2002, Matt Crawford wrote:
> > > Unless the application author can predict the exact output of
> > > the compilers, he can't issue a signature on the object code.
> > > The
>
> On 9 Aug 2002 at 10:48, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> > Same version of comp
I'm not surprised that most people couldn't produce a matching PGP
executbales - most compilers (irrespective of compiler optimisation
options etc) include a timestamp in the executable.
Regards,
Sam Simpson
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.samsimpson.com/
Mob: +44 (0) 7866 726060
Home Offi
On Fri, 9 Aug 2002, David Howe wrote:
> It doesn't though - that is the point. I am not sure if it is simply
> that there are timestamps in the final executable, but Visual C (to give
> a common example, as that is what the windows PGP builds compile with)
> will not give an identical binary, eve
> Same version of compiler on same source using same build produces
> identical binaries.
It doesn't though - that is the point. I am not sure if it is simply
that there are timestamps in the final executable, but Visual C (to give
a common example, as that is what the windows PGP builds compile w
On Wed, 7 Aug 2002, Matt Crawford wrote:
> Unless the application author can predict the exact output of the
> compilers, he can't issue a signature on the object code. The
Same version of compiler on same source using same build produces
identical binaries.
> compilers then have to be inside
Anonymous wrote:
> Matt Crawford replied:
> > Unless the application author can predict the exact output of the
> > compilers, he can't issue a signature on the object code. The
> > compilers then have to be inside the trusted base, checking a
> > signature on the source code and reflecting it
Anon wrote:
> You could even have each participant compile the program himself,
> but still each app can recognize the others on the network and
> cooperate with them.
Matt Crawford replied:
> Unless the application author can predict the exact output of the
> compilers, he can't issue a signatur
> Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2002 21:55:40 +0200
> From: "R. Hirschfeld" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> > Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2002 12:50:29 -0700
> > From: AARG!Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> > I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal
> > for achieving the following technical goal:
>
> I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal
> for achieving the following technical goal:
> Allow computers separated on the internet to cooperate and share data
> and computations such that no one can get access to the data outside
> the limitations and rules impo
> Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2002 12:50:29 -0700
> From: AARG!Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal
> for achieving the following technical goal:
>
> Allow computers separated on the internet to cooperate and share data
> and computations
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