-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On
Behalf Of Eric Cordian
Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2001 6:05 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Moral Crypto isn't wuss-ninnie.
Aimee writes:
I realize Tim's position, and I respect his right
Anonymity allows people to evade laws. Governments don't like that.
Read the archives.
-Declan
On Tue, Sep 04, 2001 at 05:47:33PM -0700, A. Melon wrote:
What makes you think remailers are such a threat that the federal
government would attempt to license them? How exactly will they help
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Anonymity allows people to evade laws. Governments don't like that.
Read the archives.
It would be nice to see at least one example of something nasty that
could be done with an anonymous remailer in the next few years where
you couldn't get the same effect at the
Aimee writes:
I realize Tim's position, and I respect his right to express his political
opinions and ideas, even though I don't agree with them, and think he is a
self-identifying flamboyant jackass. I understand that many of you have the
same opinions, and likewise
Guess not all Lying
On Tuesday, September 4, 2001, at 05:26 PM, Aimee Farr wrote:
A potential balance between national security and science may lie in an
agreement to include in the peer review process (prior to the start of
research and prior to the publication) the question of potential harm
to the
At 09:30 AM 9/5/01 +0200, Nomen Nescio wrote:
On Sun, 2 Sep 2001, David Honig wrote:
At 12:34 PM 9/2/01 -0700, Tim May wrote:
Then design such a system.
You did a few lines earlier:
(Or if one is a remailer oneself.)
Or, simply have a remailer client that randomly generates dummy traffic,
Compare this with the original claim: in a properly designed
anonymity
system the users will be, well, anonymous, and it should be impossible
to tell any more about them than that they pay their bills on time.
These examples illustrate the falsehood of this claim. Much more
is learned
Killing remailers will be a by-product of regulating the net.
Regulating the net to this extent would be a huge undertaking. Trying to
regulate dead-tree publishers to this level would be a large undertaking, a
task not likely to be accomplished without a lot of debate in Congress --
and there
Your analogy is wrong. You should compare the number of meatspace
publishers and their political clout to the number of anonymous
remailer operators and their political clout.
-Declan
On Wed, Sep 05, 2001 at 01:21:03PM -0500, Fisher Mark wrote:
Killing remailers will be a by-product of
On Tue, 4 Sep 2001, Eric Murray wrote:
Another way to kill remailers would be through anti-spam legislation
that forbids forging email headers. We're already seeing some of
this.
Declan brought this up in a sky-is-falling article about remailers and
anti-spam legislation. I do not believe
On Tue, 4 Sep 2001, Aimee Farr wrote:
It is not wuss-ninnie to spark debate, or to examine characterizations and
motives. Many say, technology is neutral. It's not. Technology is
CONTEXTUAL.
Ah, another convert. See, The message is the medium isn't right after
all...it takes message,
On Wed, 5 Sep 2001, Fisher Mark wrote:
But how do you know they've entered the anonymous system? If you are
already being pursued by your antagonist, *and* you have been personally
identified, then you have trouble you can't solve by any current
software-based security technology.
Bingo!
On Sun, 2 Sep 2001, David Honig wrote:
At 12:34 PM 9/2/01 -0700, Tim May wrote:
Someone else:
The fact that you may be
identifiable at the point of entry to an anonymity system is
a weakness, not a desired feature, and if it can be avoided, it
should be.
Then design such a system.
Tim May writes:
It would be nice to see at least one example of something nasty that
could be done with an anonymous remailer in the next few years where
you couldn't get the same effect at the corner phone booth or dropping a
letter in a public mailbox.
Are you dense, or just ignorant?
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On Mon, 3 Sep 2001, Steve Schear wrote:
At 08:55 PM 9/3/2001 -0400, V. Alex Brennen wrote:
I've tried to contact limewire about working with them on some
distributed resources coding concepts. I found them unreceptive.
They suck.
Maybe
At 10:21 AM 9/4/01 -0700, Eric Murray wrote:
I don't think that there is enough remailer traffic or remailers
to require the feds to go throught the work of getting a law passed
and setting up a licensing program. It's be nice if there was!
Certainly not now, which is why I said I was talking
On Tuesday, September 4, 2001, at 10:21 AM, Eric Murray wrote:
On Tue, Sep 04, 2001 at 12:38:52PM -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
On Sun, Sep 02, 2001 at 12:34:31PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
The other remailers can theoretically band together as some kind of
guild and reject packets from rogue
At 12:38 PM 9/4/2001 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
In the next five years or so, I would not be suprised to see a call
for federal licensing of remailers. Some of the more mainstream
remailer operators might even go along with it, eventually, calling
for a voluntary-mandatory code of conduct and
At 12:38 PM 9/4/2001 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
In the next five years or so, I would not be suprised to see a call
for federal licensing of remailers. Some of the more mainstream
remailer operators might even go along with it, eventually, calling
for a voluntary-mandatory code of conduct and
At 12:28 PM 9/4/01 -0700, Tim May wrote:
Either one runs seriously afoul of the First Amendment.
Remailers are publishers. Publishers cannot be licensed, nor can they
simply be closed down.
Let me play Devil's Advocate a bit and try to challenge this conventional
cypherpunk wisdom.
Unlike
A potential balance between national security and science may lie in an
agreement to include in the peer review process (prior to the start of
research and prior to the publication) the question of potential harm to the
nation I believe it is necessary before significant harm does occur
which
What's with this moral crypto jive? Nomen sounds like Faustine
in drag. Who cares if Osama benefits from crypto - he isn't any
greater danger to our much tattered peace and freedom than
Dubbya. Probably a lot less.
At 12:34 PM 9/2/2001 -0700, Tim May wrote:
On Sunday, September 2, 2001, at 12:26 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I stand by my earlier statement. The fact that you may be
identifiable at the point of entry to an anonymity system is
a weakness, not a desired feature, and if it can be avoided,
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On Mon, 3 Sep 2001, Steve Schear wrote:
At 12:34 PM 9/2/2001 -0700, Tim May wrote:
Anyone a remailer, anyone a mint is one strong approach.
I know this suggestion has been made before, probably by myself, but it
seems the remailer programmers
At 08:55 PM 9/3/2001 -0400, V. Alex Brennen wrote:
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On Mon, 3 Sep 2001, Steve Schear wrote:
At 12:34 PM 9/2/2001 -0700, Tim May wrote:
Anyone a remailer, anyone a mint is one strong approach.
I know this suggestion has been made before,
On 2 Sep 2001, at 3:40, Nomen Nescio wrote:
The fact that a given person is using the remailer network is not a
secret. At least one remailer finds out every time he sends a message.
The point is, the entry from the non-anonymous to the anonymous world
is a vulnerability.
Sort of. The
On Sunday, September 2, 2001, at 12:26 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If the remailer operators decided they wanted to deny baddies
use of their services, they would not only have to unanimously
agree as to who the baddies are, they would also have to deny
their services in all cases where the
At 12:34 PM 9/2/01 -0700, Tim May wrote:
Someone else:
The fact that you may be
identifiable at the point of entry to an anonymity system is
a weakness, not a desired feature, and if it can be avoided, it
should be.
Then design such a system.
You did a few lines earlier:
(Or if one is
principles is nothing to be ashamed of.
We all have them, and we should be proud of that.
From your words, I doubt you support the same goals I support.
In any case, please stop invoking my name in support of your moral
crypto points.
--Tim May
Tim May wrote:
On Saturday, September 1, 2001, at 01:30 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
Yes and no. The users aren't all that anonymous, or they wouldn't need
anonymous technologies, would they? The remailer network sees where
this message originates. If you use Zero Knowledge software, their
On Sun, 2 Sep 2001, Nomen Nescio wrote:
Again, the entry from non-anonymous into anonymous networks is visible.
Which is where distributed systems like Plan 9 come into play. By being
completely distributed and (at least in theory) encrypted at the network
layer the 'vulnerability' becomes
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