In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
> If you're worried about Joe Burglar grabbing your laptop (for the value of the
> laptop) and your business data being leaked as collateral damage, or someone
> stumbling across your warez or pr0n, then it's probably adequate
So build an individual key for each cluster by some function that uses the
original key. Same idea as using IV's, but with a few twists. IMHO,
using CBC's for disk encryption sucks because you'll need to read previous
sectors, and that's slower...
I say cluster, not sector, as it's usually faste
On Thu, Jul 31, 2003 at 12:04:13PM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
> [...]
> > >with a good distribution of IVs
> >
> > Where would you store them? The feature of this is that it's fully
> > transparent, so you can't store IVs anywhere.
>
> I'm not really up on crypto file systems, but I beleive at le
> Mike Rosing[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>
> Forwarded by request.
>
> -- Forwarded message --
>
> sector address as the IV. IVs don't need to be
> random, secret, or
> unpredictable - they just need to be unrepeated.
> (I'm
> assuming
> sector-at-a-
> time encryption).
>
>
Forwarded by request.
-- Forwarded message --
sector address as the IV. IVs don't need to be
random, secret, or
unpredictable - they just need to be unrepeated.
(I'm
assuming
sector-at-a-
time encryption).
If the IV is not a secret how are we going to prevent
block replay a
"Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>"Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>>with a good distribution of IVs
>>
>>Where would you store them? The feature of this is that it's fully
>>transparent, so you can't store IVs anywhere.
>
>I'm not really up
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> >It's a move in the right direction, but I wish they had followed through
> and
> >done the right things:
> >
> >* [AES | 3DES]/CBC
>
> I get the feeling they use ECB for speed (heavy pipelining) rather than
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> >No info on chaining modes, if any, nor of IV handling.
>
> DES/ECB, originally with a 40-bit key, more recently with 56-bit and 3DES.
> Keys generated by the manufacturer onto a USB dongle. No eas
"Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>No info on chaining modes, if any, nor of IV handling.
DES/ECB, originally with a 40-bit key, more recently with 56-bit and 3DES.
Keys generated by the manufacturer onto a USB dongle. No easy way to make
backups of the dongle. It's a messy tradeoff: If
On Wed, Jul 30, 2003 at 04:20:37PM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
> ABIT has come out with a new motherboard, the
> "IC7-MAX3" featuring something called 'Secure
> IDE', which seems to involve HW crypto in the
> onboard IDE controller:
>
> >From the ma
On Wed, Jul 30, 2003 at 04:20:37PM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
> ABIT has come out with a new motherboard, the
> "IC7-MAX3" featuring something called 'Secure
> IDE', which seems to involve HW crypto in the
> onboard IDE controller:
>
> >From the ma
> Trei, Peter
>
> ABIT has come out with a new motherboard, the
> "IC7-MAX3" featuring something called 'Secure
> IDE', which seems to involve HW crypto in the
> onboard IDE controller:
>
> From the marketing fluff at
> http://www.abit.com.tw/abi
ABIT has come out with a new motherboard, the
"IC7-MAX3" featuring something called 'Secure
IDE', which seems to involve HW crypto in the
onboard IDE controller:
>From the marketing fluff at
http://www.abit.com.tw/abitweb/webjsp/english/news1.jsp?pDOCNO=en_0307251
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