--- begin forwarded text
Status: U
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 17:02:52 -0400
To: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Peter Wayner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: Fwd: Book Review: Peter Wayner's
"Translucent Databases"
>
I think Bob made some great points
I think Bob made some great points about my book, but it's clear that
this debate
is revolving around a few sentences in Bob's review. Perhaps he miscategorizes
Brin, perhaps he doesn't. I haven't read _Transparent Society_ in some time.
Still, it's important to realize that this isn't just a ba
Pete Chown wrote quoting Ross:
> > You need a valid signature on the binary, plus a cert to
> use the TCPA
> > PKI. That will cost you money (if not at first, then eventually).
>
> I think it would be a breach of the GPL to stop people
> redistributing the signature: "You must cause any work t
Anonymous wrote:
> Furthermore, inherent to the TCPA concept is that the chip can in
> effect be turned off. No one proposes to forbid you from booting a
> non-compliant OS or including non-compliant drivers.
Good point. At least I hope they don't. :-)
> There is not even social opprobrium; l
On Mon, 24 Jun 2002, Anonymous wrote:
> The amazing thing about this discussion is that there are two pieces
> of conventional wisdom which people in the cypherpunk/EFF/"freedom"
> communities adhere to, and they are completely contradictory.
Makes for lively conversation doesn't it :-)
> Cyphe
Ross Anderson writes:
> During my investigations into TCPA, I learned that HP has started a
> development program to produce a TCPA-compliant version of GNU/linux.
> I couldn't figure out how they planned to make money out of this. On
> Thursday, at the Open Source Software Economics conference,
For those who question the use of the TCPA spec as part of a DRM
system, I refer you to the following article where the author
interviewed Jim Ward of IBM (one of the authors of the TCPA spec) --
http://www.101com.com/solutions/security/article.asp?ArticleID=3266
In particular, note the fo
...More fun and games from the "We're Monkeys, we'll *go*!!!" school of
disputation...
:-).
Cheers,
RAH
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Status: U
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 07:58:45 +0530
To: Robert Hettinga <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Udhay Shankar N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Fwd: Re: Fwd: Book Revie
The amazing thing about this discussion is that there are two pieces
of conventional wisdom which people in the cypherpunk/EFF/"freedom"
communities adhere to, and they are completely contradictory.
The first is that protection of copyright is ultimately impossible.
See the analysis in Schneier a
On Monday, June 24, 2002, at 01:47 AM, Lucky Green wrote:
>
> [Tim: do you recall when we had the discussion about the upcoming
> "encrypted op code chips" at a Cypherpunks meeting in a Stanford lecture
> hall? Was that 1995 or 1996? It cannot have been later; I know that I
> was still working fo
Ross Anderson wrote:
> ... that means making sure the PC is the hub of the
> future home network; and if entertainment's the killer app, and DRM is
> the key technology for entertainment, then the PC must do DRM.
Recently there have been a number of articles pointing out how much
money Microsoft
On Mon, Jun 24, 2002 at 08:15:29AM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> Status: U
> Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2002 12:53:42 -0700
> From: Paul Harrison <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: Ross's TCPA paper
> To: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> The
> important question is not whether trusted platforms ar
It seems clear at least if DRM is an application than DRM applications would benefit
from the "increased trust" and architecturally that such "trust" would be needed to
enforce/ensure some/all of the requirements of the Hollings bill.
hawk
Lucky Green wrote:
> other
> technical solution th
> It's an interesting claim, but there is only one small problem.
> Neither Ross Anderson nor Lucky Green offers any evidence that the TCPA
> (http://www.trustedcomputing.org) is being designed for the support of
> digital rights management (DRM) applications.
Microsoft admits it:
http://www.msn
I, for one, can vouch for the fact that TCPA could absolutely
be applied to a DRM application. In a previous life I actually
designed a DRM system (the company has since gone under). In
our research and development in '96-98, we decided that you need
at least some trusted hardware at the client
On Israel's decision to deport families of martyrs:
A Palestinian legislator, Salah Tamari, called deporting families "an
illegal,
unlawful and inhuman measure. Why should somebody be accountable for
someone elses actions?
http://www.news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=685972002
Someone need
I tried sending this last week, but it did not seem to go through:
Two points:
1. According to Poulson, the DOJ proposal never
discussed just what would be logged. Poulson
compared it to the European Big Brother legislation,
which required storage to Web browsing
histories and email header d
> Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2002 12:53:42 -0700
> From: Paul Harrison <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: Ross's TCPA paper
> I would think a TCP _with_ ownership of the TPM would be every paranoid
> cypherpunk's wet dream. A box which would tell you if it had been tampered
> with either in hardware or so
--- begin forwarded text
Status: U
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2002 12:53:42 -0700
From: Paul Harrison <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Ross's TCPA paper
To: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
User-Agent: Microsoft-Outlook-Express-Macintosh-Edition/5.02.2022
on 6/23/02 6:50 AM, R. A. Hettinga at [EMAI
Bram wrote:
> http://www.msnbc.com/news/770511.asp?cp1=1
>
> Of course, the TCPA has nothing to do with security or
> privacy, since those are OS-level things. All it can really
> do is ensure you're running a particular OS.
>
> It's amazing the TCPA isn't raising all kinds of red flags at
>
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