Re: Wash the key, don't clear it

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, Feb 28, 2003 at 01:49:34AM -0500, Patrick Chkoreff wrote: Now see, I've known about volatile since about 1985. It's just that all these cryptography books make such a big show and hoopla about zeroing out memory. Even the GnuPG code

Yes, I really did zeroize that key (good sig this time I think)

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 (My PGP client botched the signature last time when I used the clipboard method. This time I'm using the plugin button and it should work. Stupid GUI crap.) I have devised what I believe to be a foolproof and completely portable way of setting

Cryptome e-mail compromised?

Behold, a copy of the defaced main page of cryptome.org. [*] Which appears to offer a link to cryptome.org's mail. Would Cryptome's proprietor like to comment on what mail he was keeping on his web server? Strangely no mention of the specific defacement now appears on Cryptome. [*]

Re: Ethnomathematics

-- On 25 Feb 2003 at 23:58, Sarad AV wrote: Ethnomathematics is the study of mathematics which takes into consideration the culture in which mathematics arises. Mathematics is often associated with the study of universals. When we speak of universals, however, it is important to recognize

Re: Cryptome e-mail compromised?

Which defacement? Cryptome offers nothing else. Caveat emptor. Beware stings, spoofing, double spoofing, and the honest to god truth about logs and mail and ... disinfo agents provocateur. Here are a couple of messages from the spoofed or spoofing hacker(s):

Fwd: [dgc.chat] Yes, I really did zeroize that key

On Friday, February 28, 2003, at 12:50 AM, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: You are going trough a lot of trouble. What is your threat model? Nothing special, just taking the typical step of zeroing out memory. I just wanted to find a way to do it without using the va_list technique. On

Yes, I really did zeroize that key

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 I have devised what I believe to be a foolproof and completely portable way of setting an array of bytes to all zeroes, a common security operation in cryptography programs. void clear_bytes(char magic, char p[], int n) { int i; p[0] = magic;

Wash the key, don't clear it

On Friday, February 28, 2003, at 01:03 AM, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: On Friday, Feb 28, 2003, at 00:50 US/Eastern, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: You are going trough a lot of trouble. What is your threat model? Incidentally, the correct and portable (modulo compiler bugs) approach at the

Re: Yes, I really did zeroize that key (but I didn't check my code!)

For starters your signature is bad, at least here. On Thu, 27 Feb 2003 23:18:35 -0500, Patrick Chkoreff [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have devised what I believe to be a foolproof and completely portable way of setting an array of bytes to all zeroes, a common security operation in cryptography

Re: Ethnomathematics

John Bethencourt [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Wed, Feb 26, 2003 at 10:02:05PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: Well, I made a start a few years ago with Network Security: A Feminist Perspective (done when people ask me to do security talks for them without bothering to specify which aspect of security

Re: From Bush's radio address

On Fri, 28 Feb 2003, Declan McCullagh wrote: on Saturday... It will be difficult to help freedom take hold in a country that has known three decades of dictatorship, secret police, internal divisions, and war. I *think* he's talking about Iraq. Yeah, kinda too bad he's forgotten about

From Bush's radio address

on Saturday... It will be difficult to help freedom take hold in a country that has known three decades of dictatorship, secret police, internal divisions, and war. I *think* he's talking about Iraq. -Declan

Washing sensitive data

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Friday, February 28, 2003, at 01:03 AM, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: Incidentally, the correct and portable (modulo compiler bugs) approach at the language level is to mark the array volatile. This means that stores to the array cannot be

Re: [dgc.chat] Yes, I really did zeroize that key

I still think my method of having the cat walk all over some numbers and writing down which numbers she walks on is good. [EMAIL PROTECTED] I have devised what I believe to be a foolproof and completely portable way of setting an array of bytes to all zeroes, a common security operation in

interesting (fwd)

This was slashdotted - sorry for the spam if you've already seen this, but it's damned interesting reading - especially contrasted to current US media reports on various topics including war on terror and economics. -- Forwarded message --

RE: Trivial OPT generation method?

hi, You probably know this if you use it, but /dev/random is the most random one, as it always uses system entropy, rather than falling back on an algorithm to generate more bits than are available in the pool. Its always better to choose an algorithm because it has *known*