On Tue, Mar 16, 2004 at 03:29:42PM +0800, Sandy Harris wrote:
So, the apparent solution for me seems to be the approach that the SPAM
blacklists used - publish information in a subspace of the forward DNS
space instead of using the authoritative in-addr.arpa area.
Worth discussing at
a couple nitpicks on otherwise interesting points...
On Wed, Mar 17, 2004 at 09:02:17AM -0500, sunder wrote:
Look at how many folks use PGP - those who really know it and want it, or
those who know enough about it and have some easily automated
implementation that plugs in to their mail
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 01:29:53 -0500 (EST)
From: Thad E. Starner [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [wearables] Wearable Computers and Body Privacy take 2
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Thanks to everyone for their comments so far.
Here is a second version
Despite the long-lived argument that public review of crypto assures
its reliability, no national infosec agency -- in any country worldwide --
follows that practice for the most secure systems. NSA's support for
AES notwithstanding, the agency does not disclose its military and
high level
Eugen Leitl wrote:
No, anything requiring publishing DNS records won't fly. OE is
*opportunistic*. It doesn't care about what the true identity of the opposite
party is. Any shmuck on dynamic IP should be able to use it instantly, with
no observable performance degradation, using a simple patch.
On Wed, Mar 17, 2004 at 03:09:54PM +, petard wrote:
There's a well-supported extension for that: http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
Actually, plans are in the works to make S/MIME an extension as well, so
the two will soon be on equal footing.
PGP/GPG has failed to protect the bulf of email for
- Forwarded message from Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 21:42:51 +0100 (CET)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [p2p-hackers] CFP: Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Reply-To:
COMPUTER SECURITY
French Move To Fend Off U.S. Domination
With some help from Germany, the French are discreetly seeking an
alternative to U.S. domination of the field of computer authentication
systems and security (Public Key Infrastructure: [...] [ 617 words
5,5USD ]
Hi,
Sandy Harris wrote:
Tarapia Tapioco wrote:
A possible implementation looks like this:
...
* Linux/KAME's IKE daemon racoon is patched to attempt retrieval of an
RSA key from said DNS repository and generate appropriate security
policies.
Cleaner solution, but more work probably.
Why
