Re: cop-proof disk drives

2004-04-24 Thread Bill Stewart
That's really overkill. Computers these days have enough horsepower to run file system encryption in the CPU. (If you remember 5-10 years ago, computers in those days had enough horsepower to run disk compression in the CPU, and CPU speed has increased a lot faster than disk throughput since the

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-24 Thread A.Melon
Major Variola writes... > If you physically destroy the keys or the data, there is little to gain by > torturing you or your family. That is superior to gambling that your > deeper duress levels are convincing to the man with the electrodes. Are there any publicly available documents that detail

Duress, Watermarking, a simple design

2004-04-24 Thread Major Variola (ret)
Specificiation For A Duress File System. Disguised as a Watermark Annotation Management System Maj. Variola (ret), the OsamaSoft Corporation --- Background: To deter torture, physically *destr

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-24 Thread Morlock Elloi
> underground railroad would have worked better, but your still black. Obviously you don't know about whitening properties of moder ciphers! Seriously, today the distingushing marks among classes, tribes and castes are far more informational than physical. So today crypto *can* make you white, or

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-24 Thread Thomas Shaddack
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, A.Melon wrote: > Are there any publicly available documents that detail interrogation > protocols and what brainwave patterns and bloodflow look like during truth > telling and lying? Preferably something that gets into how to consciously > alter brainwave patterns and blood

Re: cop-proof disk drives

2004-04-24 Thread Thomas Shaddack
On Sat, 24 Apr 2004, Bill Stewart wrote: > That's really overkill. Computers these days have enough > horsepower to run file system encryption in the CPU. That's true, but it's possible to get access to the key in memory. Once the machine is compromised, the keys are leaked. It's true that whe

Blind signatures with DSA/ECDSA?

2004-04-24 Thread An Metet
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Here is the blind DSA signature based on MacKenzie and Reiter, http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~reiter/papers/2001/CRYPTO.pdf, in graphical form. Recall that a DSA public key is p, q, g, y; private key x; signature on hash h is: Choose k < q r = g^k mod p mod