On Thu, 2005-10-27 at 20:18 -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
> This is off-topic. Let's not degenerate into random Microsoft bashing.
> Keep the focus on anonymity. That's what the cypherpunks list is
> about.
Sorry, but I have to disagree. I highly doubt that Microsoft is
interested in helping users of th
At 8:41 PM -0700 10/27/05, cyphrpunk wrote:
>Where else are you going to talk about
>this shit?
Talk about it here, of course.
Just don't expect anyone to listen to you when you play list-mommie.
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
>From: Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: Oct 27, 2005 3:22 AM
>To: "Shawn K. Quinn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used
..
>It's never about merit, and not e
> The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
> the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
> about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about
> anything else.
Fine, I want it to be about crypto and anonymity. You can
At 12:23 PM -0700 10/27/05, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>Why don't you send her comma-delimited text, Excel can import it?
But, but...
You can't put Visual *BASIC* in comma delimited text...
;-)
Cheers,
RAH
Yet another virus vector. Bah! :-)
--
-
R. A. Hettinga
The Internet Bea
At 8:18 PM -0700 10/27/05, cyphrpunk wrote:
>Keep the focus on anonymity. That's what the cypherpunks list is
>about.
Please.
The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
about the crazy bastards w
On Thu, 2005-10-27 at 23:28 -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> RAH
> Who thinks anything Microsoft makes these days is, by definition, a
> security risk.
Indeed, the amount of trust I'm willing to place in a piece of software
is quite related to how much of its source code is available for review.
Surp
On 10/26/05, Shawn K. Quinn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
> > Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
> > thus are subject to what economists call "network externalities". The
> > best example I can think of is Microsoft
On Thu, Oct 27, 2005 at 11:28:42PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
> the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
> about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about
> anything e
At 08:41 PM 10/26/05 -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
>On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
>> Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
>> thus are subject to what economists call "network externalities".
The
>> best example I can think of is Microsoft Office fi
On Wed, Oct 26, 2005 at 08:41:48PM -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
> 1) You have told your HR person what a bad idea it is to introduce a
> dependency on a proprietary file format, right?
Telling is useless. Are you in a sufficient position of power to make
them stop using it? I doubt it, because th
On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
> Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
> thus are subject to what economists call "network externalities". The
> best example I can think of is Microsoft Office file formats. I don't
> buy MS Office because it's the
Travis H. wrote:
> Part of the problem is using a packet-switched network; if we had
> circuit-based, then thwarting traffic analysis is easy; you just fill
> the link with random garbage when not transmitting packets. I
> considered doing this with SLIP back before broadband (back when my
> frien
Hello,
At 25/10/05 07:18, cyphrpunk wrote:
> http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
>
> I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
> they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
> rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (
On 2005-10-26T08:21:08+0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote:
> cyphrpunk wrote:
> > The main threat to
> > this illegal but widely practiced activity is legal action by
> > copyright holders against individual traders. The only effective
> > protection against these threats is the barrier that could be prov
On Wed, 26 Oct 2005, JЖrn Schmidt wrote:
> --- "Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> [snip]
> > Another issue involves the ease of use when switching between a
> > [slower] anonymous service and a fast non-anonymous service. I
> > have a tool called metaprox on my website (see URL in sig) th
--- "Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
> Another issue involves the ease of use when switching between a
> [slower] anonymous service and a fast non-anonymous service. I have
> a
> tool called metaprox on my website (see URL in sig) that allows you
> to
> choose what proxies you use on
Part of the problem is using a packet-switched network; if we had
circuit-based, then thwarting traffic analysis is easy; you just fill
the link with random garbage when not transmitting packets. I
considered doing this with SLIP back before broadband (back when my
friend was my ISP). There are t
cyphrpunk wrote:
The main threat to
this illegal but widely practiced activity is legal action by
copyright holders against individual traders. The only effective
protection against these threats is the barrier that could be provided
by anonymity. An effective, anonymous file sharing network woul
> http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
>
> I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
> they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
> rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (cheaper)
> without. If anonymity mechanisms a
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