> Consider setting up a secure video call with somebody,
> and each of you reading the hash of your DH parameter to the other.
> It's really hard for a MITM to fake that - but if you don't know
> what the other person looks or sounds like, do you know it's really them,
> or did you just have an un
hi,
Thanx Mark, I was also wondering on the line of hash
functions too,me 2 dont see how it works securely.
Nor does the interlock protocol look secure to me.
Regards Data.
--- Marcel Popescu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: "gfgs pedo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> > One solution suggested agai
From: "gfgs pedo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> One solution suggested against the man in the middle
> attack is using the interlock protocol
This is the one I vaguely recalled, thank you.
> All mallory would have to do is send the half of the
> (n th) packet when he receives the half of (n+1)th
> pack
hi,
If there is no previous shared secret,then ur
communication on an insecure network is susecptable to
the man in the middle attack.
One solution suggested against the man in the middle
attack is using the interlock protocol
InterLock Protocol
Is used to foil a man in the middle attack,
On Thu, 27 Jun 2002, Marcel Popescu wrote:
> Is there a defense against MITM for Diffie-Hellman? Is there another
> protocol with equivalent properties, with such a defense? (Secure
> communications between two parties, with no shared secret and no out-of-band
> abilities, on an insecure network.
Is there a defense against MITM for Diffie-Hellman? Is there another
protocol with equivalent properties, with such a defense? (Secure
communications between two parties, with no shared secret and no out-of-band
abilities, on an insecure network.)
Thanks,
Mark
