David Jablon wrote:
[...] Where is the privacy problem with
Chaum receipts when Ed and others still have the freedom to refuse
theirs or throw them away?
At 11:43 AM 4/16/04 -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
The privacy, coercion, intimidation, vote selling and election integrity
problems begin with
David Jablon wrote:
... *absolute* voter privacy
seems like an unobtainable goal, and it should not be used to trump
other important goals, like accountability.
But it IS assured today by paper ballots. Nothing less should be
accepted in electronic systems, otherwise new, easy and silent
Yeoh Yiu wrote:
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only
vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends.
You get totals per nation, per state, per county, per riding,
per precinct, per polling stion
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
David Jablon wrote:
The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only
vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends.
What I see in serious
voting system research efforts are attempts to build systems that
Ed Gerck[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
John Kelsey wrote:
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to
'verify'
that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for
voter
coercion.
I think
David Jablon wrote:
I think Ed's criticism is off-target. Where is the privacy problem with
Chaum receipts when Ed and others still have the freedom to refuse
theirs or throw them away?
The privacy, coercion, intimidation, vote selling and election integrity
problems begin with giving
I think Ed's criticism is off-target. Where is the privacy problem with
Chaum receipts when Ed and others still have the freedom to refuse
theirs or throw them away?
It seems a legitimate priority for a voting system to be designed to
assure voters that the system is working. What I see in
| Currently, voter privacy is absolute in the US and does not depend
| even on the will of the courts. For example, there is no way for a
| judge to assure that a voter under oath is telling the truth about how
| they voted, or not. This effectively protects the secrecy of the ballot
| and
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
..
1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify'
that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter
coercion.
I think the VoteHere scheme and David Chaum's scheme both claim to solve
this problem.
One area we are not addressing in voting security is absentee ballots. The
use of absentee ballots is rising in US elections, and is even being
advocated as a way for individuals to get a printed ballot in jurisdictions
which use electronic-only voting machines. Political parties are
encouraging
John Kelsey wrote:
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify'
that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter
coercion.
I think the VoteHere scheme and David Chaum's scheme
Perry I agree with you on all *except* that you are prejudiced
against folks who are not mobile, have immobile dependants, are busy
or agoraphobes.
In-person voting doesn't resist graveyard voting much better than
lining up the meat.
One could say that in-person voting rewards those too lazy or
| privacy wrote:
| [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
|
| It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
| and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
| error and incompetence is overwhelming.
privacy wrote:
[good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic
At 11:16 PM 4/8/04 +0200, privacy.at Anonymous Remailer wrote:
In the second place, it fails for elections with more than two parties
running. The casual reference above to representatives on each
side betrays this error. Poorly funded third parties cannot provide
representatives as easily as
Perry Metzger writes, on his cryptography list:
By the way, I should mention that an important part of such a system
is the principle that representatives from the candidates on each side
get to oversee the entire process, assuring that the ballot boxes
start empty and stay untampered with
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