RE: attack on rfc3211 mode (Re: disk encryption modes)

2002-05-27 Thread Lucky Green
Peter wrote: Yup. Actually the no-stored-IV encryption was never designed to be a non- malleable cipher mode, the design goal was to allow encryption-with-IV without having to explicitly store an IV. For PWRI it has the additional nice feature of avoiding collisions when you use a

Re: attack on rfc3211 mode (Re: disk encryption modes)

2002-05-10 Thread Peter Gutmann
Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I can see that, but the security of CBC MAC relies on the secrecy of the ciphertexts leading up to the last block. In the case of the mode you describe in RFC3211, the ciphertexts are not revealed directly but they are protected under a mode which has the

Re: attack on rfc3211 mode (Re: disk encryption modes)

2002-05-10 Thread Adam Shostack
On Sat, May 11, 2002 at 04:01:11AM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: | General rant: It's amazing that there doesn't seem to be any published research | on such a fundamental crypto mechanism, with the result that everyone has to | invent their own way of doing it, usually badly. We don't even

attack on rfc3211 mode (Re: disk encryption modes)

2002-04-29 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, Apr 29, 2002 at 11:58:46AM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: | [RFC3211 mode] are you sure it's not vulnerable to splicing attacks (swapping ciphertext blocks around to get a partial plaintext change which recovers after a block or two)? CBC