Package: dpkg Version: 1.13.11.0.1 Severity: wishlist Hello,
I consider a good security practice to have /tmp and /var mounted with the most restrictive set of permissions. Having nodev and nosuid is a good first step, but having noexec set disrupt dpkg. Possible workarounds: 1) have dpkg store/copy its executable scripts elsewhere. 2) avoid relying on the auto-exec features of the scripts. F.i, if the first line is #!/usr/bin/perl, do exec /usr/bin/perl $scriptname instead of exec $scriptname and, at the same time, sanitize the call: define a list of allowable external helper programs, and refuse to launch unknown one. 3) design a wrapper that test if /tmp of /var are noexec, remount them with exec, perform the dpkg task, and restore the original state. This way, the "door" is only open during dpkg operations Best regards Pascal Dupuis -- System Information: Debian Release: testing/unstable APT prefers testing APT policy: (500, 'testing') Architecture: i386 (i686) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/bash Kernel: Linux 2.6.14 Locale: LANG=fr_BE.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=fr_BE.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8) Versions of packages dpkg depends on: ii coreutils [textutils] 5.2.1-2.1 The GNU core utilities ii libc6 2.3.5-6 GNU C Library: Shared libraries an ii textutils 5.2.1-2.1 The GNU text file processing utili dpkg recommends no packages. -- no debconf information Disclaimer: http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
