hello guys,
On Tue, 12 Sep 2006, Max Vozeler wrote:
On Tue, 12 Sep 2006 16:33:07 +0200, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
snipp
A configuration directory like the mkinitramfs.d maks described
would still be very useful for setting up encrypted root on
loop-AES from inside d-i (partman-crypto)
On Tue, 12 Sep 2006, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 03:11:39PM +0200, maximilian attems wrote:
I've removed the patch tag, as the proposed patch is nacked,
Except as outlined in [EMAIL PROTECTED],
what's wrong with the patch proposed in
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ?
it adds an
On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 04:06:20PM +0200, maximilian attems wrote:
On Tue, 12 Sep 2006, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 03:11:39PM +0200, maximilian attems wrote:
I've removed the patch tag, as the proposed patch is nacked,
Except as outlined in [EMAIL PROTECTED],
what's
Hi all,
On Tue, 12 Sep 2006 16:33:07 +0200, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
what you want is a conf dir for build specific package specific
settings.
Actually, if we look at the details, I'm not sure the loopaes-utils
package should unconditionally set the umask of initramfs-tools, as
a
thanks for your quick response.
On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 04:33:07PM +0200, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
Aren't /usr/share/initramfs-tools/conf.d/ and/or
/etc/initramfs-tools/conf.d/ already such specific config dir?
no they got source inside the initramfs on boot time,
Ah yeah, right.
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 03:11:39PM +0200, maximilian attems wrote:
I've removed the patch tag, as the proposed patch is nacked,
Except as outlined in [EMAIL PROTECTED],
what's wrong with the patch proposed in
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ?
so we need for your loop-aes pleasure a specific config dir for
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 01:26:50PM +0200, Max Vozeler wrote:
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 09:26:04AM +0200, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
On Sat, Aug 12, 2006 at 10:43:16AM +0200, maximilian attems wrote:
also loop-aes is quite a specific use case, so i'm not in big
favour of setting the umask in
On Sat, Aug 12, 2006 at 10:43:16AM +0200, maximilian attems wrote:
On Sun, 06 Aug 2006, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
The generated initramfs is world-readable (as well as the temporary
files); this leaks cryptographic keys (in password-protected form) to
all users on the system when the root fs
Hi all,
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 09:26:04AM +0200, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
On Sat, Aug 12, 2006 at 10:43:16AM +0200, maximilian attems wrote:
also loop-aes is quite a specific use case,
so i'm not in big favour of setting the umask in general
to the proposed value as in general there is
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 01:34:28AM +0200, Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
I did not file this bugreport. I agree with the worried bugreporter,
but am not in the mood for fighting, so if you cannot use my attempts at
helping you to a deeper understanding of *why* we are worried, then so
be it.
the
On Sat, 12 Aug 2006, Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
On Sat, 12 Aug 2006 10:43:16 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
yaird installs initrd.img with 600 without giving any further
reasons - see #336454
no reply from maintainer since bug is filed.
Acknowledged - that bug lack response from me.
On Sun, 13 Aug 2006 11:26:02 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
On Sat, 12 Aug 2006, Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
On Sat, 12 Aug 2006 10:43:16 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
yaird installs initrd.img with 600 without giving any further
reasons - see #336454
no reply from maintainer since
On Sun, Aug 13, 2006 at 12:13:13PM +0200, Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
On Sun, 13 Aug 2006 11:26:02 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
snipp
please specify the info:
i'm not 100% familiar with yaird code, so i'd be happy to know which
only root readable part might get exposed?
I don't know which
On Sun, 13 Aug 2006 16:34:57 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
On Sun, Aug 13, 2006 at 12:13:13PM +0200, Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
On Sun, 13 Aug 2006 11:26:02 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
snipp
please specify the info:
i'm not 100% familiar with yaird code, so i'd be happy to know
On Sun, 06 Aug 2006, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
The generated initramfs is world-readable (as well as the temporary
files); this leaks cryptographic keys (in password-protected form) to
all users on the system when the root fs is encrypted (because these
keys then get copied to the initramfs,
On Sat, 12 Aug 2006 10:43:16 +0200 maximilian attems wrote:
On Sun, 06 Aug 2006, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
The generated initramfs is world-readable (as well as the temporary
files); this leaks cryptographic keys (in password-protected form)
to all users on the system when the root fs is
Package: initramfs-tools
Version: 0.73b
Tags: patch
The generated initramfs is world-readable (as well as the temporary
files); this leaks cryptographic keys (in password-protected form) to
all users on the system when the root fs is encrypted (because these
keys then get copied to the initramfs,
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