Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-13 Thread Nico Golde
Hi Helmut, * Helmut Grohne <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2008-04-13 00:36]: > > From the source code: [...] > > 309 void set_user_id(void) > > 310 { > > 311 seteuid(user_id); > > 312 } > > > So why do you think it does not drop setuid root, the code does? > > You are right in

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Mohammed Sameer
On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 11:08:46PM +0200, Nico Golde wrote: > Hi Mohammed, > * Mohammed Sameer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2008-04-12 22:14]: > > On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 07:51:22PM +0200, Julien Cristau wrote: > > > On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 19:15:45 +0200, wrote: > [...] > > > So

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Helmut Grohne
> So why do you think it does not drop setuid root, the code does? $ cat debian/patches/05_setuid.diff Index: acon-1.0.5/acon.c Commented a statement that returns the user id to non-root. That made some control keys to not work. ===

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Helmut Grohne
> From the source code: > 35 int main(int argc,char **argv) > 36 { > 37 int i,tty,useunicode=0; > 38 char *fontf=0,*translationf=0,*keymapf=0; > 39 > 40 get_ids(); > 41 set_user_id(); > ... > 301 int user_id; > 302 i

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Nico Golde
Hi Mohammed, * Mohammed Sameer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2008-04-12 22:14]: > On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 07:51:22PM +0200, Julien Cristau wrote: > > On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 19:15:45 +0200, wrote: [...] > > So you're building a package with a setuid root binary, comment out the >

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Mohammed Sameer
On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 07:51:22PM +0200, Julien Cristau wrote: > On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 19:15:45 +0200, أحمد المحمودي wrote: > > > Hello, > > > > Actually patch 05_setuid.dpatch that was introduced in 1.0.5-2 > > comments the line: > > > > 311 seteuid(user_id); > > > > which is

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Julien Cristau
On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 19:15:45 +0200, أحمد المحمودي wrote: > Hello, > > Actually patch 05_setuid.dpatch that was introduced in 1.0.5-2 > comments the line: > > 311 seteuid(user_id); > > which is the line to drop setuid root. > The reason was to fix a bug that made some contro

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread أحمد المحمودي
Hello, Actually patch 05_setuid.dpatch that was introduced in 1.0.5-2 comments the line: 311 seteuid(user_id); which is the line to drop setuid root. The reason was to fix a bug that made some control keys not to work when 'acon' was run without sudo. I will drop this patc

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Nico Golde
Hi Helmut, * Helmut Grohne <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2008-04-12 17:47]: > The package has a setuid binary acon. The binary never drops setuid. [...] From the source code: 35 int main(int argc,char **argv) 36 { 37 int i,tty,useunicode=0; 38 char *fontf=0,*translationf

Bug#475733: acon: local root exploit

2008-04-12 Thread Helmut Grohne
Package: acon Version: 1.0.5-5 Severity: critical Tags: security Justification: root security hole The package has a setuid binary acon. The binary never drops setuid. The source code contains the following lines: (acon.c) char tmp[300]; ... if((env=getenv("HOME"))) sprintf(tmp,"%s/.acon.