Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-06 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > The test incorrectly assumes that thread stacks are executable. I suspect > > we both agree that it's desirable to have thread stacks non-executable as > > well. > > while i agree with you on this one, it is in stark contrast to what you > said ear

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-06 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > there's nothing wrong about an executable stack though. It's been part of > > Linux ever since. > > the brk() managed heap has also been executable. yet you break apps that > assume so (the ominous XFree86 server would also use the brk() managed >

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-06 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [...] incidentally, if i were to make use of PT_GNU_STACK in PaX, i > could claim the same - now what was your point of fighting this silly > issue? yes, this was precisely my point to discuss this issue. Executability of the stack is not some divine

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-06 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > actually, unmodified XFree86 works just fine. It will have an executable > > stack but it will work out of box - so no app was broken. > > false! my unmodified X server (gentoo) dies with the following core > when trying to run it under [1]: you n

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-06 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [...] also, you did break userland yourself as well, otherwise how would > you explain the patches RedHat made to the XFree86 server? actually, unmodified XFree86 works just fine. It will have an executable stack but it will work out of box - so no a

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-05 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > non-executable pages on anything else but i386 is a triviality, as the > > hardware and the kernel supports it. There's virtually nothing that PaX or > > exec-shield has to add to enable them - they are there. You are right that the other architect

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-05 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Wed, 5 Nov 2003, Peter Busser wrote: > It is in fact a simulation of a multithreaded application. [...] The test incorrectly assumes that thread stacks are executable. I suspect we both agree that it's desirable to have thread stacks non-executable as well. > I objected to adding tests that

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-05 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > glibc creates executable thread stacks by default. [...] > > > > to the contrary, glibc does this: > > [snip] > > $ rpm -q glibc > > glibc-2.3.2-101 > > that's what RedHat's glibc does. [...] yes. The changes are in mainline glibc, everyone

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-05 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > i downloaded the new 0.9.5 paxtest package and amongst other changes it > > has the following oneliner change: [...] > > + do_mprotect((unsigned long)argv & ~4095U, 4096, > > PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC); >first of all, it's multi

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-04 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Tue, 4 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > second, paxtest had some bugs which Exec-Shield exposed and made > Exec-Shield appear better than it is. i've fixed them here and > expect to release 0.9.5 today or so. the results now look like: i downloaded the new 0.9.5 paxtest package and a

Re: Exec-Shield vs. PaX

2003-11-04 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Tue, 4 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > since a few points have been made regarding $subject, let me clear > up a few of them: > > 1. 'It seems that exec-shield does 99% of what PaX does' this is not the case and i'm not claiming it. If you feel attacked, please dont - i'll stipulate that

Re: Grsec/PaX and Exec-shield

2003-11-04 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Tue, 4 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [...] Exec-shield "can" stop, but "will" stop is a completely different > matter. I'll let the bugfixed paxtest tell this story, however. i am 100% sure that by taking the range-property of exec-shield into account you can construct 'bugfixed' mappin

Re: Grsec/PaX and Exec-shield

2003-11-04 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Tue, 4 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [...] the main point of my argument: exec-shield=2 means enabling > exec-shield on all binaries but the ones it is disabled for. This would > be a secure-by-default design, and yet it's being recommended for > "testing purposes" only? [...] yes. It

Re: Grsec/PaX and Exec-shield

2003-11-04 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Tue, 4 Nov 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [...] Are you so certain that Exec-shield stops execution in shared > library bss/data? [...] no, it doesnt, this is the main (and pretty much only) substantial difference between exec-shield and PaX. Exec-shield will stop execution in ET_EXEC binary

Re: Grsec/PaX and Exec-shield

2003-11-04 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Tue, 4 Nov 2003, Peter Busser wrote: > > the reply below is mostly a re-send of a mail i sent to you privately > > but you repeat this argument again without any apparent answer to my > > counter-arguments. > > I already suggested you to reread the PaX documentation, there are the > answers

Re: Grsec/PaX and Exec-shield

2003-11-04 Thread Ingo Molnar
On Tue, 4 Nov 2003, Peter Busser wrote: > - Running paxtest shows the differences between PaX and exec-shield. > Everyone is invited to run paxtest to see for yourself. the reply below mostly a re-sent of a mail i sent to you privately - but you repeat this argument again without any appar